THE ATTACK ON THE MILITARY LEADERS. T HOSE persons who have
any power of political anticipa- tion, or any appreciation of the presages and portents of Press campaigns, must have known that something was going to happen when they noticed the curious prominence given in a certain group of newspapers, first to Mr. Smallwood's recent speech in the House of Commons, and secondly to the discussions about the Cambrai reverse. The " something " to which the Press manoeuvres were leading turned out to be—as indeed many penetrating minds had already guessed— nothing less than a furious and concerted attack upon Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig. Let us say at once that every humane person must have been deeply moved by a large part of Mr. Smallwood's speech. The spectacle of a man being prevented from staying with his dying son by some absurdly rigorous rule of a hospital, or by some capricious decision of a Jack-in-office, affords as much cause for just indignation as for grief. But we are convinced that the prohibitions under which Mr. Smallwood suffered were the exception and not the rule. Be that as it may, it would seem incredible, were it not that we know this thing to have actually happened, that Mr. Smallwood's allegations about War Office callousness and narrowness should have been made the pretext for a denunciation of the military policy and the strategical ideas of Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig. As for the Cambrai affair, we think it quite possible that the Government could give the nation more information on the matter with safety. We have always held that the British democracy is not composed of children, and need not be treated as such. Popular judgment in Great Britain has, indeed, a knack of being strangely and illuminatingly right on a vast majority of subjects. But the question whether the Government could safely give us more information about what happened at Cambrai, however it be answered, cannot possibly turn the balance of achievements which stand to the renown of Sir Douglas Haig and Sir William Robertson from a credit into a debit account. We think of the Duke of Wellington's answer to the inqUisitive and indiscreet woman who asked him : " Is it true, Duke, that you were surprised at Waterloo ? " " No," was the reply ; " but I am now." We are indeed more than surprised ; we are amazed that even those newspapers which have played the part of organized political assassins should have so little appreciation of what has been accom- plished by British arms on the Western Front. The public memory may be short, but it is not so short as the organizers of this Press campaign imagine. The attack upon the military leaders began in the Weekly Dispatch, that one of Lord Northcliffe's organs which has been described by its proprietors as " the Best of the Batch." We have not closely studied the comparative merits of Lord Northcliffe's newspapers, but we think it is fair to say that though the Weekly Dispatch may be the best of the batch from some point of view satisfactory to Lord Northcliffe's own mind, it cannot even in his view carry so much weight as some of his other organs. But the custom in a campaign such as is now being conducted is to begin the attack in some minor organ, and roll up the heavier pieces of artillery if the advance promises to be successful and any visible effect is being produced in the enemy's ranks. The greatest noise made thus far has come from the Daily tail gun, which was fired on Monday when Mr. Lovat Fraser (backed up by an approving leading article) offered the public what was, we think, the most preposterous farrago of irrelevant criticism and accusation we have read since the war began. He " downs " Sir William Robertson on the authority of Sir Ian Hamilton, without apparently being troubled in the least by the reflection that the public has a very shrewd appreciation of the comparative value of the services of these two soldiers. He denounces the policy of Sir Douglas Haig's offensive at Ypres, without referring in a single word to the consideration that, even if Sir Douglas Haig's achievements were not valuable victories—which we ourselves heartily believe them to have been—they must not be judged as the genuine results of Sir Douglas Haig's strategical ideas. Only a fortnight ago we reviewed Sir Douglas Haig's very able despatch, and pointed out that in the spring of 1917 he was required by the War Cabinet to throw over his original plan and serve temporarily in a subordinate position under General Nivelle. The plan of the War Cabinet then was apparently that strategical unity should be obtained by making General Nivelle, for all practical purposes, Generalissimo. As we know, General Nivelle suffered a disappointing reverse, and it was not until Sir Douglas Haig had given all the support to the French arms which he had been instructed to give that he was free to turn to his original scheme on the Flanders front. Through this change of plan, imposed upon him from above, even more than through the atrocious weather, which beat the record for vileness, Sir Douglas Haig was badly delayed in the performance of his task in Flanders. What should have been accomplished in the autumn ran on into the winter, and could not even then be completed.
The principal objective of Mr. Lovat Fraser's attack, how- ever, is Sir William Robertson. He asks rhetorically whether the Imperial General Staff led the Government to believe that infinitely larger results would be obtained by the Flanders campaign. In dramatically asking this question in italics, he mentions neither the defection of Russia nor the change in Sir Douglas Haig's plans to which we have already referred. After describing Flanders as our Verdun, he goes on to say : " The complaint against the Imperial General Staff is that no clear purpose lies behind the strategy it directs. In the Westsit has applied the strategy of the Stone Age. In the East it has designed its operations from the point of view of a sergeant- major." Then follows a scornful condemnation of the Palestine campaign as " the fine flower of Whitehall strategy." Nothing worth considering could have been gained in Palestine, apparently, unless Aleppo itself was reached and " the vital junction of Muslimie " on the Baghdad Railway was destroyed. Last July (so the argument goes on) was the time to decide about an advance to Aleppo, but at that time the Imperial General Staff were " preoccupied with their obsessions about the Belgian coast." From all this we gather that Mr. Lovat Fraser has overlooked the overwhelming importance which the Germans have over and over again attached to West Belgium, both from a military and a commercial standpoint. We gather also that his idea of a promising strategy for the third year of the war was to conduc:_ operations far away from, instead of as near as possible to, our base. The brilliant Palestine campaign was, as a matter of fact, successful, not merely in proportion as it has damaged the prestige of the Ottoman Turks in the Moslem world, but in proportion as it distracted Turkish attention from Mesopotamia. It seems to us, on the assump- tion that the Palestine enterprise was desirable in itself, that the Imperial General Staff adjusted the balance very nicely, and without throwing too many men into such a distant theatre of war, performed a marvellous feat which will have a very great influence upon the future. Mr. Lovat Fraser appears to be quite indifferent, when formulating his strategical ideas, to the shortage of shipping. It must be obvious to almost every one else that we could not possibly have maintained a really great offensive in any theatre where the lines of communication lay across thousands of sea miles. What is true of sea communications is true in a minor degree of land communications. The greater the distance from the base, the greater the disadvantage we impose upon ourselves. The Central Powers move inside a circle, and the Allies, with a considerably smaller number of railways, move outside the circumference of that circle.
