THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR ON RUSSIA.
IT is of no use to discuss the German Military Bill any more. That subject has been threshed out, and interest now centres itself on the vote of the Reichstag, which will not be taken for some days, as the debate will be long, and the German Government will spare no effort in negotiating with the hostile groups to secure a victory. There are, however, two passages in Count Caprivi's speech of Wednesday—a speech out of order, and. theoretically, we suppose, only a remark, though it lasted. for more than two hours—which are of European concern. One is his statement that, however extreme the danger may be, Germany cannot to avert it give up her present relations either with Alsace-Lorraine or the Empire of Austria- Hungary. This means, of course, that those schemes, one of which might conciliate France, and the other Russia, which would then deal with Austria by herself, have been fully considered and finally abandoned. That is not pleasant reading in one way, for it destroys the idea of a compromise, for which it is said the late Emperor Frederick never ceased to hope ; but the decision is probably unavoidable. The difficulty on the French side is that France is longing for victory quite as much as for her Provinces, and. would not therefore disarm, even if she re- gained her own ; and on the Russian side, that the acceptance of Russian terms would involve a dishonourable abandonment of Austria, which has made so many sacri- fices of her pride to Germany in order to avert this very danger. The Dual Empire contains enormous masses of fighting men, and many splendid officers ; but there is some root of weakness in her military organisation,—a deficiency, we conjecture, in the competence of the governing departments,—which has almost always pre- vented Austrian armies from attaining victory. Austria would be defeated, and a great defeat by Russia would either destroy the Empire altogether, or give the ascendency to the Slav population in the Empire, and Germany would then find herself surrounded on the South as well as the East by armies under Slav direction. The improbability of this compromise has been recognised for some time, but to find it mentioned by the German Chancellor and. pro- nounced impossible is of great interest, and of some, though not much, practical importance.
The second. and. much more momentous passage in the Chancellor's speech is his description of the permanent relation between Russia and Germany. It is singularly frank, and will excite among thoughtful Germans deep alarm, as showing that they have to the eastward an enemy who cannot be conciliated, and who is aware that some day or other the struggle will have to be fought out. The " cable " between Germany and Russia, hints the Chancellor, has been "lost." It is true he puts his state- ment in the polite diplomatic form "it would not be right to say that" the loss has occurred, but this is clearly what he means. The fault, in his judgment, does not rest with the Czar, who is " magnanimous " and desires peace, but with the Russian people, who, probably because there are so many Germans living in prosperity amongst them, detest the race, and whose hatred, " I fear, will grow still fiercer." The people in Russia look forward to war, and may overpower the Czar, as they have, indeed, already compelled him to make preparations of the most far-reaching character, affecting the permanent disposition of his armies. Count Caprivi's words upon this subject are so well weighed, and yet so terribly ominous and important, that we give them textually from the translation in the Times :— "The policy of Russia's military administration looks far ahead, but always keeps their goal in view. She is not yet perfectly organised, not practically ready ; but what has been done suffices to arouse our serious attention. It would not be correct to conclude from this that war is looming in the near future, but it proves clearly enough that Russia believes that the next war will be waged upon her western frontier. The movements of troops are carried on systematically, and where the railway communication is bad these movements are carefully adapted to the means of transport. New forces are gradually raised, the weaker battalions are brought into the interior, whilst the stronger are quartered on the frontier ; a systematic line of fortresses is erected, and large bodies of cavalry are stationed on the borders, evidently in the hope of inter- rupting thereby the mobilisation of our forces. We dare not shut our eyes to these facts, although there is no immediate danger. We must calculate upon the possi- bility of war." It would. be difficult for the most experienced diplomatist to frame an utterance more ominous than that, coming as it does from the first servant of the most powerful Sovereign on the Continent. Lord. Palmerston told Count Walewski that war should never be openly mentioned by statesmen until it was declared ; and though under pressure of Prince Bismarck's example diplomatists have, since Lord Palmerston's time, grown more brutally frank, Count Caprivi's words will still create a certain emotion in St. Petersburg. They would have presaged. in the last century an immediate declaration of war, and even now they imply that the speaker expects one so speedily, that a "delay even of a year" in prepara- tion would, as he subsequently observed, be a clear breach of duty. Moreover, this expectation cannot die away, for though Courts can combine, quarrel, and combine again, the hatred of race is a sentiment which it takes cen- turies to extinguish, and which occasionally, if one side or the other excites lasting fear, seems never to be extinguished. The race which feels it is always ready for war if opportunity arises, and the race which excites it seldom loses the restless suspicion which provokes it to remain armed. Such a feeling between two such races as Slays and Germans, is a menace to the tran- quillity of the Continent more permanent than the kind of angry jealousy existing between the Germans and the French.
