TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE FINANCES, THE MINISTER, AND THE COUNTRY.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S financial statement exhibits a sorry com- bination—a falling revenue, a rising expenditure, and a Ministry confessedly unable to grapple with the difficulty. Some pains are taken to show that the augmented expenditure is not of a military kind ; and Sir Charles Wood enumerated expenses for harbours of refuge, the new Houses of Parliament, the British Museum, and so forth. He might have included other expenses that are inevitablel-such as those incidental to the condition of Ireland, sanatory improvements, improvements in emigration, and the like. The deficiency of revenue is in great part caused by the visitation of bad seasons, the consequent derangement of com- merce, and other causes over which official people have no con- trol: also by causes over which official people have had control— such as the bad legislation that has inflicted ruin on the West Indies. The result is, that the estimated revenue for 1848-9 is 51,250,0001., to meet an estimated expenditure of 54,750,0001. To make good the deficiency, Lord John Russell proposes not only to continue the Income-tax, but to increase it to five per cent for two years. Painful was the effect of this announcement in the House of Commons,—a bitter if not derisive reprobation, not disarmed by the manner in which the proposition was advanced. Enfeebled by indisposition, Lord John Russell failed to state his case in the best way ; he stumbled upon infelicitous allusions—such as the often-quoted increase of the Income-tax- by the Whig Ministers in Lord Grenville's time ; he betrayed a fear of objec- tion, still more impolitic than the provocation of it. Mr. Wakley, indeed, imputed the marked contrast between the reception of Lord John's proposition and that accorded to Sir Robert Peel when be originally proposed the present Income-tax, entirely to the manner of the Premier; advising Lord John to resort, like his predecessor, to a little stratagem. But it was not only Sir Robert Peel's manner, however suasively seductive that may have been, which pleased the House and the public in 1842: it was the object in imposing the tax that reconciled the country. Sir Robert Peel's object differed materially from Lord John Russell's. Sir Robert inherited from his predecessors a financial deficiency; there was a vigorous and advancing agitation in favour of fiscal reforms : he resolved to take both branches of the subject into his grasp—to unite recruited exchequer with reformed tariff; and the Income-tax was his postulate as a locus standi. In that sense was it that the public accorded the tax to him not only with cheerfulness but with admiration. Lord John Russell's ob- ject is a much smaller one—simply to raise the wind, and to raise the wind for a spendthrift exchequer, whose lavish outlay he rather deplores and extenuates than justifies. Sir Robert's de- mand was like the call upon the shareholders of a company for capital towards a promising enterprise : Lord John's is the odious call upon the shareholders to meet liabilities without hope of return in profit. Lord John neglects even the most legitimate attempts to recon- cile the people to the aggravated impost either by mending it in its mode of incidence or by proving its absolute necessity. The tax is objectionable ; but the general good-humour, created by the merit of Sir Robert Peel's financial scheme as a whole, made the people accept the Income-tax part without minute criti- cism : Lord John proposes the same tax, not better adjusted, but in an aggravated form, at a time of distress and discon- tent. He shrinks from positively asserting the facts that go to prove the necessity of his measure. On the subject of frontier defence, for example, he dares not establish the im- perative necessity of his own plans. Not 'because it cannot be proved, but because he dreads the effect of the proof. He stands between two fears,—the fear of offending a certain party, influen- tial among some classes of electors; and the fear of disregarding a heavy responsibility. He would have the credit of providing for the national security, without the debit of having to provide the means. He wishes to satisfy parties on both sides. He wishes to make out that there is really nothing done, at least no- thing worth speaking of as a matter of cost, and yet that every- thing needful is done. There is some shuffling in this matter, and an attempt, which would be amusing if it were not hum- bling, to disguise the real efficiency of the Government mea- sures. Plain speaking would be much better, and more politic. Government do really seem to deserve credit for a considerable increase of attention to the frontier defences. Let us see how the case stands.
