THE SPECTATOR
AMERICA'S ATTACK ON THE ALLIANCE
S the days since the American bomb-
A
ing of Libya pass, it seems to be more and more generally conceded that the attack is unlikely to prevent terrorism, or even to bring a sympathetic regime to power in Libya. Instead, the defenders of the action, in Britain at least, speak of the thing as an act of just punishment, and emphasise above all that nothing should be done to weaken the Western alliance. Why, the say, should we spoil the relationship be- tween Europe and America because of something as minor as the fate of Libya? This must have been Mrs Thatcher's think- ing when she consented to American use of British air-bases. It is quite unfair to suggest that she merrily rushed into sup- Porting America, wanting Gaddafi's blood. She gave her consent sorrowfully, only because she thought that the obligations of , alliance imposed it. Certainly it is the future of the alliance which is the most important question emerging from the drama.
First we must ask, what are we left with? A cheerful American public, indeed, but also an anti-American Europe, a be- leaguered British Government, scores of dead civilians and a terrorist network not only surviving, but operating with vigour and success. America's best friends abroad are embarrassed and weakened and her best enemies are rather pleased. No triumph is visible. . Of course it is true that the use of force is risky, and any government using it will have to endure criticism and serious set- backs on the road to success. For months before the Falklands were recovered, Bri- tam was in danger of diplomatic isolation, political division at home and military disasters. Even in the invasion of Grenada, the United States had to face international reproach, not only from predictable ene- mies, but from people as respectable as the Queen. But in both cases, the use of force had a clear and attainable purpose — the recovery of British territory in the Falk- lands, the removal of a tinpot regime and its replacement by a pro-American one in Grenada. In both cases, the governments did attain their purpose. Because the suc- cess was so visible, criticism and discontent were muted. The decisive nature of force well used was apparent. In the case of the Libyan attack, it was always impossible that force could be used with this decisive effect. One bombing raid and a little naval bombardment cannot make much impression on a fanatical and international campaign of terror. The raid might have some exemplary effect, it might destroy some important installations, but it can settle nothing. To use violence without having very good reason to think that it will settle something and make future violence less likely is wrong. The Americans lacked that reason, and so were wrong. It is not arcane theorising or prissy moralising to make this judgment — it is commonsense: only act when action will work, and when you want to act nastily, apply this rule with double care.
In the light of this, one must look at what the American government, thought it was doing, and one is bound to detect an unattractive mixture of hysteria and cyn- icism. It was hysterical — righteous though the anger was — to risk so much diplomati- cally and so many lives for such an uncer- tain and inconclusive result. It was cynical to pretend to an overexcited American public that the attack could change the balance of power against terrorism, reduce the danger to American lives and silence a mad dog (it is in the nature of mad dogs that they will not see reason). The Admi- nistration must have known that they could not win by attacking, and yet they attack- ed. In other words, they acted frivolously. That is a very damaging chargé to make against a power which is supposed to be responsible for the peace of the whole world and the freedom of half of it.
It follows that those who criticise Europe's refusal to co-operate are facing the wrong way (although they are right to attack Europe's cowardly evasiveness ab- out Libyan terrorism). It is the United States which has made it clear that its punitive adventures matter more to it than its most important alliance.. It is . Mrs Thateher who understandably paid the Americans the compliment of respecting their motives. Now she, by far the best ally America has got, is paying for her mistake. The electoral consequences are likely to be severe — not, as some have suggested, because Mrs Thatcher will be regarded as a trigger-happy creature of the Americans but because, for the first time, people who are not in any way left-wing will begin to find a non-American defence policy attrac- tive. America demanded of a friend some- thing whch it was not reasonable or friend- ly to ask: the natural result is that the friendship will be impaired.
There always have been many people in America who wanted nothing to do with Europe. Recently, their influence has grown. Those in Britain and Western Europe who wish to counter their influ- ence, who believe that the Atlantic alliance is essential to the peace of the world, will not succeed in placating them by agreeing to whatever they want. If Mrs Thatcher had refused the American request, she would quickly have discovered how much the alliance meant. The discovery might well have been painful, but it would have been worth making. We need to know how we are to be defended and from whom. From now on, we are, bound to be much more uncertain. Who would have thought that a single murdering Muslim poseur could have so disturbed the balance of the West?
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