lam ?assets's HISTORY OP THE BANN OP ENGLAND.

hi the history of a nation, where actions and the actors are the first things that attract. attention, and admit of if they do not require narra- tive or dramatic exhibition, the principles that lurk beneath the narra- tive, causing events and stimulating persons, ought to be clearly evolved, how much more is this exhibition necessary in subjects that partake of the character of science, where the principle is all in all ? An extra- ordinary criminal, a remarkable suit, a particular decision, or an eccen- ticin clerk of court,, may he fitly introduced when they illustrate a. lawy.

or, sparingly, as a relief to drier matters. Such things, however, by no means form a history of law ; any more than gossipy particulars or on- rions anecdotes of philosophers form a history of philosophy, even if garnished with some loose accounts of the facts of their discoveries, while the principles embodied in the facts remain unobserved. From the connexion of the Bank of England with the Government, its long monopoly of the power of acting upon the circulation of the country, and the principles illustrated in almost every great finan- cial question with which it has been involved, the History of the Bank would seem imperatively to require a full exposition of the prin- ciples of currency, such at least as they appear to the historian, with an endeavour to show at each great crisis how far the conduct of the Directors was influential for good or for evil, and how far their decisions were guided by true principles or by any principles. How Abraham Newland " cut up," and the means by which he gained his money—the adventurous arts and frauds of Price, the once celebrated forger, with his anticipation of Jack Ketch by hanging himself—the forgeries and exe- cution of Faantleroy and others—the rush and crush at the doors of the Bank when popular loans were to be subscribed for—with biographical notices of Governors and Directors—are all well enough as gossip, but by no means fitting topics to occupy a prominent place in a professed history of the Bank of England. The formal atatistics of the subject— the amount of capital at various times, the terms on which the succes- sive charters have been granted, the prices of Bank stock, with the dividends thereupon, and the bonuses given to the proprietors, as well as the various runs the Bank has encountered, and the financial crises or panics in which it stood conspicuous—are topics more germane to its real history. Still, they are the superficials of the matter. The eco- nomical condition of the country at the last-named occurrences—the causes which produced them—how far they were inevitable, or to what extent they were owing to the conduct of the public—the course which the Directors pursued, and the results, with the principles to be deduced from their conduct and the circumstances of the case—are the animating soul of a history of the Bank, while the most important of the other points are at best but the body.

This animating spirit will not be found in the pages of Mr. Fraud& It is not that his economical views or his currency doctrines are good, bad, or indifferent : he has none. The currency question scarcely seems to have exercised his thoughts ; and when on great occasions—as the sus- pension of cash payments in 1797, their restoration by Peel in 1819, or the panic of 1825—he cannot well avoid the subject, be either pins his faith to some authority, (mostly the Bank Directors for the time being,) or takes refuge in the truism " that much may be said on both sides"; or if venturing any view of his own, he arrives at the conclusion of the politician in the farce, " that as near as he can guess he cannot telL" A. similar want of financial vocation attends him where facts or regula- tions are in question. He generally quotes statistics, laws, &c., from others. In what may be termed financial events, he looks less to the externals than to the outside. The anxious crowds demanding their money in a panic, or the equally anxious dupes demanding permission to subscribe theirs in a mania, are the things that attract his first attention; as some personal characteristics are what he chiefly regards in individuals. Mr. Francis is all for the visible and tangible—the spirit of events is beyond his ken.

