A HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.* Tns task of dealing
satisfactorily with a volume of Mr. Oman's History of the Peninsular War is one before which the reviewer may well quail. The author apologizes for the length of time—three years—which has elapsed since the appearance of volume iii, and for the length of volume iv. ; but to the ordinary man it will appear astonishing that in RO short a time so much material could have been collected, digested, and compressed into so small a space as 600 pages. We have not had the curiosity to measure the cubic con- tents of the work, but it might well be said that, unlike Dr, NT —aro% "Mr. Oman says in one page as much as another nian would say in three." The period covered is the year 1811, which opened with Massena's retreat from in front of Torres Vedras amnia the Portuguese frontier and ended with Wellington's preparations to carry his victorious army into Spain. The interest, especially for English readers, naturally centres in Wellington's operations in Portugal, where, acting upon interior linos, he was able to meet and to parry the blows first of Massimo, and later of Marmont in the north, and of Souk in the south ; but the theatre of war covered by Mr. Oman's researches is far wider than this. Simultaneous campaigns were carried on all through the year in every part of Spain. Andalusia, Mureia, A History of tho Peninsular War. Vol. IV. —Deo. 1810 to Duo. 1811, By Charles Oman, hf.A. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. [14s. not.] Estremadura, Galicia, the Asturias, and Catalonia each had a little war of - its own, and although they were but side issues they demand the most patient investigation by the historian who would trace their influence upon the Spanish situation regarded as a whole. Mr. Oman has, however, not been content even with the most painstaking research among the archives of Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon, as well as investigating masses of letters, diaries, and other records, published as well as unpublished; he has also spent much of his three years in studying the actual fields. "My survey of the main fighting grounds of 1811," he tolls us, "has been fairly complete: I spent long days at Fuentes de Ofioro and Albuera, walked all round Badajoz and the field of the Gebora„ and studied Tarragona and other Catalan sites. Barrosa alone, I regret to say, I have not been able to visit."
The result of all this labour is a book which stands alone in English military literature. It may not have quite the charm of Stonewall Jackson, for hero-worship is carefully repressed, and the strategical and tactical criticisms may lack some- thing of Henderson's peculiar insight; but the work is on a more ambitious scale, and a feeling is produced that as to the facts, at least, the last word has been said. In this it is not intended to convey the impression that Mr. Oman's deductions are in any way unsound—at least in the present volume—on the contrary, with his more careful study of the facts and his freedom from personal bias, he is able to show that many of Napier's criticisms, particularly with regard to Bereeford, are unjust. It is rather that the narrative dominates the teaching and that certain events which seem to call for especial notice are passed over very lightly so soon as the actual story has been told. We refer especially to Wellington's action in dis- patching Blake against Seville at the very moment when he himself was called upon to face superior numbers behind Badajoz. Beresford had just escaped defeat at Albuera, and Marmont and Soult, for once acting in perfect co-operation, had massed some 60,000 men on the Guadiana. To meet the impending attack "every available regular unit in Portugal had been gathered in by the 23rd (June), even Pack's and Barbaeena's small Portuguese brigades, which had remained down to the last possible moment in the Beira." Even so, excluding the garrison of Elvas, Wellington had under his command no more than 54,000; yet this was the very moment which he selected to urge Blake to go off on a wide eocentrie movement towards Seville. Put very shortly, that is the situation. To the soldier it must be of the greatest interest, for it seems to show Wellington in his true, though not in the popular, light. The ordinary view of Wellington appears to be that he was extremely cautious, that he never took risks, and that he won his campaigns either through good fortune or because he was always opposed by inferior men. The incident we have quoted—and there are many others in his career—seems to show that at times Wellington was prepared to run great risks. Surely a really cautious general would have drawn Blake close in to himself and tried to mass as many troops as possible on the Car,. But Wellington knew, or thought he knew, a better way, and "was serenely confident, when the enemy came up against his front, that lie had thrown a bomb behind them whose explosion would cause no small stir and infallibly draw back a large section of the Army of Andalusia to defend Seville. Without these troops Soult would be in no condition to attack him, even with Marmont's aid. The crisis between Elms and Badajoz, therefore, could only last for a few days." Yes, but how much depended upon those few days I If Soult and Marmont were to attack before Blake could make himself felt, if anything should go wrong in the time calculations, another retreat into Portugal followed by another weary term of waiting, with all the political complications which must certainly follow, might have been the result. But somehow or another Wellington's calculations rarely, one might almost say never, went wrong. He was a past-master of the use of detachments. He knew exactly how far he could go and went the whole way ; but he never ventured a foot beyond. On this occasion he was not put to the test, for the French marshals declined the proffered battle ; but it was really this gift of unerring calculation which earned for Wellington his reputation for extreme caution. It is interesting, and not unprofitable, to speculate upon the character which he might have earned had his forecast been wrong, and had
be been beaten in battle after sending away a portion of the available force.
