LORD STANLEY AND THE COMING- WAR.
IT would seem to be almost impossible for England to adhere to the policy of non-intervention. If ever there was a Foreign Secretary who might be trusted not to intervene un- inecessarily in Continental quarrels it is Lord Stanley. If ever there was a quarrel in which intervention was inexpedient, it is the one between France and Germany about the evacuation of Luxemburg. Yet unless all Europe is deceived, Lord Stanley Ias not only intervened in that affair, but intervened in such a manner that it will be harder than ever to maintain peace. The situation, stripped of diplomatic reticences, is this. The "Emperor of the French demands the evacuation of Luxem- burg as a right—the Sing of Holland being sole proprietor of the State—and as a concession necessary to his honour, and threatens that if his demand is rejected he will enforce it by arms. The Bing of Prussia rejects the demand, first, as unfounded—he having treaty rights in the fortress ;—and .secondly, as one with which his honour will not permit him to comply. The issue being joined, the best hope of peace is that Napoleon, aware as he is of the magnitude of the risks involved in war, should be furnished with some honourable .excuse for retreat. Thereupon, Lord Stanley, according to mport, intervenes with a despatch in which England gives her opinion that France is in the right, and follows this up by joining Russia and Austria in an "identical note" to the same effect. Further, he is even said to have sanctioned the proposal of certain alternatives, such as the " neutralization " of Luxemburg, or its transfer to Belgium, or its exchange for a Belgian district to be given to France, all of which have been more or less summarily rejected. The honourable path of retreat is therefore cut off, and Napoleon, assured by all Europe that he is quite in the right, must either go forward, or admit publicly that he abandons a claim, adjudged by disinterested parties to be valid, out of fear. That is not the result our diplomacy was expected to achieve, and it is the worse because there was no necessity for intervening. The question at issue is not one of importance to us. If the Treaties of 1839 are in existence, as Prussia contends, her right to gar- rison Luxemburg is as clear as ours to garrison Malta. If they are not, as France contends and Lord Stanley appears to have argued, what, beyond acknowledging that fact, have we to do with the matter? Lord Stanley will probably plead that peace is of the highest importance to our individual inter- ests, which is true, if by peace we mean a genuine peace, and not merely an armed truce, bat how does intervention help to *aiikiin it I It might, no doubt, if we were prepared to
threaten an alliance with France unless Prussia made some concession, but we are not prepared. We are not about, and we know that we are not about, to land an army at Memel, or blockade Hamburg, or do anything whatsoever contrary to the interests of Germany. If France wins we may have to fight for Belgium to maintain our pledges, and if Germany wins we might interfere to protect Holland as a free and allied State, but until one of those two countries is threatened we most assuredly shall not fight. Count von Bismarck knows that as
well as we do, and the despatch therefore reads to him as a mere declaration that England likes peace on the Continent
better than war. So does he, only he dislikes the price he would just now have to pay for it. But there are moral forces which we have to consider ? The "moral force" of England was very strongly exerted on behalf both of Denmark and Poland, and saved neither of them one single exaction. The Prussian Government does not care one straw whether we think it in the right or not, and as for peace, it may reply, and doubtless will reply, that peace is very dear to it, and that Napoleon has only to recede to make peace certain, while we are directly advising him not to recede by declaring his pre- tensions reasonable. Why should not our moral force, if exerted only to secure peace, be applied to the plaintiff as well as the defendant ? Interference of this kind simply increases the chance of war, by irritating the stubbornness of Prussia and the sensitiveness of Napoleon to repulse. Prussia is not likely to yield the more because officious friends think she might as well yield, or France because those same friends formally declare that she has reason on her side.