There has for several years been a progressive increase of the home forces, and at present efforts are made with the specific ob- ject of rendering the frontier defences effective. Since 1835, the number of seamen and boys in the Navy has been increased from 17,500 to 29,500; the Marines, from 9,000 to 13,500; the Army, from 100,991 to 138,769 men ; Ordnance, from 8,252 to 14,294: the total increase of men in Army, Navy, and Ord- nance, for that period, being from 135,742 to 196,063—an increase of more than 60,000 men. Lord John Russell thinks that the force was inadequate in 1835 ; and though it has beep so largely increased since that period, his acts prove him to think that the process of increase should still continue. Under the late Government, 15,000 Pensioners were organized as an effective force. Under the present Government, if we understand Lord John's terms, the following are the items of increase : Dockyard Battalions, 18,900 men ; Artillery, 2,843 ; Boat Battalions, 2,016; Infantry; 3,428; Sappers and Miners, 586; guns allot- ted to this force, 1,080: Coast Guard, drilled and organized at a small addition of pay, 2,000 ; added to that force, 6,000 men. Within the last few years—namely, since 1844, the year of the pritchard affair-226,77961. has been expended on strengthen- ing the fortifications at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Devon- port, Pembroke, and Sheerness. The further and future in- crease is to be as follows : Marines, (including 1,500 voted last year,) 3,000: Artillery—Sappers and Miners, 4,000; Royal Ar- tillerymen, 1,450: added to the home force, regiments with- drawn from India, upwards of 5,000: reserved squadrons of steamers at Portsmouth, Cork, and Sheerness. The total in- crease to the Military and Naval Estimates is 358,0001. More- over, Lord John devotes 150,0001. to laying the foundation of a Militia. Though there is no vast increase to the Estimates, there really is an augmentation of forces: the additional number of men at home is considerable—making, one arm with another, more than was demanded in the Duke of Wellington's letter to Sir John Burgoyne ; and although there is no great increase of outlay, it must be remembered that the return of the regiments from India ought to have figured as a reduction, but that the reduction in India is balanced by a real increase at home. In this respect the Government seem to be doing their duty, though they waive the credit of it to escape the hubbub always caused by increased taxation, especially for military purposes. Still there is hubbub ; and to allay it Ministers make a further proposal, which has taken various shapes. First it was a proposal to refer the Military Estimates and Miscellaneous Services to two Secret Committees ; and precedents were cited, in the in- quiries of 1785, '91, '96-7, 1807, '17, and '28. The precedents were uniform only in being infelicitous—each suggesting some unhappy dissimilarity either in the occasion or object of inquiry. Most of them occurred in war-time, when secrecy was justified on various grounds. The inquiry of 1785—a year in which Consols were down to 58—resulted in real fiscal improvements, and the discovery of an enormous default, (40,000,0001.,) such as there is now no reason to suspect. The Committee of 1791 only reported on a very complicated and difficult state of matters, and their re- port led the way to no increase of taxation or additional loan. In 1797 there was the suspension of cash payments, followed by that delusive agricultural " prosperity "—that intoxication, with its headache of the morrow, of which we have just driven away the direct consequences by abolishing the Corn-laws ; surely not to begin the folly over again. The ease of 1817 was more like the present,—only that the country had been exhausted by the long war instead of peace : the inquiry resulted in the sacri- fice of one-tenth of official salaries—is that to be the case now, and will another Marquis Camden cut down his sinecure pay
of 25,0001. to 2,500/. In 1828 there was a totally different state of circumstances—an excess of income over expenditure, and esti- mates reduced by more than a million. These precedents were cited on Monday : by Tuesday, Sir Charles Wood discovered that they did not apply. Sir Charles also made another discovery. At first he talked of " secret " Committees. "Why secret? "everybody asked. The Committees, as Lord John Russell confessed, were not likely to lead to any great reductions ; they were not likely to detect any momentous and unknown facts : the most that was expected of them was to justify the plans of Ministers; but how could that be done by a secret inquiry ? Would the public consent to be sa- tisfied in the persons of thirteen gentlemen? Nor was there any need for secrecy, unless Ministers have the keeping of some un- known and portentous mystery. We are seeking no belligerent advantage abroad, circumventing no suspected defaulters at home, but only wanting to ascertain facts and make arrange- ments patent to all. By Tuesday, however, Sir Charles Wood had discovered that the Committees need not be "secret," but only " select." If there was any hope of smuggling a weak Go- vernment out of the rough conflict of a Committee of the whole House into the sate and silent waters of it Secret Committee, it is abandoned. Ministers have further been forced to declare that they do not seek to shuffle on to the shoulders of the Committees the burthens of responsibility. It does not appear, therefore, of What special use the Committees will prove, except to write a commentary on subjects debated in open House—two large essays on things in general for deposit in the library. inquiry nquiry seems to have occurred to Ministers as something to stand between them and the public : that hope is given up ; but they stand committed to the investigation, and that must go on pro forma.
