THE FRANCO-ITAL1AN TREATY.
WE see no reason to regret even secretly the conclusion of a commercial Treaty between Italy and France. The prosperity of any country is a benefit to Great Britain because it increases her trade; and the suspension of the tariff war which has now raged for some years between Italy and France must tend to increase the prosperity of both. France wants the Italian wines, which she improves and sells as her own ; and Italy wants French manufac- tured goods at lower rates than she has recently been paying. Protectionist feeling in the former country will probably be offended, but Protection never enriches, and in Italy the feeling of all industrials is clear, for at the mere announcement of the signature of the Treaty, with- out details, the Italian bonds rose nearly 3 per cent. 'With the Italian masses, too, the Treaty will be most popular, not only because they are always longing for lighter taxation, but because the relaxation of " tension" must increase the demand for Italian workmen, who, if there were no resistance or jealousy, would swarm into the Southern Departments of France, and help to prevent that gradual failure of population which is sapping the strength of the Republic.
That the Treaty will help to diminish the strength of the Triple Alliance is possible, for it will soothe away many causes of friction between Italy and France ; but the diminution will not be great. Italians are not willing to abandon their ultimate protection against invasion, and in any case will act, in the event of war, with an exclusive eye to their own interests. That is the instinct of the house of Savoy, bred into it by their position for a thousand years between the hammer and the anvil, and it accords with the temperament of Italians, who, unless carried out of themselves by patriotism or passion, never lose sight of material advantage, and delight in the finesse which, as they think, makes bargaining successful. We do not think, therefore, that the present distribution of forces will be seriously modified, or that France will be greatly encouraged to force on the quarrel with Germany which, as her people believe, is to end one day in the revindication of Alsace-Lorraine.
It might go otherwise, though, if France, vexed and alarmed by the pressure of Germany and what she con- siders the unfriendliness of Great Britain, were seriously -to take up the old project which has so often fascinated her statesmen, and which was for a moment realised by Napoleon, the union of the Latin races. We English rather disregard those races as sources of effective power, and no doubt the failure of Italy in the war with Menelek and of Spain in the war with America has in a measure justified that disregard ; but it is possible to push depreciation much too far. The Latin peoples depend upon their leaders much more than the Teutonic peoples do, but they throw up men of genius at least as often, and when led by such a man they are forces to be reckoned with. A league including France, Spain, and Italy is a league of eighty-seven millions of civilised men, combining the French fire, the Spanish stubbornness, and the Italian persistency, with a magnificent geographical position on two seas, and would constitute an immense body of power such as ought to make attack nearly impossible and to dominate the Mediterranean. That France, though governed by very ordinary men, may for the third or fourth time in her history entertain such a dream we think quite possible, for when France is fretful she revolves large schemes ; but, fortunately for the peace of the world, the obstacles which have always hitherto baffled the execution of this project are many of them still in existence. The Bourbon dynasty in Spain is not overthrown yet, though it is tottering, and between that dynasty and the French Republic there can be little cordiality either of purpose or of feeling ; while if France is to master Spain, a possibility we discussed at length last week, she must devote to the task all her energies and capacities. There are, too, in Castile and in Southern Spain, which are not in daily contact with France, strong jealousies and antipathies to be overcome. These jealousies and antipathies are in Italy probably insuperable. Though both peoples are Southern, both nominally Catholic, and both emotional rather than cool, there is between Frenchmen and Italians some incurable cause of distaste, and even hatred, which acute observers have striven ineffectually fully to explain. The kind of feeling which produced the Sicilian Vespers still from time to time hurls the Marseillais upon the Italians of Marseilles, and gangs of Italians and Frenchmen employed on the same railway almost invariably attack each other with their knives. Nor is the distaste confined to the labouring population. The Italians never reconciled themselves to the rule of Napoleon, though it was far more vivifying than any which had gone before, and throughout modern history have been readier to accept German ascendency, though they detest it, than the ascendency of the French. If France is their " natural " ally, as so many French Republicans say, why have the Italians preferred the Triple to the Dual Alliance P We do not think, therefore, that a League of the South is in any degree probable, and failing that great project, see no reason why the political approach of France to Italy should be witnessed with any kind of uneasiness here. The secrecy with which the Treaty has been concluded is no reason, for that is always necessary in commercial negotiations to prevent specula- tion ; and the exultation of the French Press is no reason either, for French journalism is for the moment vexed and sore, and ready to embrace any one, black or white, who approaches it with expressions of gratitude or amity.
We might indeed welcome the Treaty, as a political event, with hearty pleasure if it be true, as M. de Blowitz asserts, that it is the first move of the French Govern- ment towards a policy of conciliating her neighbours. Warned, he intimates, by the result of the Fashoda affair, France has resolved to enter upon a less" disobliging" policy than she has recently pursued, to be more complaisant, and, in a word, more seductive' towards all with whom she comes in contact. That, no doubt, is sound policy, for France has felt her loneliness, even if the new friendliness were at first to display itself only to smaller States. It is difficult to be good-humoured yet retain wrath, and France, who is fond of realism, would soon perceive that if she were obliged to play a good-humoured part, she had better play it with the Great Power whose friendship would secure to her other things than safety. That Power by no means rejects her hand, only asks, as there is reason to ask, whether she means truly to change her policy, or is only smiling the better to bide her time. If France were in strong hands we believe M. de Blowitz's statement would be absolutely correct ; but Foreign Secre- taries dealing with France have to face a difficulty which teaches them extra caution. Her Governments change sr very fast, and each new Minister wishes so much that some of his policy should be, or at least seem to be, his own Hanotaux, for example, might have treated the Fasboda incident with less or more of "common-sense and sound judgment" than M. Delcasse. This difficulty, however, arises from the internal circumstances of France, and is perhaps less formidable than it seems, for the policy of pin-pricks has been maintained against both England and Italy with a persistency which appeared independent of any changes in the personnel of the Quai d'Orsay, and the policy of good-humour may prove to be as lasting. The British Government, therefore, can only remain on the watch, and express the while a cordial appreciation of the stroke of good luck which has befallen its Italian ally.
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