RUSSIAN SINCERITY AND ENGLISH SINCERITY.
TT may seem that the point taken up by the Duke of Argyll
in the House of Lords on Monday week, and again in the Times of Monday last, and the presumably semi-official reply signed " S." in the Times of Wednesday, have rather a slender connection with practical politics. But in reality, half the blunders of popular opinion on the Eastern Question are due to the misconceptions formed as to the moral grounds of diplomatic action, and the false judgments to which those misconceptions give rise. The arrant nonsense talked as to "Muscovite tactics," whether in relation to the action of Prince Gortschakoff or the action of Mr. Gladstone, has probably done more to throw dust in the eyes of the English people than the most serious arguments could have effected. And we can hardly therefore do a greater service to the public at the present moment, than by explaining the actual outcome of the debate and correspondence initiated by the Duke of Argyll in refer- ence to the straightforwardness or want of straightforward- ness of Prince Gortschakoff and of Lord Derby. We believe that both the Russian and the British diplomatist have been steadily pursuing their own different ends without any attempt at disguise, but that the concentration of the attention of each on those ends has been so complete, that one of the two has not unfrequently been quite taken by surprise —and very unpleasant surprise—at the action of the other. Only while Russia—so far at least as the printed correspond- ence goes—has had the reticence and self-command to refrain from invectives against Great Britain, Great Britain, as repre- sented by Lord Derby, has not shown that reticence and self- command towards Russia. There was, perhaps, a good reason for this. Lord Derby had failed in the object he-had at heart, while Prince Gortschakoff had not failed ; and failure is not apt to promote either reticence or self-restraint, at least in statesmen of the calibre of Lord Derby. But as regards mere straightforwardness, we cannot see that there is anything at all to choose between the straightforwardness of Prince Gortschakoff and the straightforwardness of Lord Derby.
The issue is this. It is said on the anti-Russian side,—by "S.," for instance, in Wednesday's Times, and Lord Derby's bitter reply to Prince Gortschakoff's circular gives at least a fair reason to suppose that this is the view of the British Government,—that the declaration of war by Russia, as the result of the Turkish despatch rejecting the Protocol, was a step which the British Government had no reason to expect during at least the first portion of the negotiations concerning the Protocol. And the popular allegation goes further,—we do not mean that semi-official writers like "S." are responsible for so strong a form of the insinuation,—and asserts that Russia entrapped Great Britain into signing, in the hope of promoting disarmament and peace, a Protocol which was subsequently used by Russia to strengthen her position in making war,—the certainty of war having always been present to her mind. The Duke of Argyll replies that Russia never at any time gave Lord Derby to believe that she would disarm without obtaining from Turkey some substantial guarantee of improve- ment, and that Lord Derby's reproach to Russia that no guaran- tees were demanded in the Protocol, though literally true, is something of a quibble, since the Declaration separately ap- pended by Russia, and which Lord Derby not only knew to be an essential part of the conditions of disarmament, as regarded Russia, but publicly treated as giving Turkey an opening for reconciliation, did insist on both peace with Montenegro and a serious undertaking of reforms by Turkey, as conditions of a dis- armament which otherwise Russia refused to contemplate. Now, to this "S." replies in Wednesday's Times by quoting a despatch of Lord Derby's, dated March 13, in which he recounts a conversation with Count Schouvaloff about the Protocol, in which conversation the Russian Ambassador declares, first, that demobilisation is out of the ques- tion, without Russia's obtaining "some tangible result, as regards the improvement of the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey ;" and then goes on to treat the signature of the Protocol then under discussion as sufficient guarantee for such an improvement, and as likely to "termi- nate the incident." And "S." contends that it is not till March 21, or eight days later, that Count Schouvaloff and General Ignatiew insisted on the additional conditions con- tained in the Russian appendix to the Protocol. Also it is added that the language held to Lord Lyons in Paris on March 9, by General Ignatiew, equally held out the hope that Russia would disarm after the signature of the Protocol, without in- sisting on the further conditions mentioned in the separate Russian Declaration. Now the answer to this statement is very simple. In these conversations the subject of discussion was not at all the question of Russia's immediate disarmament, but only the best mode of "terminating the incident "—i.e., the diplo- matic incident commenced by the Russian Circular issued after the Conference. What Russia stuck to was that nothing should induce her to demobilise without gaining some substantial step for her clients, the Christian populations of Turkey. This she has never ceased to assert. Mr. MacColl, in a letter published a month ago in these columns, in reference to the Italian Green-Book, shows that even when in Berlin, before he reached either Paris or London, General Ignatiew simply scouted the idea of giving Turkey a year of grace in which to carry out her reforms, without taking any security for their performance, and insisted that Russia could not afford such a waste of power. Indeed, he declared that the Protocol was proposed as a mode of stimulating Turkey to immediate action. And when we find Count Schouvaloff speaking to Lord Derby, on March 13, in exactly the same tone, it seems per- fectly obvious that the " draft " Protocol, which was then the subject of discussion, was one much better calculated to apply this stimulus than the Protocol afterwards signed, and the deficiency of which in " stimulus " to reform was doubtless supplemented by the special Declaration appended to it by Count Schouvaloff. There can be no reasonable doubt that the draft Protocol of which Count Schouvaloff spoke as likely to furnish a sufficient termination to the incident of the Russian Circular was one far more efficient in stimulus, than the one actually accepted by Lord Derby. Indeed, even in the selections from the correspondence presented to Parliament, there is something like evidence of this. In the conversation which took place in Paris on the 9th of March, recounted to Lord Derby by Lord Lyons, General Ignatiew is described as proposing that "a Protocol might now be