As for the Cambrai affair, we fancy that if the
whole truth were known, it would be found that there was no failure whatever in Staff work. A popular impression has been created, quite wrongly, that our Staff work is commonly defective. The truth is that it has been wonderfully good in view of the fact that the whole direction of our present vast Army is an improvisation. We imagine, though we are only guessing, that what happened at Cambrai was that after the first success—unexpected in its magnitude- forees were withdrawn from neighbouring positions in order to follow up the success and seize as much ground as possible in the " first fine careless rapture " of the advance. No doubt to do this was to take a risk, but it was a justifiable risk. In war such risks must continually be accepted if success on a great scale is ever to be won. When fortune frowns on a General and the point of his line which has been temporarily weakened is discovered by the enemy, the General is said to have blundered. If we had not had Generals capable of this kind of blunder, we should never have done any- thing. " Show me the General," said Turenne, " who has made no mistakes and I will show you a General who has seen little of war."