The question is, does General von Caprivi, speaking as he was in order to carry a Military Bill, exaggerate at all ? We fear not. The existence of a strong dislike between Slav and German has been recognised for centuries. Ever since the time of Peter the Great, the Russians have imported Germans to fill offices requiring a certain kind of capacity ; and the Germans in Russia have attained high position and considerable prosperity. Even now, they and their descendants swarm in many departments of the State, in all mercantile employments, and in many of the farming districts, where their superior enterprise and habit of "dutiful" work enable them to live far more com- fortably than their rivals. The Russians, however, dislike them as much as the Jews, and dread them far more, and, of late years, have tried hard to " Russify" them by a persecution which has repeatedly involved extensive expulsions, one on a scale so large that Prince Bismarck authorised wholesale deportations in reprisal from Prussian Poland. A dislike of this kind may, however, continue for years, or even ages, without producing much effect ; but of late years, probably because consciousness is more awake, it has, as General Caprivi observes, tended to grow fiercer. The desire to expel the Germans altogether has in Russia become so strong that employes are dismissed wholesale, and the German colonies are no longer safe. The Russian soldiery distinctly resent the triumphs of the German Army. The fissure between Germans and Slays in the Polish provinces of Prussia grows visibly deeper, and the Polish Members act as a separate faction in the Reichstag. In Bohemia the German and Czech populations stand enrolled in hostile camps, and society is divided into two parts by a system of boycotting, often almost childish in its virulence,—the Czechs, for example, refusing to hear an Italian singer because she was imported by a German manager of an opera house. The Slays, both in Germany and Austria, are even suspected of a wish that Russia might win in the great war, and a Bohemian orator re- cently more than hinted that if the crisis occurred, the Slav soldiery of the Hapsburgs would not fight with a heart. The cause of the antipathy lies deep in the nature of the two races, one of which tends—for good or evil—to be child-like, and the other over-serious ; but it may broadly be stated that the Slav never loses his dread of the German, or the German his contempt for the Slav, and as the races advance these feelings become more conscious, and therefore deeper. They are greatly aggravated, as in the case of the English and Irish, by the fact that the less efficient race is decidedly the quicker of the two, and the more sympathetic, and that the more efficient is in external manner incomparably the more disagreeble. Altogether, the two races left to themselves would like to try once for all which is the stronger ; and for political purposes, race hatred can assume no more dangerous form. It is to be feared that General Caprivi is right, and that, apart from the great French quarrel which has lasted twenty-one years, and may last sixty, the German Empire will have to remain for generations, possibly for centuries, on guard towards the east. A revolution in Russia would alter the situation, and so would the rise of a South Slav Federation in the Balkan Peninsula, for a South Slav Power must seek a German alliance ; but statesmen can only reckon with facts as they stand, and the facts show that a motive-power exists in Russia beyond the reach of diplomatists, and beyond conciliation by any bribe, which may at any moment throw upon the Germans an organised race of brave white men, twice as numerous as themselves. That is a part of the situation which insular Englishmen are apt to forget, and which should be considered when we condemn the Germans for allowing their institutions to remain so penetrated with the military spirit. The science of war has advanced fast ; but no one has yet discovered a means other than armies of making a people not protected by the sea permanently safe from a military invasion. Abel may be as good as gold, but he can only " love " Cain when keeping his flocks within an island.
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