THE CONNECTION BETWEEN POLICY AND EXPENDITURE.
THE discussion about the National Expenditure is entering on a new stage. From an argument as to the amount of Tory and Liberal budgets, and the comparative success of the two parties in finance, it is passing into a discussion on the principles and policy of our war expenditure. General Peel, on the one side, by his attacks on Liberal thrift, and Mr. Childers and Mr. Stansfeld on the other, by their criticisms of some items of Tory expenditure, are introducing new material into the debate. This was, perhaps, unavoidable, as good finance is inseparable, not only from a sound general policy, but from sound departmental notions as to the means by which the policy is to be carried out. But it also proves, what is otherwise apparent enough, that, on the issue as first put, the verdict has not been in favour of the present Government. It is they and their defenders who have insisted on a new and larger issue, and the inference is plain that so far as the finance of the matter is concerned they are entirely out of court. They have, indeed, made no reply to the bulk of the Liberal accusations. They cannot deny that during the Liberal term of office the amount of expenditure was reduced from the point at which their predecessors left it ; that reductions were perpetually in progress ; that economy was manifested by the constant excesses of the Estimates over the actual expendi- ture; and that in consequence of this prudent management there were large surpluses to reduce the National Debt, and large remissions of taxation to benefit the community. Neither can they deny that under their own administration the case has been quite reversed. Quite apart from the Abyssinian Expedition, they have increased every estimate ; the Estimates in turn have been systematically less than the actual expendi- ture ; and last year there was a deficit, as, it is estimated, will also be the case during the current financial year. These are all admitted facts, and in a financial sense only two expedients have been tried to diminish the effect of the contrast. It has been said that at one time or other the total Liberal expen- diture was as high as the present amount, but this is suicidal in the mouths of people who promise no amend- ment, as a defence against accusers who boast that they looked with no pleasure on increased expenditure, but hastened to make reductions. It has been said, again, that the additional expenditure is caused by new demands, or by old things becoming more expensive, and Mr. Hunt some time ago produced a list of the " additions " as a triumphant refu- tation of every charge. But to this also the reply has been easy. New demands are of perpetual recurrence • the Liberal
Government was at no time exempt from them, but the way to meet them was by economy in other directions, which the. Liberals, in fact, practised, and the Tories, by their very argu- ment, confess they did not. An attempt was also made to insinuate that the services are more efficient in consequence of the new expenditure, but the proof of the new efficiency and the connection between it and the new expenditure has been. entirely wanting. So the controversy has run, and the result, we think, is decisive that, on this line, the addition of three- millions to the Estimates cannot be justified—that the Disraelite- Government has itself to blame for the bad budgets and the deficits which it would fain show must also have happened
under Mr. Gladstone's regime. Will the party be more suc- cessful on the ground finally taken up, though also hinted at from the first—the vindication of the expenditure as the- necessary result of a certain policy which can also be justified ?
Stated briefly, the Conservative view is an assumption that the present theory of our military arrangements is not to be- disturbed by reductions ; our whole force is so weak that addi- tions in any direction, whether of arms, or men, or reserves,. are to be welcomed, but no new improvements, at least none. lately made or now making, will justify a saving elsewhere. This on examination was the real theory of Mr. Hunt's list of additions," though Mr. Hunt did not openly put it forward. General Peel now declares explicitly that "so long as the pre-- sent duties are required of the Army,"—and he obviously has. no doubt of any of the requirements,—he does not think extra expenditure can be met by corresponding reductions. There- might be a small saving in administration, but nothing besides. The same spirit is manifest in his account of what he thinks,
a great fault in the Liberal management of the Army. Com- paring 1860-61 with 1865-6, he asserts that the gradual diminution of the Estimates was due to a diminished manu- facture of guns. The total expenditure decreased two millions, and so did the expenditure on guns and stores. The reason was, that as the expenditure went on, doubts arose as to the character of the patterns followed, and the money was retained till the doubts were solved. Hence, he says, the Liberal Government, during its last administration, only saved because it did not know how to spend, and it did not begin saving till it had spent altogether twelve and a half millions on stores for which, to a large extent, though he does not pare ticularize how much, there is nothing to show ; and is not this a clear instance, he asks, of wasteful expenditure, with which may be contrasted the more efficient expenditure of their successors ? Financially, of course, this argument is a bad one, because nothing could have been wiser than the Liberal
hesitation when it was seen that wrong things were being got;.
but it is equally bad as regards policy. General Peel laments, not the original amount of expenditure, but the retrenchment which is financially commendable, and he thinks it rather hard that the patterns were not found out in the time of his pre- decessors. He has no notion of a good-enough degree of effi- ciency which may answer the purpose practically, but he would:, multiply armaments with every new improvement or discovery. The same spirit is apparent in all he has written. The Contagious-- Diseases' Act, a better system of enlistment, Snider rifles—are-
all to increase efficiency, but nothing is to go. And what- General Peel says of the Army is said by others for the Navy.