signed, embodying the reforms ultimately recommended by the Conference, requiring the Porte to execute them, and stating that if the Porte should neglect to do so, the Powers aviseraient." Now there would be the greatest difference in the world between such a Protocol, which would have laid the commands of Europe on Turkey, and the one actually signed, which ' required ' nothing, and dealt only in 'hopes' and 'in- vitations.' Turkey would have known very well that a Proto- col 'requiring' her to do certain things which she did not intend to do, could not be followed only by inert discussions as to the next best persuasive to apply. There would have been a guarantee for action in such a 'requisition' from united Europe, far more powerful than any which the feeble document actually agreed to—and which was equivalent to a declaration that those who had watered down the wording would never, under any circumstances, coerce,—could possibly suggest. It is unreasonable to assume that on March 13 Count Schouvaloff was speaking of a protocol no more impera- tive, no more likely to stimulate Turkey, than that which was actually signed on the 31st. He was speaking of what was most likely a very different thing,—the draft protocol which has never yet been published. Doubtless the Russian declara- tion—which Lord Derby was so far from regarding at the time as insulting to Turkey, that he told our representative at Con- stantinople that the Protocol, "taken in connection" with that declaration, gave "an opportunity for the arrangement of a mutual disarmament by Russia and Turkey, of which the latter ought on every account to endeavour to avail herself," - —was meant to supplement in some degree the excessive weakness of the Protocol itself, and to supply something of
that 'stimulus' which the united Powers of Europe had failed to apply. But even if the Protocol, as signed on the 31st of March, had been identical in terms with that discussed on the 13th, the Circular Despatch of Turkey issued on the 9th April was obviously of a nature to extinguish all the hopes which the Protocol was designed to promote, and to revive all the sinister expectations which the Protocol was intended to dissipate. That Circular was of a nature to satisfy the new Turkish Parliament, and was a defiance to Europe to interfere in any way with Turkish concerns. It was on so- called Turkish reformers that Turkey fell back, while she defied foreign intervention ; and these Turkish reformers were utterly opposed to the spirit of all the measures which Europe had recommended and which Russian feeling very properly demanded. Of course, after the circular despatch of April 9 was once published, a perfectly new diplomatic "incident" of the most enormous importance was entered upon, and Lord Derby's profession that with patience and temper the differences between Russia and Turkey might still have been composed, was utter nonsense,—nonsense which he must have known to be nonsense. What Lord Derby really meant in making that profession was not that Russia could then have hoped to get what was needful out of Turkey without war, but that any Power which cared but little for the protection of the Christians in Turkey, compared with its desire for peace in Europe, might have affected to hope what it pleased, after it well knew that all hope was gone. Turkey had chosen to abide by the will of its patriotic Parliament, and to set Europe at defiance. Russia, of course, had no choice but to accept the challenge, or abandon the Turkish Christians to their fate.
We maintain, then, that Russia and England have both been substantially straightforward throughout the negotia- tions,—Russia, in insisting on reforms which would prac- tically have separated the Christian provinces from the Con- stantinople Government, whatever appearance of connection had been retained,—England in insisting on any concessions to Turkey, however great, such as would have kept the peace in Europe. Russia did not want war, but preferred it to leaving the Christian provinces helpless for the future, and probably knew from the beginning that unless she were pre- pared to leave them so, war it must b& England did not want to leave the Christian provinces helpless for the future, but preferred this course to war, and probably she, too, knew from the beginning that unless at the cost of war they must be left helpless. They were both straightforward in their way, but straightforward for different ends. The people of Russia were willing to make any sacrifice rather than leave the Slavonic Christians to the mercy of their oppressors, and the Government of Russia did the will of the people of Russia. The Government of England were willing to abandon anybody and everybody to their fate, rather than hazard the risks of a break-up of the Turkish Empire, and they were very angry with the Russian Government for not taking the same view. But though both Powers were straight- forward in their way, their ways were not parallel, but on the contrary, at odds with each other. And while Lord Derby was obviously quite sincere in throwing over every other end to patch up a temporary peace, he seems to have been simply incapable of entering into the Russian view, which was never the least like his own, and never for a moment concealed. Russia armed to prevent Turkey from putting off Europe any longer with vain promises, and never held out any hope of disarming till she had secured that Europe should not be again put off with such promises ; and this every Foreign Office in Europe well knew. The Russian Government, indeed, did not dare to disarm without securing this end, and no doubt it knew, as all sensible people knew, as soon as the Turkish Parliament came together, that nothing but war would secure such an end. But Russia very wisely tried to be as moderate as possible in her mod= operandi, and to get Europe to go as far with her as possible, before having recourse to war. Turkey, on the contrary, never meant to grant any- thing that would have alienated from her the enthusiasm of the followers of the Prophet, and Turkey well knew that what was demanded of her would and must have alie- nated from her that enthusiasm ; and therefore she laughed her European advisers to scorn. Again, England was playing for delay and compromise, and counting (rather hopelessly) on the fears of all parties, being angry with everybody in turn who could surmount and control his fears. But hers, though a straightforward, has certainly been a more ignoble and con- temptible policy than that of either Russia or Turkey. Russia's was the courage of a noble popular sentiment ; Turkey's the courage of bold popular passion ; while England has displayed the cold timidity of complete official helplessness to part the two combatants whose collision she deprecated and dreaded but could not prevent.
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