THE NEXT SIX WEEKS
THE Quebec Conference,, which ended on Tuesday, had sat for one day short of a fortnight. Though by the nature of things no detailed decisions can be announced, or even indicated, there is evidence that the time was well spent. The joint statement issued after the last session by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, if it tells the world little, tells it at least this : that the whole field of war-operations was surveyed ; that all decisions necessary for forward action everywhere were duly taken; that further conferences will be needed, particularly one in which Russia will participate ; that the main military issue at Quebec was the war against Japan (with whom Russia is not at war) ; that full agreement was reached on the political issues underlying or arising out of the military operations ; and that an announcement regarding the recognition of, or " relations with," the French Committee of National Liberation will be made before the end of this week. To that official communication the less formal statements of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill to the Press added something but not much. The Prime Minister referred appositely to the turn the U-boat war had taken—he might have said a great deal on the revolution in the shipping situation resulting from the victory over the U-boat, the opening of the Mediterranean and the immense output of shipping in the United States—to the prospect of beating down our enemies " one by cue," and, generally but suggestively, to the fact that there is " something coming " soon.
So far as this goes there is no ground for criticism, and the congenital critics who are trying to magnify, or invent, differences between Britain and the United States on the one hand and Russia on the other might well turn to more productive employment. The absence of a Russian representative from the Quebec talks is fully explained first of all by M. Stalin's inability to leave Russia, and secondly by the fact that operations against Japan were the main subject of discussion; if Russia had taken part in that discus- sion the effect might have been to precipitate that very attack by Japan which, on the whole, it is convenient for her at the moment to avoid. It is reasonable, moreover, to suppose that one topic which bulked only less large at Quebec than the war against Japan was an intensification of the war in Europe, with a view to relieving the pressure with which Russia is so valiantly coping—and, of course, with a view equally to larger results still. Russia could ask no better than that. Her direct collaboration in Allied strategy in Western Europe or the Mediterranean is not called for, since there is no case for any precise synchronisation. Russia is beating the best divisions Germany can produce, and, as our correspondent " Strategicus " points out elsewhere, though Britain and America are in one way and another keeping vast German forces occupied as it is, the fact remains that if by new assaults in the west or south sixty German divisions, or anything like it, could be detached from the Russian front Russia might achieve a complete break-through in the east, and the joint offensive thus effected might compass Germany's downfall sooner than most of us had hoped.
On that vital question Quebec has shed little light. In one sense that is reassuring, for it must be supposed that the plans laid at Casablanca looked farther ahead than the capture of Sicily, and it would be highly disconcerting if military operations had to be held up till statesmen in Canada gave the word for a new move. There is in fact no reason for assuming that. It is to be hoped, on the contrary, that the word that went out from Quebec, if any did on this point, was for an acceleration of the military operations by every means possible.. While the layman should be circumspect in his criticism of the generals, it is good neither for generals nor for leaders in any sphere of life to feel that in all circumstances they will be immune from criticism. And great as the universal admira- tion for the deliberate and systematic methods of Generals Eisenhower and Alexander and Montgomery is, concern at the apparent failure to maintain the Allied momentum is visibly and intelligibly growing. Reasonable persons who had no desire to dogmatise on strategy felt surprise that Allied forces did not effect a landing somewhere in Calabria even before Sicily was completely cleared, with a view to taking the Germans escaping from Sicily in the rear. They still feel surprise that ten days after the Sicilian campaign ended the process of " softening Italy by air- attack, which had already been in progress for some days, should not yet have opened the way for further action by land forces. It is recognised that such action may be reported at any moment, and that masons which cannot be disclosed may account for the apparent delay. But that there should be some perplexity and even some uneasiness at the failure to maintain the maximum pressure on the enemy in Italy as well as everywhere else is no more than natural.
Everything tends to emphasise the transcendent importance of the next six weeks in the development of the war. By the end of six weeks we shall be well into October, and on more fronts than one campaigning by that time will be difficult. Meanwhile all Europe is tensely awaiting that intensification of the Allied attack which every factor in the situation imperatively demands. Never was there a moment when vigorous action by the Allies promised more fruitful results. In France the population has been warned to hold itself in readiness, and sabotage is steadily growing. Wherever on the north, west or south coast an Allied landing is effected a rising of well-organised forces in the enemy's rear can be counted on. In Yugoslavia and Greece guerilla bands are assum- ing the dimensions of a regular army; prepared, with complete and intimate knowledge of the terrain and liaison officers already available, to co-operate with any Allied force which may effect a landing from the Adriatic or the Aegean. Germany's satellites realise the situation to the full, and though they are still hopeful of getting something better than unconditional surrender terms they are likely, one by one, to put themselves in Allied .hands rather than go on fighting as Germany's henchmen with no hope of profit for themselves ; Finland may be the first of them. In such circum- stances, with the end of summer approaching, the case for swift and massive action by the Allies in more theatres than one is so manifest that the possibility of certain political considerations delaying it cannot be altogether ruled out. It may be that so far as such difficulties existed the statesmen at Quebec have either found a way round them or decided to override them. If so they have done useful work. For it would be a disaster if any- thing but purely military considerations should stand in the way of a concentration of assault on the fortress of Europe at every point, and at the earliest moment, possible.
If any further arguments in favour of that were needed they would be found in 'Whatever is known of the condition of Germany and Italy. So far as Italy is concerned, while it is clear that that unhappy country is being compelled for the moment to continue the war, it is equally clear that as an effective fighting force she may be almost entirely written off. That being so, the delay in action by the Allied land forces, and the continued " softening " of a country that is palpably as soft as putty already, becomes the more inexplicable. We need air-bases and certain ports in Italy badly, and it is hard to believe that there can be any insuperable difficulty about securing them. No-doubt it is necessary for plans and preparations to be complete, but plans must have been framed, and preparations made, long before the Sicilian enterprise was finished—or even begun. And while we are preparing, so is Germany. We shall have increasing resistance to meet the longer the assault on Italy is delayed. On the other hand success there would further lower the already depressed spirits of Germans both at home and in the army. That depression is not to be exaggerated; there is no break in morale, and under the drastic Nazi discipline, of whose rigour the appointment of Himmler as Minister of the -Interior is significant, there cannot be till the situation is desperate. But certain symptoms are worth noting. The bombing-offensive is rendering millions of Germans homeless, a fact which affects morale as well as industry ; there are reports of trouble with U-boat crews, who realise how increasingly perilous to themselves and how decreasingly injurious to their enemies their operations are becoming ; the fate of Hamburg is notorious throughout the Reich and the fate of Berlin soon must be ; the loss of Kharkov and other impending disasters in the east cannot be concealed or misinterpreted for long. Every new blow will leave its mark on minds on which despair of victory has fastened. The faster and the fiercer the onset the sooner the inevitable end will be achieved. That is so plain that impatience at any avoid- able slackening or delay is neither to be wondered at nor suppressed.
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