Wrecking the Shah's dream
Roger Cooper
Although the current absence of bulletins from Iran is seen in some quarters as a sign that the patient is recovering from a critical illness, it is much more probable that the disease has still not run its course. And it is still too soon even to make a realistic prognosis.
The installation of a military government earlier this month seemed to stop the antiregime and anti-Western demonstrations, at least in the capital. These had included the ransacking and burning of selected targets, among them banks, cinemas, liquor stores and the British Embassy. But it is not at all clear whether the generals have broken the strikes crippling many sectors of the economy, most significantly in the vital oil industry. In any case, the forcible restoration of the present semblance of order has done nothing to revive business confidence — once Iran's most precious asset after oil. Access to foreign credits has been cut off when most needed, while actual disinvestment continues in many sectors.
The military regime openly declares itself to be temporary, and the Shah has personally pledged to make up for the 'cruelty and lawlessness' of the past. But scepticism runs deep in Iran today, and neither promise has met with the response which had been hoped for. By arresting many opposition leaders and re-imposing censorship the new government has made it harder than ever to assess popular feeling, but it seems that strikes have turned into go-slows and that widespread antipathy to the regime continues.
The causes of the crisis are to be found in a complex web of social and economic grievances, many going back years. Although the limelight is currently on the seventy-eight-year-old Ayatollah Khomeini, the exiled religious leader now waging his life-long vendetta against the Pahlavi dynasty from Paris, he is not a viable political alternative to the Shah. A religious revival has undoubtedly taken place in Iran over the past two years (as in several other parts of the Muslim world), but Khomeini's current prominence is more the result of his convenience as a rallying-point for the opposition, particularly his relative inviolability abroad, than because of any religious message he may have. Indeed, there are indications that, were he to return to Iran, differences of opinion within the religious groups might become even more evident than they are at present Already,' the main plank in Khomeini's platform — the abol ition of the Pahlavi monarchy — differs from that of the leading ayatollahs in Iran, who call for an 'Islamic government', but say this could be either monarchical or republican. The exiled ayatollah is said to have threatened a jihad (holy war) against the regime and an armed uprising; the ayatollahs in Iran told me recently that a jihad cannot technically be declared against a Muslim ruler, and the Shah clearly qualifies as one, even if his sincerity is sometimes questioned. Moreover, they have constantly counselled passive resistance in the face of overwhelming military might. Khomeini's personal hatred of the Pahlavis is understandable since he lost his father, perhaps his son, and his own liberty at their hands, while his anti-British attitude is not untypical of men of his generation. But his lack of contact with ordinary Iranians, td say nothing of his age, make him a dubious political leader — or even barometer.
The economic causes of Iran's problems date from the sudden upsurge in oil revenues in 1974. Whereas the economy had been progressing rapidly yet soundly in the previous decade, the tripling of foreign exchange revenues to some £10 billiona year, led to a frantic shopping-spree that benefited few people. Inflation, scarcely known before, reached Latin American levels and, as villagers rushed into the towns for their share of the mirage, agriculture stagnated and Iran became more and more dependent on imports. Rents soared, partly as a result of the huge increase in foreign 'experts' — ranging from lorry-drivers to atomic scientists — who were needed to run the new toys. Many personal fortunes were made, but when the economic bubble burst two years later the average Iranian was left with a high cost of living, shortages of even basic necessities and a serious deterioration in the quality of urban living.
But just as serious to the wrecking of the Shah's dream of a 'Great Civilization', a material paradise set in an autocratic and culturally sterile atmosphere, has been the deep dissatisfaction with Iran's westernisation and modernisation. The destruction of symbols of such trends in the recent rampages indicates the extent of this feeling. This is not so unjustified as it may at first seem since the third-rate examples of Western culture, which so often are all that the Third World sees, are hard to defend.
Further social, as opposed to purely religious, discontent stems from the blatant deviations from the spirit of the Constitution, which more than seventy years ago guaranteed a wide range of civil liberties — unfortunately only rarely enjoyed. The legislature and judicature have lost all their power and prestige to the executive, which all too often took on the role of both judge and jury. With extraordinary contempt for popular feeling, a new calendar and a single-party system were introduced, and with corruption rampant the gap between rich and poor was allowed to widen dangerously. For the time being the armed forces are clearly in command. The first indications of the character of Iran's new Prime Minister, former Chief-of-Staff General Gholainreia Azhari, have now come from an interview with The Times, in which he implies that he, and not the Shah, is at present running the country. Predictably, he sees the situation in simple military terms, with himself as a 'fireman, who will fight the fire until he has put it out.' He is not a dictator and will act through Parliament. Yet he talks of Pr°I": osing new laws to 'quicken up' his antr corruption drive, and he has given par' liament only one day to' ratify his cabinet and programme. Significantly, he was even prepared to discuss the possibility of Iran without the Shah, even if only to say be feared such a situation since 'every officer ls so devoted' to him. The Shah's own character cannot, fail to be an important factor. When I interviewed him in mid-September he was depressed, but not completely dejected. I felt stronglY that he was surprised and hurt by the strength and determination of the °prosition to his regime, yet flashes of his old confidence came through. He saw the, opposition as 'anti-national' afl 'communist-inspired', both emotive but largely meaningless expressions in the Iranian context. Later he was to apologise 101 the past, and now General Azhari depicts him as a changed man, one in effect prepared to barter autocracy for dynastic stir" vival. The Shah has also recently repeated his belief that the mystical forces he says have always guided him are urging hinl t° soldier on. It certainly seems unlikely that the Shah would voluntarily give up nwr,e power than was absolutely necessary, so ills present posture must be taken as tactical rather than a case of the leopard reallY changing its spots. Meanwhile there are rumours and counter-rumours and dozens of coth; promise formulas. Most of the latter vvoniu have the effect of papering over cracks ia the opposition's front, which have becorne more visible with success, and limiting the power of the throne. Many would agree that even the Constitution is a Trojan horse, since one provision (never observed) gives a board of religious jurists a legislative veto, Certainly there is a strong case for updating the Constitution.
The army appear to have bought dine, although just how much is uncertain. Ti real challenge to military rule will collie' the strikes, go-slows and demonstration continue, which at the time of writing sees likely. But if the generals find Iran in its present mood ungovernable, or if they can' not tolerate the continued antipathY towards their commander-in-chief, theY may in the end decide that he is expendable. For, as many rulers have discovered to the cost, you cannot buy allegiance, you can only rent it.
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