THE SETTLEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA.
SIR GARNET WOLSELEY appears to have done his remaining military work exceedingly well. He collected an irresistible force to crush Secocoeni, stormed that chief- tain's stronghold, captured him in a cave to which he had retreated, and then withdrew to arrange matters in the Transvaal. Some of the details of his victory are still obscure, as we are not informed whether the tribe has fully submitted ; but Sir Garnet Wolscley is evidently satisfied,—and his is, on such a point, the best opinion obtainable. The Boers, after such an example, will scarcely rebel, and we may, therefore, we trust, believe with some confidence that fighting in South Africa is over for the present, and that it only remains to organise the South- African Dominion. That, however' is a very difficult task, and we are not quite sure that the Government plan, though sound in the main, will succeed, unless much greater energy is displayed in pressing it upon the colonists, who at present regard it askance. That plan is a modification of Lord Car- narvon's scheme of Confederation, made more acceptable by an offer of a considerable, though still undefined, grant of money. In a despatch dated Juno 12th, but published only last week, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach tells the colonists of Cape Colony that they really must rely upon themselves against native attacks, that her Majesty's Government cannot undertake such a task, and that hereafter her Majesty's forces will only be stationed near Cape Town, for the defence of "a Naval station of great importance to the interests of the whole Empire." He therefore urges the Cape Colony without delay to take the lead among South-African Colonies, and accept the principle of confederation, and pro- mises, if they/will but agree, that her Majesty's Government " would be prepared, if the suggestion I have made were carried out in a manner which they could approve, and a pledge was given by the Cape Parliament on behalf of that colony, to be afterwards confirmed• by the Union Legislature, that no further aid should be required from this country for military purposes, to propose to Parliament that, as its contri- bution towards defensive organisation, pending the complete establishment and consolidation of the Union, this country should undertake, for a term of five years, to provide annually a sum equal to that voted by the Union Legislature for the maintenance of a frontier-defence force, the numbers of such force and the places at which it should be stationed being mutually agreed upon between the Imperial and Colonial Governments. This force would be raised by the Union Government, and not borne on the Imperial Army Estimates. The contribution thus to be made from Imperial funds would, of course, be contingent upon the thorough efficiency of the force, as shown by the annual report of an Im- perial officer, under whose inspection it would be placed." This is, at all events, a definite plan, and if it were heartily accepted by Parliament and the Colonists, it might succeed. The 'Government of the Dominion might raise a moderate sum, say 1250,000 a year, which, if doubled by the Imperial Treasury, would suffice to keep up a small, highly organised Army, con- sisting of, say, 3,000 Europeans and 5,000 natives, officered upon the Indian plan, and supported by a Militia, including, in case of need, every white man between twenty and thirty in the colonies. Such a force ought to be amply sufficient to put down any native rising, and place even outlying districts in as much safety as was ever attained by early American settlers. The farmers, no doubt, must help,—muet learn how to construct stockades and little forts, must acquire the use of arms, and must be ready when called upon by proper
authority to turn out, as American settlers did ; but a large number of them display this readiness already. The' dark races must either be disarmed or thoroughly trusted, and every vestige of unfair legislation swept away. There is no necessity, as yet, to entrust them with political power, but every obstacle to their recovering fair wages when withheld should be removed, and all legislation should encourage them to form villages, to pay taxes—if necessary, on the Feejeean principle, but better still, on the principle of a light tax on every house, or cultivated acre, or each beast—and to seek the wealth the possession of which of itself secures peaceful order. Under such a system, the dark races may, with European supervision, prosper greatly, and South Africa, as it becomes peopled, may be as contented as Florida or the districts of India settled by reclaimed wild tribes. If all impartial evidence may be trusted, there is nothing in any of these races which should make them hopeless savages, while there is a strong disposition to settle quietly, to earn wages, and in Natal, at all events, to leave the management of affairs to the officials. The natives of Natal, considering their relation to the Zulus, the sharp demands made on them for carriers, and the great excitement which British reverses must have caused, behaved during the war with Cetawayo exceedingly well.
But then will Parliament and the colonists accept the pro- posal? We are very doubtful about both questions. Parlia- ment does not like indefinite grants, or precedents of limitless application. Suppose the new Dominion should decide upon an army out of proportion to its resources, quite a possibility, if the ultra anti-native party obtained power ; or suppose Canada and the Colonies of Australasia demanded to be treated as well as the South-African Dominion. There is very little reason why they should not, for although neither Canada nor Australia are in any danger from dark races, they are all called on for military expenditure, and might all be very seriously involved in an Imperial war. It would be difficult to refuse their applications point-blank without a reason, and not easy to find a reason which would cover one set of colonies, and yet leave the others without any moral claim at all. Indeed, we do not know that we could with complete justice compel Ceylon or India to defray her whole military ex- penditure, while contributing so very large a proportion of that incurred in the South-African Dominion. Parliament may refuse to be logical, but will greatly prefer, we suspect, a definite grant, or a thirty years' guarantee for some moderate loan, to any vote depending year by year on the vote of a Parliament which it will not control. That objection, however, can be got over by a change in the form of the concession ; but suppose the (Jape Parliament refractory. Its Members are not won over yet to confederation, and still less ready to bear the expenses of self-defence. Their latent idea is that they can keep down little risings very cheaply, that any groat rising would be for the purpose of driving out the white men, and that, as against any such project, the British Government is certain to defend them. That has been their idea all along ; it has not yet been proved inaccurate, and they may cling to it all the more tenaciously, because they think an " Imperial " Government firmly fixed in Great Britain, and know that no such Government could, in common consistency, desert a British colony. It is all very well to talk of defending Simon's Bay, and Simon's Bay alone ; but the cry of a colony in serious danger, with cable communication in existence, would be far too sharp and loud for Parliament to disregard ; and if Parliament did disregard it, the people would not. The Now Zealand example proved that, and the New Zealand example, we may be perfectly sure, is thoroughly compre- hended at the Cape. Of course, one outburst of imminent danger during which this country remained passive would terminate the whole question, but then it would also terminate all connection between Great Britain and her South-African Colonies.
This is the essential crux of the question, and we confess we do not feel any hearty confidence in any easy solution of the difficulty. It may disappear, of course, in a very short time. The colonists may come to be convinced, as Canadians have been convinced, that a quasi-national existence would lfe pleasant for them ; or they may, by great discoveries of gold, get rid at once of all financial difficulties, and of all difficulties about the disparity of numbers between the races ; or they may attract to themselves the permanent loyalty of some one dark tribe brave enough to supply cheap and efficient soldiers ; or finally, they may devise some scheme—say, a modification of the one now established in her Majesty's Navy—by which they could ensure a supply of trustworthy dark sepoys at very low rates indeed. But apart from such possibilities, which are too vague or too distant for reasonable politics, will the colonists of the Cape be willing to undertake their own defence over territories small indeed, as compared with those administered by Lord Lorne, but occupied by two millions of dark men, and invaded day by day from the north by multitudes of whose character, objects, and history they and we are alike ignorant ? The prospect is dubious still, and we can see no method of improving it, except by selecting Governors-General to whom it shall be a permanent object to awaken throughout South Africa something of national feeling and pride, of that hope of growing into a nation which animates the Canadians and the settlers of New Zealand. The moment that is felt, all difficulties will vanish ; but until it is felt and displayed, we shall never feel secure that at the most awkward moment the British Govern- ment may not have laid upon it the onerous and thankless burden of a South-African war. Confederation is the first necessity towards the development of such a feeling, and Par- liament will not be wise, if it is chary either of effort or material help in sweeping away the obstacles that remain.
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