and survival
It seems almost frivolous, in the midst of our domestic difficulties, to advert again to something that has happened within the Common Market. But the French decision to float the franc they say it will last for six months, but our own government said the same about the pound — is of the utmost political consequence to Britain, alike in foreign as in domestic policy. Before we joined it was evident to some, as since we joined it has become obvious to nearly all, that the French valued the Market above all for the contribution in cash terms it made to French agriculture, a contribution enshrined in the Common Agricultural Policy. The CAP cannot survive without fixed exchange rates between the member countries of the EEC. More than a year ago this paper argued that it could not survive on British contributions if the pound were floating; how much less can it survive when, in the national interest of France — though not necessarily in the interests of French farmers — the franc itself goes free on international currency markets? More recently we argued that the British decision to refuse to agree to a European energy policy unless we had a satisfactory regional policy in return was the end of the beginning in the battle to destroy the Common Market. The floating of the franc signals the beginning of the end.
Consider the matter in terms of our domestic crises, and with reference to Europe as a whole. A united Europe is impossible without a common currency, and a common currency impossible without a pooling of reserves. Therefore, the nations in favour of a united Europe decided to create a common currency, first by fixing the value of their individual monies in terms of one another, and then by beginning the pooling of their reserves. First Britain and Italy, and now France, discovered that any such fixing, and any such pooling, was impossible because of the damage, in modern conditions, which would be done to the interests of their own people. Each of the three countries was forced, by events, to float its currency: European co-operation and European integration were proved by the facts of life to be not merely undesirable but impossible.
But this is not, this cannot be, merely a demonstration of how European integration has failed to work for the moment. It is a fundamental proof that the thing cannot work at all, since, in the face of a major crisis, member countries find it impossible to avoid acting in an anti-Community fashion. No one would accuse Mr Heath, whatever may be held of M. Pompidou, of deliberately putting the interests of his own country before those of Europe as a whole, but he has been forced to do so in order to survive. The lesson is that, in all things, survival must be put before everything else, and the national interest put at the head of the programme for survival. We must prepare for an economic siege in this country: there is now, clearly, no avoiding it; and, unpleasant as it may seem in prospect, the alternative of bashing away at a meaningless and useless incomes policy formula, while ignoring what is going on in the rest of the World, what other people are doing to protect their interests, would certainly seem in retrospect so staggering a folly as to merit unfavourable comparison with the prevision of the ostrich, with its head buried in the sand. Even now, despite all his mistakes, despite all his failures, Mr Heath could gain enthusiastic Support from a divided country and a doubting Party if he clearly and always, at whatever cost to his international dreams, put Britain first. The people are prepared for a siege. They feel, wiser as they are than the politicians, that a siege will come anyway. Let the Prime Minister put himself at the head of those Manning the ramparts; and let him begin with the introduction of import controls.
10r, though the trade figures — a deficit for 'last month of more than £300 million, and for he year of more than £2,000 million — were uch better than expected, they are but a mild ndication of what is to come. One of the major items in the trade bill is the excessive cost of our imports. Both the floating franc and our membership of the EEC will cause further rises in import prices: so, whatever the rules of the Community say, the Government Must act by protection to reduce the cost to the country.
Market folly
With a cheek that almost beggars belief the European propaganda sheet New Europe editorialises in its latest issue, "The British people are sensible, cautious. They may not like the Common Market much, but they would soon Sense the recklessness of taking Britain out." In other words, the Marketeers in their mad and dishonest folly, having taken the country Measurably far down the road to destruction, resist any attempt to halt that deadly march ,on the grounds that the destruction you are Becoming aware of is better than any assertion Of your own interest, will, or identity. The lies Unsuccessfully told to win British approval, for entry; the dishonest and anti-parliamentary Manoeuvre which took us in — even these are not enough. In sullen madness the proEuropeans now tell us there is no alternative to our torture. Fortunately, the people, and some politicians, are made of sterner stuff.
Chance for Israel
The ceaseless perambulations of the indefatigable Dr Kissinger have again produced some Movement in what seemed a totally frozen situation. It is clear that the Secretary of State has, in fact, done better than he himself exPected, by persuading both Israel and Egypt to take practical steps towards the disen gagement of their troops on either side of the Suez Canal: he had hitherto hoped merely to obtain an agreement in principle to disengage. Assuming now that the agreement is but the prelude to some really constructive negotiation, there are several points of interest in the overall diplomatic situation. It is clear, for example, that Egypt is not going to sacrifice her own interests in order to serve the general Arab cause, and that her first preoccupation is going to be the Sinai rather than Jerusalem or the West Bank. It is also clear that a deep split now exists between Syria and Egypt. Further, the preoccupation of the so-called 'second circle' of Arab powers, and notably Tunisia and Libya, with their own affairs indicates a further easing of pressure on both Egypt and Israel.
In this situation it might be well for the Israeli government to take an imaginative and bold step in their relations with Egypt. An offer by the Israelis to withdraw immediately to the Sinai passes could be construed as a really worthwhile effort for a settlement with Egypt. However, as General Sharon's cross-Suez strategy indicated in the late war, the Israelis have little to fear from the Egyptian army as long as they possess the kind of retaliatory power which actual possession of at least one of the passes would give them. Such a move would, moreover, shorten the Israeli lines of communication, and greatly ease the pressure on a citizen army which will find it difficult to remain mobilised. Here, then, is a chance for Israel to show goodwill and serve her own interests at the same time: it is a chance worth taking.
Edmund Blunden,
With the death of Edmund Blunden there disappears from the scene another of the small band of poets who found their distinction through experience in the first world war. Blunden had begun to publish — two small pamphlets appeared in 1914 — before the war began. But he was then set fair for the pastoral life of an Oxford don: Flanders it was which changed not only the direction but the whole character of his life, and its influence on him is well set down in his prose classic Undertones of War. Literary journalism and, subsequently, the chair of English in Tokyo, became, after his demobilisation, his means of earning his bread. His name was made with the publication of The Waggoner (1920) and The Shepherd (1922). It is now clear from these volumes of early maturity what was not generally understood for a long time, that the principal professional influence on Blunden was the poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the latter century had more importance in his work as he grew older, and the influence of the great Elizabethan period thus faded — generally to the detriment of the verse. Its quality began to recover, however, under the influence of yet another conflagration, that of the second world war, and some of his best poems are contained in Shells by a Stream (1944) and After the Bombing (1949). From these we can see, not only the affect on him of the classical British poetic tradition, but also that of human conflict in war. Much of his power and intensity came, indeed, from the fact, that unlike many lesser poets he was never political, never really allied to a faction or a cause outside his work. This was his strength: it gave him his quality; it will ensure the endurance of his memory.
