THE SETBACK IN TUNISIA
By STRATEGICUS
T is impossible completely to dissociate the Tunisian battlefield
ei from the Russian theatre, not only because the developments form striking a contrast, but even more because the two theatres are rategically connected. The Russian offensive has achieved such agnificent successes that it has engendered hopes which one hardly ared entertain a few months ago. Indeed, it is these very hopes at form the basis of a natural impatience with the setback in unisia. If there is any possibility of the enemy being defeated this ear, or even brought to the penultimate stage of defeat, it must be
the result of the common effort of the Allies. In any case, it nnot be achieved by the half-hearted attempts of the Anglo- merican armies ; and even less can it be realised by fumbling the hance in Tunisia. Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill fully recognise e situation, as the Prime Minister has shown by his recent speech. ut between the announcement of the instructions given to the ervice chiefs at Casablanca and their translation into action lies a
p which the events of the last week have fully revealed.
It was on December 18th that the present writer suggested that ommel's plan was " thcheck and delay, and thereby separate the first and Eighth Armies as long as possible ; and, if given the hance, to intervene in Tunisia before they can co-operate." That as clearly the purpose Rommel was attempting to achieve, and the nly reason for recalling this suggestion now is that it was so obvious at we ought to have been able to depend upon its being taken into ecount. The suggestion implied that there would be a period of anger when Rommel entered Tunisia, since, if he could detain the ghth Army in the. south by means of rearguards, he. would be able o throw into the Tunisian struggle a reinforcement of an appre- iable number of troops and some armour without a corresponding trengthening of the Allies. A few weeks, he hoped, might enable im to inflict irreparable damage upon the First Army.
If we admit that the possibility was obvious, What then should ave been the appropriate Allied reaction? Everyone will admit, vithout going into tactical details, that one might have expected the lies to reinforce their positions as much as they possibly could, o hasten the creation of forward airfields and hold their armour eady within reach of the places which were most sensitive to a udden blow. Instead of this, no sooner had Rommel crossed the ronder than reports began to fill the newspapers of reorganisations nd withdrawals. General Juin was said to be taking the French ut of the line in order to re-arm them. The outcry to assemble the nited States troops into larger units was heard. It was stated that he Fifth United States Army was being withdrawn to form a mass
manoeuvre.
All of these changes were, of course, desirable. They could scarcely ave been suggested otherwise. But if they were carried out when, nd as, suggested they were a gift to Rommel. What could he have sked better of fate, after the rude shocks he had suffered at the ands of the Eighth Army? The one thing every general hopes for s the chance to take his enemies in detail. It is precisely this that 'e are so anxious to avoid on the Continent. The two Allied leaders Casablanca urged upon their service subordinates more speed nd more weight in their blows, so that Germany would not have o face Russia alone but be compelled to meet the full strength of the Allies at one and the same time. In Tunisia, as far as one can Judge from the far from completely reliable reports, Rommel was resented with the chance of meeting not only the North African armies alone, but only part of them—the First Army, including an merican corps and a French corps (embodying another American vision). - Rommel is not the man to miss chances. He may overplay his hand ; but at least he plays it out to the end. While he was striking the blows that gave him not only Feriana, Kasserine and Sbeitla, but also compelled the evacuation of Gafsa and even Toseur, where a small American unit felt itself safe on the western edge of the Chou Djerid, the public was being fed with complacent assurances that he only wanted "room." The Germans always want room.
Lebensraum and Grossraum have been the parrot cries with which every fresh advance has been whipped on. But they want room permanently, and that implies the final defeat of the enemy. Rommel was aiming at the very foundation of the Allies' position in Tunisia. He was attempting to capture the almost invaluable rail and road junction of Tebessa, some miles inside Algeria ; and during the last few days he has been pressing ahead with undiminished ardour. He has captured the Kasserine pass and pressed up the track towards Thala, which is only about seven miles from the Tebessa- Tunis railway. He has advanced up the Sbeitla road towards Shiba. He has pushed along the road, and the wadi that accompanies it, towards Tebessa.
The main thrust is towards Thala, and there he is, at least temporarily, held. But the detail is of less importance than the design. The former cannot be fully known even if it were not in constant flux. The design is plain. Rommel wants so much room that he is attempting to turn the right flank of the First Army and force it to abandon its hold on north-western Tunisia. If he could, he would fling it back and pin it to the coast. Indeed, it is only prudent to recognise that, with von Arnim, he is attempting to crush the Allied force before Montgomery can intervene to crush him. The Germans are convinced that not only the big lie but also the big plan stands the better chance of success. They have suc- ceeded by attempting what seemed impossible. One day, of course, it will destroy them, as Stalingrad demonstrates. But meanwhile fortune favours the bold. Rommel is nc great strategist, but he is a clever and very daring tactician. He is playing for a great prize ; and already it looks as if he had won the most precious immediate want of the enemy—time.
He is gambling on the turn of the season and the strength of certain defences. The Mareth line can be turned in time and under suitable conditions ; but the vital question is how long it can be held by the presumably weak rearguard. When the Mareth line is passed there is the great lake and marshy area that narrows the issue north of Gabes to some fifteen miles. This line, too, could be turned if only the hot and dry season would hasten its approach. Montgomery is steadily advancing against the Mareth defences, and it is very unlikely that he will be betrayed into hasty moves that might defeat his whole purpose. Alexander, now in operational control of another critical situation, would scarcely counsel him to take risks that might ruin his chances of intervening decisively in central Tunisia.
There cannot be the smallest doubt that we have suffered a severe setback, and the probable result will be to postpone the Allied intervention on the European Continent. At the present moment, however, it seems that we may have checked Rommel's advance through the reinforcement of the threatened sector. But it is not at all unlikely that he may set in motion an attack on another sector. One attack has already been made upon Medjat ; and, if it were possible to reinforce the threat to the right flank of the First Army by another on the left, that force might still be compelled to undertake the radical readjustment it is fighting so hard to avoid. It is at least reassuring that the fighting is now being co-ordinated through the Eighth Army coming under the same direction as the First ; and if the Northern force can prevent the enemy from disengaging about Kasserine, Rommel may be placed in an unfavourable position for the advance of the Eighth Army. Russia, fortunately, still continues her victorious progress. The capture of Sumi, on Tuesday, carries the troops halfway from the Kursk-Kharkov railway to the junction of Bakhrnach on the line to Kiev. Lebeden, less than 3o miles to the south-west, is the farthest west yet reached, and it opens fresh vistas. The most dangerous of the other thrusts is the advance upon a broad front between the Kharkov-Kherson and the Kharkov-Crimea railways towards the Dnieper bend. This threat has been developed to such an extent that it appears unlikely that the Germans will be able to take their stand on the Dnieper line before the Russians have turned it. The hope of so doing is improved by the Sumi-Lebeden advance. This thrust is pointing in too dangerous a direction for the Germans to ignore ; and the advance towards Orel must be causing anxiety.
It is a remarkable tribute to German discipline that they have been able to rally their defensive in the eastern Donetz. They are holding open the gap which the spearhead at Krasnoarmeisk threatens to close ; and, in the bitter weather which must make movement on the roads almost impossible, are making their way westward. They must have left, at least, their heavy material behind, and Stalin's record of guns and tanks lost already implies the heaviest drain upon the enemy's factories. It has fallen just at the time when he is trying to sweep up reinforcements to make another bid for a decision in Russia. Goebbels significantly, for the first time, makes use of the word " attempt." It is in order that even the attempt may be impossible that one hopes for the speedy imple- menting of the instructions which Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill issued.
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