THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN.
THERE is nothing to be made of the news from Afghanistan, until we know accurately the cause and the result of the heavy firing round Cabul heard at Latabund on the 22nd and 23rd, and reported by Colonel Norman on the 24th inst. All that is certain as yet is that General Gough received an imperative summons from General Roberts, sent apparently by a horseman, to advance with supplies and ammunition for only six days ; that he obeyed it, starting with 1,400 men on the 17th inst. ; that he had some fighting up to Latabund, but that he had advanced beyond that post, where Captain Hudson had been stationed with 700 men. A telegram has indeed been received by the Daily News from Lahore, dated on Christmas Day, announcing General Gough's arrival in Cabul "without opposition," but it is difficult to see how the intelligence arrived, as Colonel Norman, at Jagdalak, had just been attacked, or how General Gough had evaded the clouds of enemies whom all correspondents speak of, and who must have watched his march. Whether he reached Shirpore, however, or whether he did not, the latest information reports continued firing for forty-eight hours, and on the result of that contest the imme- diate future must depend. Everything is to be hoped from General Roberts's energy, and he would probably break out, on receipt of a heliographic message from General Gough announcing his approach ; but there was evidently no imme- diate or decisive victory, and fighting Pathans on their own hills, when they mean fighting, is like fighting mosquitoes. Even an explosion of gunpowder, though it will clear a room of the pests, does no permanent good.
The best news from the front is the proclamation of Musa Khan, son of Yakoob Khan, as Amoer of Afghanistan. Musa Khan must be a very young lad, but his nomination is on that account all the more important. It signifies that the leaders of the insurrection, who are reported, with probable accuracy, to be the soldier Mahommed Jan, and the grandmother of the elected Prince, the wife of Yahiya Khan, chief of the Molimunds, are not fighting for their own hands, but are desirous of keeping power in the hands of the Barukhzyes, and setting up as near an approach to an organised government as is possible in'Afghanietan,—a government, too, claiming to rule the entire kingdom. They have not chosen Musa Khan for his abilities, but for his birth. This movement is distinctly in favour of British policy. If we resolve on fighting on, it is far easier to contend with a Government than with an insurrection ; while its overthrow will mark our victory far more definitely than any success over isolated factions, each of which will be despised by its rivals as unable to succeed in war. If, on the other hand, the British Government, taught at last by events, resolves to retain the scientific frontier, and leave the Afghans to settle their own affairs, the existence of a formal Government will greatly facili- tate their action. A treaty of some kind can be made with Musa Khan or his Divan, and support in money allowed him sufficient to keep him "friendly," without retaining British troops in a country where a solitary British officer is immedi- ately shot at, and a feeble body of troops immediately ex- posed to massacre. We need not say that this is the policy to which we still adhere. General Roberts, victorious or defeated, must be rescued, and the British flag once more be raised above the Bala Hisser. That task is peremptory, if only for the sake of our military reputation, gravely compromised by our unreadmess and the break-down of the Transport Depart- ment; i but that achieved, there is no reason whatever for remaining n Afghanistan. Let Musa Khan's Court reduce the country to order, if it can, assisted by an allowance of £100,000 a year from India, and the advice of the best Mussulman Envoy the Viceroy can select. He has several such men at his disposal, any one of whom would keep the Foreign Office far better informed than a European, who will hear nothing and know nothing, and will require a guard of 2,000 men merely to keep him alive. The substantial part of the Treaty of Gundamuek will then be carried out, without the perpetual risk of disorder in India because the Afghan clans are tired of seeing an Infidel Envoy lording it in Cabul. The danger of Russia occupying the place we resign is purely imagin- ary, even if, which we greatly doubt, the fear of that occurrence is honestly entertained. It will take Russia years to reach the Hindoo Koosh, and thenceforward the Afghans will fight
her as they have fought us, and with the better arms, artillery, and advice which we could supply in any quantities. They have no penchant for one set of Infidels over another set, and no desire to share the fate of the Khanates. Meanwhile, we can strengthen our own frontier with forts and railways, till, if Russia ever does come—a mere dream, but the dreams of great parties are as operative as facts—we can fight her from a fortified base in unbroken railway communica- tion with the sea, and therefore within five weeks' reach of our arsenals at home. That seems to us, of all possible positions, the most favourable to our safety through long periods of years ; while it is far the least expensive, and least calculated to use up our present slender resources in trained men. Moreover—and this is to be gravely thought of by Conservatives—the 'only alternative is a very frightful one. It is now evident that Lord Lawrence was right, and that Afghani- stan cannot be held in thorough subjugation by. less than 25,000 Europeans. Twelve thousand are employed now, and are, so to speak, lost in the magnitude of the work, while we still occupy nothing but the merest fringe of the country. The Sepoys detest the service, and our only native troops thoroughly fit for it are the Goorkhas, who are limited in number, who are Hindoos, and therefore detested by the Afghan people, and who are required for many other duties. Neither this army, nor its cost, can be drawn from India ; they must be main- tained by England, which would thus be required to supply £3,000,000 a year and an annual relief of 10,000 men, only to hold a barren and hostile dependency, which Russia, when- ever she was irritated, could always threaten. We should have a sterile Ireland to garrison, 8,000 miles off. If that is a prospect which pleases the English people, we have nothing more to say, except that the English people is very easily deceived ; but if not, then the alternative policy is to reconquer Cabul, acknowledge Musa Khan, assist him with money only to re7 build his authority, and remain fortified but quiet behind our own borders, to await the next call upon our energies. To proceed with an aimless and endless policy of conquest be- yond our own hills, is only to throw away resources in order that soldiers should have new opportunities of distinction, and the country fresh occasions for alarm.
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