The situation is as grave as it is possible for it to be before troops are actually in movement. If we may believe state- ments which, though not absolutely official, have all the appearance of truth, Napoleon has addressed a demand to Berlin, the Powers have endorsed that demand, and Berlin has declined civilly and quietly to accede. What remains for Napoleon except to prepare himself to support his demand by arms, or to retreat, acknowledging himself defeated ? He may do the latter, of course, but if he does he will take a course at variance at once with his policy, his present position, and his recent acts. His policy is to compensate France for the strict- ness of his internal re'gime by extending her influence abroad, and retreating, after a formal challenge, will not extend her influence. His present position is that of a man whose reputation for political sagacity and nerve begins to wane, and would, under one more failure, disappear. Retreat would unmistakably admit one more failure. His acts are those of a man who sees that war is at hand, and silently prepares for the battle. The first reserves, 60,000 men, have been called out "for drill" for the 1st of May. All officers, non-commissioned officers, and men on furlough have been ordered to present themselves at their posts on the same date. The fleet, it is stated, has been quietly made ready for active service. Horses for the Artillery—the last thing a govern- ment buys, they are so costly, and in peace so useless—are being purchased everywhere. Orders for shoes and socks have been widely distributed, and all the soldiers in the Army directed to present themselves to the surgeons, that men unfit for campaigning may be weeded out. The semi-official papers are instructed to say that the situation grows worse, and the. chief among them, the Constitutionnel, talks of "unjust pro- vocation" addressed to France, and rumours as to commands in the campaign begin to circulate in the Army, rumours which point to the organization of the Emperor's personal staff. He is, say the gossips, to command himself, with General Montauban, ablest of the " Mamelukes," as chief of his central staff. All these things may be done, no doubt, expen- sive as many of them are, in order to impress the Prussian Court with the idea that the Emperor is in earnest, but then they may also be done with a view to immediate war, and the latter is the more probable explanation. The Emperor knows perfectly well that to address visible menaces to a new power is to make it almost impossible for that power to give way, and no menace could be more visible than preparations such as the Belgian, German, and even French journals report. The Emperor, we fear, is preparing for war, and if he is, he will strike soon, and strike hard, lest his adversaries, whose impatience is becoming feverish, and whose commerce is paralyzed by the suspense, should gain the advantage of time. The suggestion that he must first raise a loan is a mistake. The French Treasury can get money enough for the wants of a few days without difficulty, and to ask for a loan in advance is to invite a discussion upon the propriety of the war. The cannon once heard, the Chamber will vote anything without
discussion or opposition, and with the French system of open loans the emergency will not greatly affect the price.
It is strange to observe, as the crisis draws near, or seems to draw near, how slight is the bias of English feeling to one or other side. Our interests not being directly involved, the public judgment is unclouded, and it holds itself in suspense, to be decided in the main by the course of events. Of sympathy with either side there is little or none. There is no moral question involved, and no tangible result except the loss of treasure and lives. On the moral side neither Power is much in the right or much in the wrong, neither attracts the sympathy which flows naturally to the weaker, neither offends English feeling by hectoring or apparent desire for war. On the other hand, there is no result probable, scarcely any possible, which Englishmen strongly desire, as they desired, for example, the liberation of Italy. If France wins completely, she will have the Rhine, and Germany will be broken up, and neither of those results will be acceptable to this country. If Germany wins completely she will overthrow the Bonaparte throne, and may compel Holland to enter the Confederation,--consequences which most Englishmen regard as decidedly undesirable. If France wins a little, she will gain Luxemburg, or the like, at a heavy price, a result of no imaginative grandeur ; and if Germany wins a little, she will have a trifling increase in importance, a consequence not worth the cost. Finally, a drawn game, leaving each power pretty mach as it is, could excite no feeling except a gentle contempt for the madness of nations which cannot exist without trying each other's strength in such fearful fashion. There is nothing as yet apparent in the struggle to which the British mind can fasten itself with a sense either of liking or antipathy, and public opinion, though fretted as usual by the annoyance consequent on war, awaits events in a spirit of the coolest criticism. If there is a bias at all, it is towards the Prussian side, partly from a latent fear for Belgium, partly from a liking for any power which seems at once strong and unaggressive, but chiefly from cordial appreciation for Count von Bismarck's bulldog courage. To take a menace from France unmoved, seems to the average Englishman the perfection of political nerve.
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