How valuable this reputation was Mr. Oman shows us in the closing section of his volume. By this time, September 1911, the centre of interest had shifted from Badajoz to Ciudad Rodrigo, which was blockaded by the allies. Once more Marmont massed his forces against them, but on this occasion Wellington, as at Waterloo, was slow to concentrate. " Thus, by his own fault, Wellington was short of two divisions and a brigade from his left in the perilous afternoon hours of the 26th. And on his riiiht also he was weak, owing to the fact that he had deliberately left Craufurd upon the Vadillo, beyond the Azava, till the 250." Nevertheless the British commander showed a bold front at Fuento Guinaldo, and merely by so doing warded off the danger ; for "the syllogism,' Wellington never fights save when be has his army in hand and has found a good position; he offers to fight now ; therefore he feels himself safe against any attack,' seemed a legitimate logical process to Marmont and Montbrun." In war a true knowledge of the character of the opposing commander is of the greatest assistance to a general; a miaeoneeption of that character may prove to be disastrous, and one great difficulty is that peace conditions provide no true guide.
Unfortunately the allied arms were not always so successful as under Wellington, and an excellent example of how not to conduct war was furnished by an attempt to relieve Tarra- gona, which was besieged by Suchet. A relieving force under Campoverde was on the hills just outside the town, and about 1,100 British infantry reached the roadstead by sea. Vigorously handled, these forces were quite sufficient to raise the siege ; but Campoverde was unequal to the task, and the British commander was hampered by orders "to do every- thing that could be done for the place short of placing his detachment in any position where it was exposed to serious danger of having to capitulate, i.e., he was forbidden to land if he should think Tarragona untenable unless he judged himself able to bring off the troops by sea in the moment of disaster." With such orders—and they came from Graham— no commander could act with resolution, and it is not to be wondered at that, after staying in the roadatead for thirty-six hours, inspecting the defences and consulting with the Governor, Colonel Skerret sailed away and left the city to its fate. What that fate was it is unnecessary to say here beyond the mere fact that it was worse than that of Badajoz in the following year. Thus it is that the smallest operations reflect the character, even at a distance, of the man who is responsible for them. Even more deplorable was the action, or rather inaction, of Campoverde. With 11,000 men under his command he hesitated to attack the 8,000 under Suchet, who was already pretty fully employed by the garrison. Instead of attempting anything he contented himself with quarrelling with his subordinates and inviting the co-operation of the Britieh. Meanwhile "the great fortress which for three years bad been the basis of the Spanish resistance was taken," it was a pitiable affair, but it would be difficult to improve upon Codrington's verdict that "the Marquis (Campoverde) blamed Generals Miranda and Caro, while the latter retorted the accusation, and I am inclined to think, by giving full credit to what each says of the other, neither will suffer ignominy beyond that to which his conduct has entitled him."
Good, indeed brilliant, as all his work is, it is especially in tracing the course of these secondary operations and their influence upon the primary fields that Mr. Oman excels. It is a work which could not have been accomplished without amazing industry. Nevertheless the reader never gets fogged in a mass of detail, as might so easily be his fate, for the salient features of the war are always kept in their proper light. This is, perhaps, more than usually difficult in the operations under notice, for the year 1811 was curiously deficient in dramatic incident. There was nothing in it to appeal to the imagination like the retreat to Torres Vedras in 1810, nor like the storming of Badajoz and the Salamanca Campaign of 1812. It is, of course, true, as Mr. Oman says, that the offensive had passed to Wellington ; but, as he also says, the fact was as yet hardly realized, and a state of equipoise can only he made interesting by the most skilful historian, In one respect, and in one only, have we any fault to find, namely, in the absence of a general map upon which the relationship of the various forces can be conveniently followed, The omission is a serious one which has marred other volumes of Mr. Oman's work ; and it is the more regrettable because it could so easily be rectified.
Previous page
