Political Commentary
Wilson's little bit of sunshine
Patrick Cosgrave
4„Ithough the generalisation to the effect that Governments lose elections rather than op r/Psitions winning is true enough, as general election time comes nearer, a government's Stic°Pe for manoeuvre and action is greatly re tioed, and its capacity to respond apPeelingly to events sharply diminished. Moreover, the generalisation ignores the ability of t‘Onited and convinced opposition to take the "?St positive advantage of any slip on the Pa St of a government. In 1970, for example, it eeoked as though Mr Wilson was gaining reormously from his prime ministerial prea°gative to name an election date, by picking theloment when he was comfortably ahead in h e °Pinion polls. But it is also the case that te and his closest advisers were looking with trePidation to the possibility of a major indusprplel dispute in the autumn, which would etlY damage their newly re-discovered jlanding and compel them to soldier on e,rPughout a winter fraught with all the miss'.'es which commonly attend that political IP, on. And despite constant campaign aphv:urances to the contrary Mr Heath and — as a used to call it himself — the best prepared We°Position team the country had ever seen s„ re able to wrest opportunity from Mr Wil.htt's disadvantage, r hese reflections are prompted by tin odd i„.,eent conjuncture of events. First, over the ‘,."'tfortnight or so an admittedly somewhat 7atery ray of sunshine fell on Mr Wilson's ,°Wearying efforts to keep the Labour Party rsited and make it effective. It began to look t, though compromise and conciliation bekeen the three effective power blocs of the ljY — parliamentary right, parliamentary
and trade unions — would produce an
omic policy statement which, if a good 1,'el more socialist than anything offered in 4°64, 1966 or 1970, could nonetheless be made p..eePtable to a general public accustomed by trr Heath to collectivism. Then, with the lekY shoals of a couple of National Execu6e meetings still to come, up popped the phlancellor to announce £500 million worth of 07-lic expenditure cuts. It was not so much tkat the,cuts were unexpected; not so much s'iaat they might be represented as unnecester?: if all that ministers have recently been tir,"ng us about the general state of the natFi'llal economy was true; not so much that eY, Could arouse in the Labour breast the tti:;lo of savage indignation that so many ac ns of this Government have excited in the sPee:t. It was, rather, that the Government eo.rried to stumble slightly, and that stumble, i,l,r_toiding with the growing coherence of ;13our's disparate elements actually acceler p.d,the process of drawing together.
ern 'las to be remembered that not very many In b act ers of the Labour Party in Parliament the ally believe that they are going to win eeh next election. But all are beginning to acMr"t„that, if they stand together, and support on.,_Ln wilson's leadership with a good deal more D_usiasm than they have done in the recent Agns1. they could be in with a fighting chance. tlit is beginning to be realised rather wideser"et Mr Wilson's leadership thoroughly de -7'es such support. ehlake the genesis, development and present on"acter of the eagerly awaited statement eoceaecioomic policy. Successive party conferhay's, and successive trade union leaders sivh?, since the last general election, succesronc_q' demanded more and more radical,
'e and more wild-eyed, commitments in the field of economic policy; and last year a party policy discussion paper was produced which went quite some way to meet the demands thus expressed. Throughout, however, Mr Wilson continued his discussions with the major union leaders, men already tempering their more radical enthusiasms as a result of their experience in real, grinding negotiations with the Heath government. Finally he was able — and, over the next fortnight will twice more be able — to bring before the Shadow Cabinet and the NEC a much more moderate policy which is already agreed in all its essences with Messrs Jones and Scanlon.
Increasingly, Mr Wilson is being given some credit by the press for what he has done. But it is curious how many people nonetheless represent the affair as some kind of positive triumph for the right or ' moderate' wing of the Labour Party. What appears to be happening is something far more complex. And while it is true that the Labour right will, by and large, feel able to welcome what eventually emerges in the way of an economic policy from all the cogitation that has been going on, it is doubtful if any one of them — except, possibly, Mr Crosland, and his ascription is doubtful these days — contributed very much to the work. Rather, the parliamentary left discovered within itself a desire for unity during the fratricidal struggles over the EEC, resolved not to use what was then its undoubted power to drive the Jenkinsites from the party, and carried over that con structive spirit of unity into the discussions on economic policy. The left discovered that it wanted unity; and that it wanted power. To maximise the chances of achieving both its leaders offered compromise: compromise was not exacted from them.
Here we see 'a second facet of Mr Wilson's achievement. No commentator has doubted his willingness since 1970 to sacrifice, or
appear to sacrifice, almost anything to the end of preserving party unity. But, as he en
gaged in that struggle, he did not lose sight of his other objective, that of making Labour a party of government. It was his instinct for the centre which guided his apparently meandering steps through the morass of Labour theology and conspiracy theory. And while it is almost certainly true to say that the left will never love or trust him again in the way they did when he resigned from the Atlee government, or when he stood against Hugh Gaitskell for the leadership of the party, his constant awareness that they represent the life-giving spirit of the movement as a whole, that it is they rather than the right, who must be brought into the business of preparation for government, has given his standing with them a new solidity to replace the solidity lost by the betrayals and about turns of his period in office. Contrary to so much opinion, Mr Wilson's efforts have been helped rather than hindered by the absence from his front bench of Mr Jenkins and some of his allies.
No equivalent to Labour's driving, emotional force exists in the Conservative Party. It is the fervour of a movement that gives Labour its strength, but which makes'it so difficult to control. That fervour demands a constant series of emotional gestures, protests, and outbursts, some of which occasionally pretend to be policies. Mr Wilson is, of course, an expert at making such gestures, and at propounding the policies which gives them flesh, on party platforms. He understands the power of indignation in politics. And because he understands it ringing denunciations flow from whatever pulpit he occupies — on Lonrho, on the Cayman Islands tax haven, on land prices, on property speculators. This is part of the deeper cosmetics of politics and Mr Heath, however much he affects to despise them, gained enormously from a much more subfusc use of them when he addressed himself to industrial relations and price inflation during the last election campaign. Mr Wilson is doing the same now; and it remains an open question whether the policies reflecting the indignation to which he gives vent would be any more effective than those which Mr Heath promulgated.
All that, however, lies in the future. What Mr Wilson, who deeply regretted the May Day semi-strike, now clearly hopes for is a period of industrial peace, without excessive wage increases, at the end of which price inflation will be seen not to have been reduced by the Government's incomes policy. At that moment he will advance to the country bearing a price control banner. In his reading, the Government will then have nothing to say, and the test of all his tireless work of conciliation and preparation in opposition will be at hand.
Of course, none of it may necessarily work out like that, and Mr Wilson, like Mr Heath, must depend on fortune for the fruit of his labours. If fortune fails him he would, of course, have to go, bequeathing to his successor a united party, exactly the same bequest as Gaitskell made to him. It is far too early to be certain about the identity of his heir, but a few points of likelihood can be made. It will not be Mr Callaghan, who would be too old and who, realising that fact, will almost certainly shortly depart for the International Monetary Fund if Mr Barber gets him a job as its chairman. It will not be Mr Benn: the united anger of the party at his recent caperings over Rolls-Royce showed not merely the desire of the left not to engage in doctrinal extravagance, but also their impatient intolerance of his courtship of them. It cannot be Mr Jenkins, who has faded almost wholly from the collective consciousness, and it is unlikely to be Mr Foot, who does not really seem to want it. The outstanding dark horse is Mr Short, who has been winning golden opinions as Deputy Leader, but if the time factor is right, and Mr Heath goes to the country late rather than early, the shrewd money will remain on Mr Crosland.
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