We need scarcely say that those who look fora. scientific or statistical history of the Bank of England will not find it in these volumes. The Vo- lumes, have, however, a merit of their own : they are readable, and even interesting—more so, indeed, than might be expected. They bear about the same relation to a philosophical history of the Bank, as the aneedntical accounts of Mr. Heneage Jesse do to Hume's or Lingard's Eriglan& Courtly, or literary, or personal gossips are numerous enough : Mr. Francis is a bank and business gossip. Had he been born at the Con- quest and lived till now, and been disposed (a bolder supposition) to cut his reminiscences very short,. he might have told his listeners just such a story as he gives his readers, about the persecutions of the earliest money dealers the Jews, and, after their expulsion, of the Lombards; • bow Gresham borrowed money for the Tudors ; how Charles the First seized the deposits in the Mint; and Charles the Second shut up the Exchequer; the style in which the old goldsmiths did their business; how the Bank first opened at Grocer's Hall, and what a poor place the then youngish old lady had in Threadneedle Street when she first set up there ; what a pre- cious squeeze there was in the Rue Quincampoix_ when Law was distri- buting the shares in the Mississippi scheme ; how " the quality " as well as the citizens thronged to. Broker's Alley and jostled each other during the South Sea mania; how the Frenchmen did jabber and gesticulate, when, instead of gold for their notes, they read a decree of the Regent " suspending the payment of them till further orders "' how John Buff roared for Parliament to pay and punish, when he found himself done byi the bursting of the South Sea Bubble; how cleverly the Bank in the '45 managed to stave off stoppage by paying notes in sixpences to their own agents, who took the silver out at one door and then came back again with more notes to repeat the process, so that the public could never get near the counter; and what a sound view that practical mail Mr. Thornton took of the war and invasion panic in '97, and the con- sequent Bank restriction, when he declared the demand for gold was caused by the "want of notes and not of guineas," and that if the Bank had been more liberal in their discounts and in their issues of paper, people would net have run for gold!

There are better, or at least more statistically informing things in the volumes, than mere gossip. The story of the Bank so far as charters and accounts go may be found there ; not very complete, or simply narrated, but still with facts, and facts of value from being brought together. The author has also dug up many curious particulars of the early state of the Bank and its struggles, when goldsmiths pre- sumed to rival it, and could even contemplate its ruin. The following refers to 1715 and the first Jacobite rebellion.

" The feelings of the private bankers towards their great rival do not appear to . have been verysenciliatory. The same writer [of a pamphlet] says— I humbly refer to a case recent in memory, of two goldsmiths (Knights also, and one of them Member of Parliament too) in Fleet Street, who pushed at the Bank of Fragland at the time of the Pretender's invasion from France. One of them, it was said, had gathered a quantity of Bank bills to the value of near 100,0001.; and the other a great sum, though not so many; and it was said, resolved to de- mand them all at once. Let the gentlemen I point atinquire with what difficulty Sir R. Hoare wiped off the imputation of being a favourer of the rebellion, and how often in vain he protested he did it with no such view, and how hard the Whigs were to believe him. Sir Francis Child, indeed, carried it with a higher hand; and afterwards pretended to refuse the bills of the Bank, but still declared he did it as a goldsmith, and as a piece of justice to himself, on some points in which the Bank had, as he alleged, used him ilL' The proposed invasion proved the esteem with which the Bank was regarded by those whose good opinion was worth possessing. It was found that the Protestant succession had supporters as ardent as the adherents to the house of Stuart. When the run took place, many, instead of withdrawing their deposits, carried all their cash to assist the establish- ment. The Lord Treasure:. Godolphin, who as an astute and able financier felt that the credit of the country was convected with that of the Bank, informed the Directors that the Queen would allow for six months an interest of six per cent on their sealed bills. Nor was this all : the Dukes of Marlborough, New- moths and Somerset, with others of the nobility, offered to advance considerable sums of money to the corporation. A private individual who had but 5001. carried it to the Bank : and on the story being told to the Queen, she sent him 1001., with an obligation on the Treasury to repay the whole 5001. It is pleasant to read of such chivalrous devotion repaid in so royal a manner. Encouragement such as this gave &firmness to the establishment; and, united with a call of 20 per cent on the proprietors, enabled the Directors to meet their difficulties and presereetheir - credit."

EPOCHS OF NOTES. •

In 1759, Bank-notes to a smaller amount than 201. were first circulated; and the Directors commenced issues of 151. and 101., to meet the necessity experienced by the community. * In 1795, the corporation commenced an issue of 51. notes. * * The necessity of an issue of notes under Si. being greatly felt by the com- mercial interest, an act was passed on the 3d of March 1797 authorizing it; and by the 10th of the same month, notes for 11. and 21. were ready for delivery.

HANGING FOR ONE-POlJN. D NOTES.

The circulation of 11. notes proved conducive to a melancholy waste of human life. Considering the advances made in the mechanical arts, they were rough and even rode in their execution. Easily imitated, they were also easily circu- lated; and from 1797 the executions for forgery augmented to an extent which bore no proportion to any other class of crime. During six years prior to their issue there was but one capital conviction: during the four following years eighty- five occurred.

THE TRADE IN "FLIMSIES."

