BOOKS.
MEMOIRS OF MY OWN TIME.*
M. Gurzerr's fourth volume, unlike his third, is almost exclusively historical, a fact which brings the one defect of the Memoirs into a painful prominence. M. Guizot, cold and doctrinaire as a politician, as a writer cold and given to abstract observation, is too reticent ; so careful of his facts and his words, so anxious to let out nothing incon- sistent with the strictest official honour, so anxious to forget the small intrigues which crossed or thwarted his own policy, that his writing leaves the impression of unfaithfulness, of concealing facts which, unless history rejects all analysis of the causes of external events, ought to be made known. This defect is of little import when M. Guizot is describing his efforts to establish a sound educational system. Readers are too much charmed with the profound reflec- tions upon education, to care whether this be history or only philo- sophy written by an historian. Besides, on such a point M. Guizot is less reticent—official etiquette demands no concealment of mere arguments, and intrigue busies itself with matters more directly profit- able than instruction. But the relative value of reflections and facts is changed when a statesman promises to reveal the true history of affairs like that of the intervention in Spain, or the share of France in the contest between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. Then excessive reticence, however honourable to the politician, is fatal to the his- torian, and suggests the thought which the student of these Memoirs has so often to repeat, "M. Guizot has written too soon." It is im- possible, while so many actors in these scenes are yet living, and while M. Guizot must avoid even the appearance of censuring the banished House he served so well, for the whole truth to be told, and the feeling that it is not revealed is always present to the reader's mind. The action of France in favour of Mehemet Ali, for example, is thus accounted for : "Arguments, in some points substantial, in others specious, were not wanting to justify this double policy of France. The importance of Egypt in the Mediter- ranean has been set forward, with the assistance France might derive from that quarter in case of a contest either with England or Russia; and, above an, the necessity, in the precarious state of the East, that Egypt should neither remain in impotent hands, nor pass into those of enemies. I shall balance the value of these reasons when I treat of the great debates in which they were introduced. They were opinions formed after the blow was struck, rather than determining causes before the event. To speak truly, the policy of France on this question derived its source from our brilliant expedition to Egypt in 1798; from the renown of our generals, soldiers, and scholars; from the reminiscences and impressions of their achievements and labours ; from impulses of imagination, and not from calculations of safety or political balance. A lively interest attaches itself to the theatre of that national and singular glory. Egypt conquered by a French army and described by a French institute, had become a popular fantasy in France; we associated ourselves with its destinies ; and its new master, equally glorious and remarkable, who governed with so much reputation while courting our favour, became in our estimation a natural ally, whom we supported from inclination and enthusiasm rather than from reflection and motives of interest."
That statement reads frankly enough, and is doubtless, as far as it goes, strictly and historically accurate. It would do excellently for the tribune, particularly if the orator were anxious to conceal his devotion to a icing's will by calling it the popular voice. It explains perfectly the permanent tendency of the French people, usually so indifferent to questions arising beyond Europe, to feel an interest in Egypt ; but it does not explain in any satisfactory degree why a French Ministry should have supported. the Pasha who, as they knew well, intended to seize the throne of their own ally. The real reason that a French nominee in Egypt, and still more on the throne of Turkey, would have made the influence of France irresistible in the East, is kept studiously out of sight. So with the affairs of Spain. It is acknowledged that the leading idea of the French Government with reference to the succession, pre-
vious to the death of Ferdinand III., was to favour Don Carlos as the candidate whose claims least endangered the interests of the Bourbons. Queen Isabella, if enthroned, must marrry, and might marry a man "hostile to France," i.e. to the reigning family. But the accession of Queen Isabella once complete, M. Guizot describes events as if the sole object of France were the progress and advan- tage of Spain, an object a little too transcendental to obtain credence as explaining the action of a great military power. M. Thiers wanted armed intervention, and the king an unarmed intervention ; but both, if we believe M. Guizot, were actuated solely by regard to the great interests of Spain. The fact that M. Tillers regarded the influence of France as an object superior to any conceivable gain to Spain, and that the king had a strong family interest in that country, a sense of which was never absent from his mind, is entirely passed over. The influence of the king in the matter is admitted; but of his motives we have no more than we might gather from the ifoniteur. His arguments, indeed, against intervention are admirably rendered, and as interesting now as they were in 1836: "Let Let us assist the Spaniards externally,' he said to me ; 'but let us not embark in their vessel. If we ever do so, we must take the helm, and God knows what will then happen to usl Napoleon failed to conquer Spain, and Louis XVIII. to win the people back from their disorders. I know them- they are not to be subdued or governed by foreigners. They call for us to-day ; we shall scarcely arrive amongst them when they will abhor and impede us by every means in their power. Do you remember Rayneval's despatch, in which, while preaching intervention to us, he pointed out the inevitable accompaniments. It would be necessary, Ile said, that the French army, to consolidate its work, should occupy for more or less time the country it had pacified, without which the flame would indubitably burst forth anew. And have you not told me that the Duke de Fries informed you himself, within the last few days, that the intervention of France in Spain would avail nothing, if not followed by an occupation of four or five years at least? Trust me, my dear minister, let us not employ our army in
* Memoirs to Illustrate the History of My Om Time. By F. Guizot. Vol. IV. (Richard Bentley.) this interminable work, or open this gaff for our finances; let us not set this cannon-ball on foot in Europe. If the Spaniards are to be saved, it must be their own work ; they alone can do it. If we encumber ourselves with the burden, they will place it exclusively on ours shoulders, and then render it impossible to
te Larne.' There spoke a man whose supreme advantage it was to have under- stood Europe between 1789 and 1815, as well as after that great ter- minal stage, and the king as usual, defeated the cabinet. But this, though extremely. interesting, will scarcely disabuse France of the belief that the king had a personal policy, not quite so absolutely dictated by anxiety for the welfare of France. M. Guizot admits, Indeed, that the king too frequently gave an impression, for which he thus unsatisfactorily accounts :
"No prince, I would even say voluntarily, no man has more frequently con- veyed the semblance of faults he possessed not, and of errors be never committed. Be had been a participator in so many unforeseen disasters, had lived in the midst of so many rains, and had himself suffered so many privations, that he ever retained an extreme mistrust of the future, and a lively apprehension of the fatal chances which might still reach him and his family." . . . . .
