All England will read with intense interest the articles which
Captain Mahan is contributing to the Times on the late "war on the sea and its lessons," of which the first instalment appeared on Thursday. Quite admirable is the description of what Admiral Sampson's 'bottling' of the Spanish fleet at Santiago really meant. "Few realise the doubts, uncertain- ties, and difficulties of the sustained watchfulness which attends such operations as the 'bottling' of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Sampson; for 'bottling' a hostile fleet does not resemble the chance and careless shoving of a cork into a half-used bottle—it is rather like the wiring down of champagne by bonds that cannot be broken and through which nothing can ooze." The blockading of the Spanish squadron, says Captain Mahan, showed the correctness of the report made by a Committee of British Admirals to the effect that to successfully blockade the enemy's fleet your ships must be in the proportion of five to three. Sampson's proportion was seven to four— "a proportion not dissimilar." We cannot, of course, touch on anything like all Captain Mahan's lessons, but we may note his excellent general observation on the rules of war. "All rules of war, which is not an exact science, but an art, have this characteristic. They do not tell one exactly how to do right, but they give warning when a step is being contem- plated which the experience of ages asserts to be wrong. To an instructed mind they cry silently, Despite all plausible arguments, this one element involved in that which you are thinking to do shows that in it you will go wrong."
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