The Ghosts of Potsdam and Rapallo
By ERNST FRIEDLAENDER
DR. SCHUMACHER, leader of the Opposition in Western Germany, recently said the Western Powers ought to revoke the .Potsdam Agreement clearly and unequi- vocally. And he made the prediction that if the ' four Allies " could reach an agreement at Germany's expense they would do so without the slightest hesitation. Dr. Schumacher mentioned the Potsdam Agreement ostensibly in connection with Dr. Adenauer's negotiations vtith the Allied High Commission. The three Foreign Ministers of Britain, the United States and France had in their communiqué, issued after the Washington Confer- ence, not specifically referred to Potsdam. But they had said that the Allies were obliged to retain, in the common interest, certain " special rights " in Germany after the end of the occupa- tion regime. " Questions affecting Berlin and Germany as a whole," as well as the stationing of Allied troops in Germany, were expressly mentioned in this connection. It is a fact that the presence of the Western Allies in Berlin goes back legally to the Potsdam Agreement. The Allies believe that a full restora- tion of German sovereignty without any " Berlin clause' would jeopardise their status in Berlin. A specific revocation of the Potsdam Agreement would do this all the more from the Allied point of view. Dr. Schumacher knows all this. But his basic distrust is stronger than his regard for legal technicalities. Even a dormant Potsdam Agreement looks dangerous to Dr. Schu- macher. It might be resuscitated at any moment. It is extremely significant that at this stage of international affairs - Dr. Schumacher speaks of the " four Allies." There would unquestionably be considerable strength and soundness in the German:argument that if nothing can be gained by interpreting 1951 in terms of 1945 this must be all the more true when 1922 is brought into the picture. Rathenau's deal with the Russians in 1922 at Rapallo, whereby he restored Ger- many's diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union at a time when the Soviets were still more or less kept in quaran- tine by the. Western Powers, may have come then as a blow to the West. It proves nothing whatsoever for the .present. But ghosts are unfortunately stronger than arguments. And it is not simply Rapallo as an historical fact. Rapallo is a symbol for manifold fears and suspicions, concerning " the German danger," or at least an innate German unreliability and incalculability. So if anything comes up in German politics which has any bear- ing on territories east of the present borders of the Federal Republic, numerous suspicions are immediately raised abroad : " A second Rapallo ? " ' Will Germany play off the East against the West ? " ' Will Germany betray the West ? " This seems particularly true in connection with the present campaign for free elections to an all-German national assembly and for the restoration of a united 'Germany. Many foreign observers may interpret the initiative taken by Herr Grotewohl, Minister-President of the German puppet-government in. the Soviet Zone of Germany, as a pure piece of Soviet bluff and propaganda. They may accordingly be of the opinion that the Federal Republic ought either to have ignored or clearly rejected these overtures. Anything deviating from this course of action, anything like taking the Grotewohl initiative seriously or reacting to it with a counter-initiative, may then already be taken for a first step towards playing the Soviet game for an anti-Western move on the part of Western Germany. . And this is seemingly all the more plausible when it is remembered that Grotewohl's initiative came on the day after the Washington communiqué. What else then could it be but the Soviet counter-move to Western plans for partnership with Germany and for Germany's remilitarisation within the scope of the European and Atlantic community of defence ? To keep Germany out of this community, is not that the motive behind Grotewohl's action ? And must this not be apparent to everyone in the Federal Republic ? All this sounds very rational. But it leaves out one paramount fact—the eighteen million Germans in the Soviet Zone of Ger- many. The vast majority of these, except for the very young, have one outstanding aim-to be liberated, if not immediately from their foreign rulers, at least from their German Com- munist masters, and to be reunited with Western Germany. And this unity, based on liberty, is also the ultimate goal of West German policy,. This is fully in harmony with the ideals of the Free World. A reunited Germany is but a partial aspect of a reunited Europe. To bring the Soviet Zone back to the Federal Republic is as much European policy as to bring Poland or Czechoslovakia back to Europe. Free all-German elections would result in the utter defeat of Communism in the Soviet Zone. They must appear to the people in that Zone like a gift from heaven. So, if such elections are being offered by the Communist rulers, not a single inhabitant of Eastern Germany would understand a cold refusal on the part of the Federal Republic. It would look like betrayal. It would give ample material for a vast Communist propaganda campaign in the Soviet Zone, claiming peace, unity and liberty as Eastern ideals and denouncing war, separation and domination as Western policy. Such a campaign after a West German refusal would not be without effect in Eastern Germany. It would not even be without effect on the people in Western Germany whose longing for a united Germany is equally great and sincere.
The Federal Republic could neither ignore nor simply reject the Communist offer. These are the facts: Herr Grotewohl and the so-called Parliament in the Soviet Zone, the Volkskammer, asked the Bundestag to send West German representatives to Berlin for an all-German " consultation " with East German representatives. The " consultation " was to have two tasks : first, to organise free, all-German elections in order to form a " united, democratic and peaceful Germany " ; second, to hasten a peace-treaty with Germany. The Federal Government and the Bundestag have at no time agreed to any " consultation " with representatives of the so-called German Democratic Republic of the East Zone. They have completely ignored the point of hastening a peace-treaty. They have confined themselves to dealing with the question of free all-German elections.
The Federal Government has laid down in fourteen points the guiding principles for such free elections. These are to be amplified by a full-fledged electoral law, to be put before the Bundestag in the near future. As far as the Soviet Zone rulers are concerned, this is a case of " take it or leave it." In the fourteen points full liberty by Western standards is demanded before, during and after the elections. The elections are to take place under international protection and under international supervision. More than that: a neutral international commission under the supervision of the United Nations will be asked to make a full enquiry concerning political conditions bath in the Federal Republic and in the Soviet Zone in order. to ascertain if free elections are at all possible. The four Occupying Powers are to be asked to grant to the German people free elections for a national assembly with constituent, legislative and government- forming powers, according to these pt'hciples. They have also been asked to grant, first of all, free elections in all four sectors of Berlin. This is clearly an appeal to the Soviets to show their good faith in Berlin before anything further is undertaken. The only appeal directed to the German Soviet Zone authorities is an indirect one : to commit political suicide.
In German Communist quarters there was at first violent indignation. But the Communists were restrained from an im- mediate negative answer by their Soviet masters. The Russians await further details. The next act may show that the Russians are prepared to sacrifice their German henchmen and to grant free elections in exchange for German neutrality. In the Federal Republic it is well known that neutrality is not compatible with unity based on liberty. No official answer has so far come from- Soviet quarters. The three Western Powers, on the other hand, have notified the Federal Republic that they will bring the , German requests before the United Nations at the earliest possible opportunity, and that they sympathise with the initiative taken by the Federal Government and the Federal Parliament.
It may be impossible to banish ghosts with arguments. Is it quite impossible to banish them with facts ? This works both ways. Potsdam and Rapallo are dames of the past. The best method of burying the past is to build a better future. Nothing could be more constructive in this respect than a complete and generous agreement on free and equal partnership between the Western Powers and the Federal Republic. This is not the time for bargaining but for courageous action.' Courage is needed against the ghosts of Potsdam and Rapallo—courage and confidence.
Previous page
