GERMANY AND THE HERZEGOVINA.
AT first sight, the most important fact that has transpired since we last wrote upon the Eastern question would seem to be the pacific, or rather we should say the restrained, action of Servia, whose Parliament has expressed its absolute
confidence in Prince Milan, whether he recommends war or peace,—which practically means that it has consented to be guided by the suspensive peace policy of Ristics. But we doubt much whether this fact, though of course, in one sense, it is the most important of the week in its bearing on the Turkish imbroglio, is really more than a symptom of what other Powers are doing. The peoples of Servia and Monte- negro are, there is no doubt, most eager for war. If they could but get the slightest intimation of the passive intentions of the Great Powers, they would be at war in a moment. The majority in the Skouptschina or Servian Assembly for the address of con- fidence was largely composed of nominees of the Government, thirty-three of whom have seats in the otherwise elective Assem- bly. The majority for the Government was 71 against 44, the 44 being for immediate war. But if from the 71 who carried the vote of confidence we deduct 33 nominees, there remains of the purely elective part of the Assembly a majority of six (44 against 38) in favour of war. That of course makes no difference, except as regards the impression we ought to derive from this vote concerning the condition of opinion in Servia. Unquestionably Servian popular opinion is eager for war, though it is not unnaturally reluctant to encounter the displeasure of Austria, which might be shown in a very humiliating and painful form. But what we really have to consider is not so much the attitude of Servia, as the forces which determine that attitude. No doubt Servia is being restrained by very active means. But what are the considerations by the use of which she is thus restrained ? No doubt they are the promises and arguments advanced by Austria and Russia ; and as Austria and Russia will, of course, have very great difficulty in agreeing, their own interests being in many respects opposite, we believe that the real casting-vote is likely to remain with Germany,—though if we had a more courageous Foreign Office, it might well be given by England. Now the German Government has just put out a somewhat important, though very carefully ambiguous manifesto, as to its own disinterestedness in the question, by way of rebuke to the writers in its own semi-official Press, who have, it seems, ventured to assume that Germany has primary interests of her own in relation to the struggle,—a view which the German Foreign Office strenuously denies.
The drift of the peremptory rebuke thus addressed by the German official paper,—the Imperial Gazette,—to the whole Press, but especially the semi-official Press of Germany,— which last has, it seems, been writing in a very unauthorised way on this subject,—is simply this :—That the highest interests of Germany are not directly concerned in the question ; that her first object is to support the wishes of the two Empires with which she is allied, and which are directly concerned in the question, since it is a matter of the first moment to them. " The policy of Germany," says this remarkable manifesto, " is far from claiming, purely for the sake of prestige or from a sense of power, a leading position beyond the measure of German interests. To remain the friend of one's friends comes certainly within the domain of German interests." And then the manifesto concludes with a very sharp disavowal of any desire to take these friendly Powers under its " tutelage " in regard to this question. The manifesto is certainly stamped with authority, and reads as if it proceeded from Prince Bis- marck's direct instructions. It is important on this account,— that there is evident in it an irritation at a line of comment in the German Press which had been of a nature to defeat the efforts of the German Government, by exciting the suspicions either of Russia or of Austria as to the dictatorial bent of her great ally.. Now we take this manifesto as a strong confirmation of the view we have more than once expressed, that Germany really does aim at a certain policy of her own in relation to this question, though, of course, she wishes it to be one by which she may lose no friends and make no danger-
ous foes. Otherwise, this official manifesto comes to nothing. Of course, Germany is acting as the friend both of Russia and of Austria, but as Russia and Austria have apposite leanings, Germany, if she is to recon- cile them at all, must do so by presenting a policy of her own which will have some claim to be an intermediate policy between that of Austria and that of Russia. Now what Russia would probably prefer—if it were only possible—would be to keep quiet altogether, till the time seems ready for the great blow which would enable her to break up the Turkish Empire in Europe, and seat herself in Constan- tinople. What Austria would probably prefer would be- an an extension of her own Protectorate over such of the Slavonic States as are most in need of protection against Turkey, without further annexations of purely Slavic States such as would excite that keen jealousy already felt by the Magyars of the Croats. But neither of these ideals is very easy of realisation at present. Russia cannot pose as the Protector of Turkish Christians, and yet refuse to help- them because her plans are not yet matured for a break-up of the Turkish Empire. Austria cannot hold back Servia and Montenegro from the dangerous and, as it might prove, dis- astrous policy of war, without giving them some substantial equivalent for their good behaviour. Both, therefore, are under heavy recognisances, as it were, to do something, and Germany is more likely than any other State to be able to act as umpire between them. Our hope for the agreement of the Powers on some plan for the partial self-government of Bosnia and the Herzegovina is grounded chiefly on the recent tendency of German policy in these regions, and on her evidently advantageous diplomatic position for bringing such an agreement about. If England had any such policy, and were not too timid to press it, England might not only now do Europe a great service, but obtain a. new influence in the German Foreign Office which might prove of no trifling use whenever the next Western mis- understanding recurs.
Previous page