The great cry is that there were no sufficient " reliefs " pro- vided when the Tories came into power, and this turns out to- be a complaint that the building of unarmoured steamers had been checked. Steam and iron armour have changed the- whole conditions of naval warfare, but the old plan of multi-- plying wooden ships for foreign stations is to continue without change. The improved efficiency produced by better pay and, other means is also to be met by no economy.
The Liberal theory of policy is something very different.
It is to take nothing for granted in the existing expenditure.. The War Ministers are not to say each year, "So long as the- present duties are required of the Army and Navy we must have so much to spend, and this and that change cause us to. ask an extra grant." They must consider with the Cabinet what duties are to be required of the Services, in what way the routine can be advantageously changed. It is not argued that this has been done to perfection under Liberal manage- ment, but the idea is not scouted as it is on the other side. It is on this principle that the effect of each change requires to be studied. There being no assump-
tion that only additions are to be considered, it be- comes necessary to inquire with each addition whether it does not displace something else. A Contagious Diseases' Act.
is to diminish disease, consequently there will be less hospital expenditure, and the active Army being more efficient its numbers will be reducible. The effective strength of our Navy is henceforth to be in ironclads, which we have peculiar facilities in building, and which compared with wooden ships require fewer men ; here is surely a possible opening for great changes in the Estimates. Steam and telegraphs may enable us to concentrate our force better, keep it more in hand, and so dispense with many foreign stations. These are specimens of the way in which a Government should reason, according to the Liberal theory, and in which it is clear enough the Tory Government have not reasoned. They charge the Liberals instead with not building ships enough, but the ships wanted are small and imarmoured, whose addition at no little expense by a Tory Board of Admiralty has added in no way to the real naval force of the country. We need not point out how fitly the question of scale of expenditure, which is so import- ant, financially, enters into the consideration of the general policy of the Services. Some services may appear less im- portant when their cost is considered in relation to every other item of expense and the total which the country can afford.
Which policy should be preferred ? Thus stated and con- trasted, there can hardly, we think, be a choice. Few will avow a preference for what is, in effect, a random and reckless expenditure, seeing that it has no teleological guide,—only a vague notion that we have so little efficiency that we must welcome every addition. A policy of prudence and watchful- ness, not hurrying into new things, measuring closely what can be afforded, aiming rather at what will serve than at an ideal perfection, is the only course to be deliberately chosen. It is an additional recommendation that the prudent policy will alone conduct to brilliant financial results, though the importance of that recommendation after the present debate will not be disguised. Excluding altogether the financial aspect of the matter, the Liberal idea is the one which promises most in regard to efficiency. Nothing is gained by vast establishments or stores which some inven- tion has superseded, or the maintenance of a routine which might not only be dispensed with, but by dispensing with which the new system would be freer to work. To secure the highest efficiency the system itself must be periodically revised, and if this is done in order to a financial advantage the benefit in efficiency follows all the same. There is a gain not only in finance, but in the very purpose which those who neglect finance profess to cherish as superior.
We have been stating the case generally, but the argument is only strengthened by applying it to the circumstances of England at the present time. Such a programme as that of Mr. Stansfeld in naval matters—the reduction of unarmoured foreign squadrons, the building of new types of ironclads, rather than the multiplication of ships of a type which may quickly become obsolete, the strengthening of the fleet, in short, in the direction where the real strain in war must come, to the neglect of ornament and show,—may not be absolutely the best, but the mere suggestion shows how much the new cir- cumstances require to be considered. The minor points where superfluities can be curtailed must be manifold when such changes are possible. The case is not different with the Army. If, as has been pointed out, the British Army is largely employed in services where it does not meet new weapons among its opponents, there must be some room for reduction with every increase of efficiency. And there is the difficult question of the colonial garrisons, which has never been fairly faced. It is not merely that we defend colonies which require to defend themselves ; the painful fact is that we have numerous contingents, which are insufficient for the supposed work of defence required of them. Is this helpless system to last Probably, too, with a more efficient Navy we should be able to dispense with a part of our home standing Army, trusting more to our Volunteers and Reserves, which ought to be better organized. Our purpose being defence, we should be content with insurance against disaster, and take advantage of our insular position to avoid the gigantic burden of having enormous levies ready for immediate campaigns. Thus there is room for a bold and vigorous policy, which will really accomplish the attainable objects in our military and naval arrangements at less expense than before ; and it is manifest that such a policy is more likely to come from a Cabinet and Ministers who revise regularly, than from a Government which assumes the necessity of no change except in the way of additions.
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