"On another occasion I happened to be alone with the King. He spoke to me of his domestic position, of the future of his family, of the chances that still weighed upon them ; and he grew warm while entering into the detail of his expenses, his debts, and the absurdities in which people indulged as to his pro- perty. He took me suddenly by both hands, and said with extreme emotion, 'I tell you my dear minister, that my children will want bread.' When under the empire of this feeling, he anxiously sought, for himself and for those belonging to him, some guarantees for the future, and at the same time expressed his solici- tudes and complaints with a freedom and intemperance of language which some- times astonished his friendly auditors, supplied his enemies with suspicions in support of their credulity or inventions, and inspired the public with that mis- trustful bias against which we had to contend when, in the name of justice and sound policy, we asked for the dotations which the King seemed to solicit as a greedy and anxious plaintiff:"
All of which, thdugh intended to place the king's solicitude in the light of an excess of paternal feeling, is scarcely a reply to the fact that Louis Philippe repeatedly postponed the safety of cabinets to these personal demands. It is a fair evidence of the manner in which M. Guizot writes history, that he never once explains why he, an independent Minister, introduced a dotation bill about which he was not at ease, and which he visibly did not approve. He simply asserts that the stories as to the wealth of the late king were libels.
The historical value of this volume of these Memoirs lies in this only, that it explains the arguments by which the ablest servants of the Monarchy of July wish their transactions to be judged. The Me- moirs do not, for instance, tell us why the French Ministry sup- ported the claim of Mehemet Ali to Syria; but they do tell us, and with remarkable force, the argument by which the Ministry hoped to bring that support within the routine of international affairs. And that argument, that the best conclusion to the Eastern question would be to break Turkey into little free states, is, we think, the weakest of the hundred solutions statesmen have suggested for the permanent difficulty of Europe. Thus considered, the Memoirs form a most valuable addition to the history of the time, all the more inte- resting because written with the stately though constrained force that M. Guizot can always exert, and studded with valuable analyses of political character. Two of these are obviously careful portraits, though both from the public rather than the personal side. Here is M. Gnizot's view of Lord Palmerston as an English Minister: "Lord Palmerston has neither hatred nor ill-will towards France. He is an Englishman who serves England, and his sentiments vary with his conduct, according to what, in his eyes, the interest of his country requires. It may be said, and I incline to think, that he gives himself up too exclusively to this patriotic egotism, and that, in his zeal for the success and political honour of England, he estimates too slightly the moral sentiments and necessities of natural justice which modern civilization has developed in men's minds on the subject of international relations. Patriotic egotism is legitimate, provided it does not too much resemble the rude indifference of the barbarous ages. But to this disposi- tion Lord Palmerston adds another, which in the exercise of affairs embraces serious inconveniences. The special question of the moment with which he is occupied engages him to this extreme point, that it sets aside every other con- sideration and idea. Although of a singularly active spirit, fertile, sagacious, and vigorous, he has not that permanent grandeur of imagination and thought which never loses sight of things in their entire scope, and which assigns to every interest and to every separate affair the exact place and degree of importance which belongs to it in the general system of the interests and affairs of the country. He incessantly forgets the extended policy in which he is engaged, and which, in his mind, becomes concentrated in each distinct question as it successively presents itself, and is treated by him with energetic ability, but without foresight."
Of M. de lietternich, M. Guizot says that, though he com- prehended new ideas, and the new relations of States, his one object was to maintain the European system as organized at the Congress of Vienna. His defects were astounding self-conceit and want of nerve : "In 1848, during our mutual retirement in London, a con- viction of error,' said he to M. Guizot one day, with a half smile which seemed to justify his words beforehand, 'has never crossed my mind.' The author's gentle reproof—" I have been more fortunate than you, prince,' I replied; on several occasions I have satisfied myself that I was mistaken' "—elicited no displeasure and no shame. Strange to say, this overwhelmning conceit was unaccompanied by courage, and the policy of Austria constantly wavered because the all-powerful Minister of State dreaded to offend a few "members of the Imperial family, the society of Vienna, and the Emperor Nicholas." It is, we think, rather in such sketches that the general reader will find his attraction to this volume, than in any new light thrown on the history of Europe.
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