The odium thrown upon the Bank for the many deaths which have taken place for forgery must necessarily find some palliation in the subtlety of those who en- tered into the dangerous traffic. It was in truth a trade. The notes were fre- quently sold at so much in the pound, and, as in the instance about to be related, they were often sent into the foreign market. In 1808, Vincent Alessi, a native of one of the Italian states, went to Birmingham to choose some manufactures likely to return a sufficient profit in Spain. Amongst others he sought a brass-founder, who showed him that which he required, and then drew his attention to "another article," -which he said he could sell cheaper than any other person in the trade. Mr. Alessi declined purchasing this, as it proved to be a forged bank-note; upon which he was shown some dollars, as fitter for the Spanish market. These also were declined; although it is not much to the credit of this Italian that he did not at once denounce the dishonesty of the Birmingham brass-founder. It would seem, however, from what followed, that Mr. Alessi was not quite unprepared; as in the evenin he was called on by one John Nicholls, and, after some conversa-

tion he to take a certain quantity of notes, of different value, which were to be for at the rate of six shillings in the pound. Alessi thought this a very profitable business, while it lasted, as he could always procure as many as he liked, by writing for so many dozen candlesticks, calling them Nos. 5, 2, or 1, according to the amount of the note required. The vigilance' of the English police, however, was too much even for the subtlety of a • he was taken by them, and allowed to turn king's evidence; it being thowht very desirable to discover the manufactory whence the notes emanated. In: December, John. Nicholls received a letter from Alessi, stating that he was going to America; that he wanted to see Nicholls in London; that he required twenty dozen candlesticks No. 5, twenty-four dozen No. 1, and four dozen No. 2. Mr. Nicholls, unsuspicious of his correspondent's captivity, and consequent frailty, came forthwith to town to fulfil so important an order. Here an inter- view was planned within hearing of the police-officers. Nicholls came with the forged notes. Aless1connted up the whole sum he was to pay, at six shillings in the pound, saying, " Well, Mr. Nicholls, you will take all my money from me." "Never mind, sir," was the reply; " it will be all returned in the way of business." Alessi then remarked, that it was cold, and put on his hat. This was the signal for the officers. To the dealer's surprise and indignation, he found himself en-

try , with the-counterfeit notes in his possession, to the precise amount in num r and value that had been ordered in the letter. Thus Mr. Nicholls found his business suddenly brought to a close, and the brisk trade in imaginary candle- dlesticks finished, to the, infinite welfare of the public.

The story of the South Sea Bubble, though having small relation to the history of the Bank, is carious, and even appropriate, for its picture of public mania without even plausible grounds to rest upon. It has also smother aspect of interest, as showing that some of the public writers of the day, as in the case of the late Railway mania, distinctly warned the public of the nature of the bubble • but the public then, as now, were not honest speculators, but fraudulent gamesters. To follow this point wonkl lead to greater length than we can afford ; but the following is a proof that there is nothing new, in this century, in the way of impudence and.gullibility.

"The South Sea Company was a legitimate trade to some of the speculation which arose.

"Schemes were proposed which would have been extravagant in 1825, and winch stamped the minds of those who entertained them with what may be truly termed a commercial lunacy. One was for the discovery of perpetual motion. Another fors ubscribing-two millions and a half to a promising design hereafter to bepremalgated: A third was a Company for carrying on an undertaking of greet advantage, but nobody to know what it is; every subscriber who deposits 2/. per share, tobe entitled to 1001. per annum.' Even this insolent attempt on the credulity of the nation succeeded; and when the arch rogue opened his shop the house was beset with applicants. In five hours 2,0001. were deposited in the hands of the projector- and from that day he ceased to be heard of in England. projects like these enlisted the lowest with the highest. On some sixpence and en others one shilling per cent was paid; and as no capital was reqmred, the comparative beggar might indulge in the same adventurous gambling, and enjoy the same bright castles in the air, which marked the dreams of the rich and the

great. Some came so low as to ask only-one shilling deposit on every thousand pounds. Persons of quality, of both sexes, were engaged in these. Avarice triumphed over dignity: gentlemen met their brokers at taverns, ladies at their milliners' shops."