In the course of his wonderful essay in strategy, Mr. Lovat Fraser goes on to tell us that the French call Sir William Robertson " General Non, Non," because he is supposed to say " No " to every proposal that may happen to come his way. But after all there may be great merit in a " No." The man who can keep a stiff upper-lip, and has the ability to answer fully, quickly, and decisively with a negative, has at least one of the primary virtues which are required in a Chief of the Imperial General Staff. We hope and confidently believe, for example, that Sir William Robertson would instantly have said No, No " to such a hotch-potch of ill-digested strategical ideas as Mr. Lovat Fraser has set forth. If we had had a Chief of the Imperial General Staff ready glibly to say " Yes, Yes," we might have already lost the war. In conclusion, Mr. Lovat Fraser tells us that though Sir William Robertson has been foremost in encouraging promotions from the ranks, he has never encouraged them " beyond narrow limits." " We want an Eric Geddes at the War Office, one trained as a Shunter."
We are obliged to the Daily Chronicle for reminding us that not much more than a year ago the Daily Mail wrote as follows about those whom it now attacks
" They [the Government] need not trouble themselves about our strategy or about the management of our campaigns and the dis- tribution of the Army. These matters are in the hands of the two most capable soldiers whom Great Britain has produced for many years—Generals Sir Douglas Haig and Sir William Robertson. There is no Cabinet Minister or ex-Cabinet Minister, not even the most eminent, the most gifted, the most eloquent, the most ener- getic, and the most popular whom the country would allow at this time of the day to interfere with the plans of these two men. We have had more than enough of this sort of thing in the present war."
It is being asked in newspapers and elsewhere whether the War Cabinet is in sympathy with this organized attack upon the military leaders. Are any statesmen or politicians behind it ? Does the Prime Minister himself, for example, approve ? We can say on this subject only that Mr. Lloyd George has given no overt sign since the attack was launched that it has his approval. We may remember, however, that in the past Lord Northcliffe's papers have shown a great deal of shrewd sense in demanding what they had some reason to believe was likely to happen. The apparatus of prophecy used in this way often produces wonderfully imposing journalistic results. This may be only another case in point. We must remember, again, that the Prime Minister's most unfortunate speech in Paris did in substance and effect bring most damaging charges against the strategy of Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig, however indirectly or unintentionally those charges may be said to have been conveyed. Another point we have noticed is that in Mr. Lloyd George's Paris speech, in Sir Auckland Geddes's recent speech, and again in the Daily Mail article, a good deal is said about the disproportion of casualties to results. The accusation of butchery against a General in the field is of all charges the most cruel. It undermines the con- fidence of the men in their officers, and it paralyses the hands of the leader himself. But as we have said, there is no overt sign that the present attack enjoys any approval from Mr. Lloyd George. We sincerely hope it does not. When, however, the journalistic and political advisers of the public move along contiguous lines, they may, if the occasion for doing so suddenly arises, join their forces completely.
It is therefore not inappropriate to address some kind of appeal on the whole subject to the Government themselves. What we desire most earnestly to say is this. The decision whether the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Com- mander-in-Chief in the field are fit to hold their positions.is one for the Government, and for the Government alone. The Government ought never to fail to show in the clearest and most emphatic way that the military leaders of their choice have their support. If the military leaders no longer deserve that support, it should be withdrawn instantly and for reasons that can be explicitly stated. The intolerable policy is partial, grudging, and only semi-loyal support from the Government. This is grossly unfair to the soldiers, and may indeed break their hearts and lose the war. If the Government should decide that Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig are not men fitted to bear the enormous responsibilities which rest upon them, and clearly give the nation satisfactory reasons, the nation would certainly approve the act of the Government. What the vast majority of Englishmen cannot endure, and what they will soon learn to hate and despise from the depths of their souls, if this kind of Press campaign is allowed to continue, is that the Government, while permitting. Sir William Roberttion and Sir Douglas Haig to remain in their positions, should not show emphatically that they trust them and mean to stand by them all the time. A negative attitude on the part of the Government is not good enough. Neutrality is indeed exceed- ingly harmful, and may be disastrous. A Press campaign either by innuendo or direct accusation is bound to affect the discipline not only of the Army but of the whole nation, and to destroy the confidence of the men in the fighting-lineand that of the frankly war workers at home. We say y that in our opinion the present campaign against the military leaders is atrocious and disgusting. We do not, of course, suggest that the Government should stifle opinion, which we may well take to be genuine opinion, however foolish and mischievous ; but we do say that the Government have it in their power to render it quite innocuous, if not altogether to end it, by expressing their undiminished confidence in the military leaders. If those military leaders still retain the confidence of the War Cabinet, let us know it at once. If they do not retain the confidence of the Government, let the present situation be ended. Things have gone too far, and political intrigue is much too widely suspected, for the Government not to say one thing or the other.
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