The Premier admits that there will be no reduction of public burthens. There is merit in the candour, impossible as deception on that point would be. The falling revenue cannot be met by reduced expenditure ; there is no redress for that grossest of national "grievances." Why? Why must the people bear the evil, without hope of remedy except in the turn of the seasons?— Because the country is mechanically ruled by "the system " ; and "the system" is administered by men who lack the powers, if they have the will, to cope with the troubles of their country. The country is undergoing a financial despotism, and no financial Epaminondas or Hampden appears.
That which our expenditure is meant to purchase must go on increasing. The country is growirc, every day more civilized ; its relations with the rest of the globe are incessantly extending; there are more objects for its activity ; it needs more accommoda- tion , more servants, better service; and these things must be paid for. The payment goes on: are its purposes secured ? Is the apparatus of official management to fall out of repair, like old ma- chinery, costing much but losing its power of vigorous action, and suffering the country to sink down to a lower place among the nations ; or are we, awakened to a sense of the lethargy which, is stealing over us, to regain our -vigour and keep our place Suppose we consent to decline. In that case, we may easily save present outlay, at once. We may hand over our obligations to posterity, and leave posterity to compromise with the public creditor, at the easy expense of the national faith. We may cur- tail expenditure, by reducing our public servants, cutting off em- bassies in foreign countries, disbanding our armies, abandoning our colonies, foregoing improvements, forswearing art, and, as
England, if often leads to war, contracting even our trade. ngland, if she please, may become less than Holland—the workshop of [part of] the World, and nothing besides; and she might really save outlay in the process.
Suppose we resolve to keep our place. We must maintain the national credit at all cost ; provide for extended trade extended protection, civil and military ; make more use of our colonies b colonizing. We must augment our public services, civil and military, to meet augmenting demands ; only, as we must emu. cise a stern economy, we must effect the future increase without a corresponding growth of outlay. It would be possible to do so. For instance, we may increase the available numbers o our army by placing our colonies on a footing to provide for their own defence, and enable us to bring home our troops. We may abandon needless meddling in etch petty internal affairs of foreign countries as do not concern us; throw open diploimicy- make it rest, not on secrecy and chicanery, but on good honest statesmanship, and thus simplify its duties and its cost. We may open all public services to ability vice interest; reorganize their personnel, and simplify their duties, so as to obtain more efficiency and more service without more cost, though not without more benefit to the public servants. Public virtue, especially the offi- cial recognition of worth and ability, would set an example to private virtue ; ostentatious luxury would give place to a decorous parsimony—not a starving habit, but the more homely, hearty, well-fed plainness, which used to be typically " English." Then would our burthens become light upon renovated national vigour. Why is not this done?—Not because it is impossible, but for want of statesmen to grapple with the affairs of a living nation of flesh and blood.
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