It is said that elderly and very weak-minded people, when suffering under physical pain, often fancy it arises from their position. They cry for change as a relief, and wear out the patience of the attendants by in. cessant alterations of posture, without the slighest benefit. Something like this occurs when rash or desperate speculations infeot a community, induce people to embark in adventures without reason and beyond their means, and when they fail, the cause is in anything rather than them.-

selves. Just now the commercial world is suffering from a mania which has embarked an immense amount of capital in railway speculations not likely to yield the promised profit, or any profit for several years to come. The Bank, as usual, has displayed an incapacity to comprehend its position or the principles on which it should act. The corn-trade has engaged in speculations so rash, that it is said dealers have in some cases paid; or rather have undertaken to pay, freights to a higher amount than the commodity is now worth. And in addition to the folly of man, we have just struggled through a dearth, and are suffering from a scarcity of cotton in proportion to the demand. Hence, of course, extensive de- rangement to commercial men .as well as ruin to gamblers or speculators.

People, however, will not admit that they are in fault : it used to be the Bank—it is now the currency. Yet letus look at some of the results of an issue of paper unchecked but by the necessity of paying in gold. It is a chapter from the panic of 1825.

"The stoppage of the bank of Sir W. Elford, at Plymouth, while it addecl to the alarm in London, created a melancholy scene on the spot. The people were almost frantic. The holders of notes crossed and jostled each other in all direc- tions. There was literally a whole population with food in abundance staring them in the face unable to procure it, as nothing but gold would be taken. Day- break witnessed the bank surrounded by tumultuous mobs, and the civil power mustered in front. ' A night of fearful omen succeeded to many an unfortunate family.' The ran on the Norwich Bank was stopped by the notes of the. Bank of England being given in exchange. " On the 12th of December, the crash which struck terror and alarm throughout London commenced with partners in the banking-house of Sir Peter Pole and

Co., which was said to have yielded 40,0001 a year for the previous seven years, announcing their incapacity to meet the claims of their creditors. At nine oclock this stoppage was known, and the exchange was resorted to to ask the cause,

and inquire if other houses were in danger. Forty-four country banks were con-

nected with the firm, and the ruin of many was anticipated. The agitation of the City exceeded everything that had been witnessed for a century. The Funds fluctuated violently. Rumours of the failures of other firms spread rapidly. On

the 13th, an important house, possessed of half a million of undeniable securities, declared, after a most severe pressure, an inability to meet its creditors. On the 14th, a West-end banker advertised that, though compelled to pause for the pre- sent in his payments, he hoped to resume on the following Saturday; and in this he was successful. On the same day the distress was increased by the stoppage of two firms, known as Sikes, Snaith, and Co. and Everett, Walker, and Go.

The confusion spread; men ran in alarm and dread to draw the balances from the hands of their bankers. Lombard Street was crowded with persons waiting

in anxious fear or idle curiosity. A few gazers around a door was sufficient to

create the destructive rumour that a run was made upon the establishment. But there was no occasion for rumour. The people seemed to anticipate that the

bankers kept all their deposits to answer unreasonable demands, and that the

expense of a banking-house was maintained for the sole purpose of benefiting the public. Many a firm, of unimpeachable honour and unquestionable solvency, was compelled to bend before the storm. The merchant looked to his banker for sup. port; but all the efforts of the latter were directed to save himself from destruc- tion. The usual channela of credit were stopped, and the circulation of the court- try completely deranged. Checks came pouring in from all quarters; and it. was remarked, that the question would soon.be, not who goes, but who stands?'" "For two or three days the most unquestionable security would not procure money; nor could the public funds be said to have a price. fliers was no market for Bank, there were no buyers of East India stock. It wee the opinion of Mr. Hnskisson that in forty-eight hours all dealings would have beeastapped between man and man except by way of barter. Owing to the difference in the money and account prices of Consols, those bankers who were compelled to sell stock to raise cash pawl at the rate of 72 per cent for the necessity."

There is nothing like this now, or any apprehension of it. Numbers of people—large classes of society—are not involved in distress or rain by men with whom they had no connexion or matters over which they-could. exercise no control. The trader who has refrained from speculation, or not diverted his capital from his legitimate business to railway schemes, may be straitened, no doubt, in the general pressure ; but he is safe. Failure is confined to those who have brought it on themselves by their rashness, or to men who have trusted these speculators in the way of business. Solvent and prudent men are secure; upwards of seventy banks are not spreading ruin through the country by their stoppage,, involving traders and non-traders in one common misery.