Russia in Germany
By MARK ARNOLD-FORSTER Berlin, November 19th.
SINCE 1945 the Russians have twice taken big risks in Germany. In June, 1948, they accepted the possibility that their blockade of Western Berlin might lead to war ; and last September, woen they created an East German State, they must have realised that they could hardly fail to shock their friends in Poland. In Eastern Europe the creation of a satellite State is normally a matter of routine, a process which the people themselves can understand, even if they object to it. Yet, when this familiar process was applied to the Soviet Zone of Germany, the Russians took a surprising amount of trouble to exaggerate its significance. In particular they sought to represent the imposition of popular democracy on eighteen million Germans as the result of an irresistible national independence move- ment, actively supported by the whole German people. There was no need, for instance, for Stalin to describe the proceedings as "a turning-point in European history" or to explain that the German and Soviet peoples together possess "the greatest capacity in Europe for the execution of undertakings of universal significance "—as alarming a statement as any Pole could wish to hear. Nor was it necessary, in order to create an East German State, to proclaim the existence in Western Germany of an imaginary "National Front," said to be determined to reunite the whole country and to persuade the Occupying Powers to leave the Germans to their own devices.
There can be no doubt that Stalin was taking a serious risk in sending his remarkably fulsome telegram to the East German Presi- dent, Wilhelm Pieck, and in encouraging the National Front campaign. Moreover, it was a risk which could have been avoided had he been content merely to confer the blessings of popular democracy on another eighteen million people. His willingness to accept that risk is a measure of the importance which he and his advisers must attach to their latest German enterprise. They must, in fact, believe that it is now worth trying to do two things at once, one of which may yet involve them in serious trouble with their Czech and Polish allies. They seem to have decided, in effect, to create yet another People's Democracy in Eastern Germany and, at the same time, to extend their influence in the West. Eventually, no doubt, they hope to persuade the Americans to withdraw their troops from Europe (provided the Red Army withdraws to Konigsberg). But not even Stalin can feel confident that the East Gerrnan Government (and Marshal Rokossovsky) will be able to convince the Poles that the Oder-Neisse line is, in fact, "an immutable frontier of peace."
The immediate problem, that of turning Eastern Germany into a Popular Democracy, should prove to be well within the capacity of an expert like Gregori Maximovich Pushkin. As Soviet Ambassador to the East German Government he may have to vary the technique he used in Hungary, but he is almost bound to succeed in the end. At present the East German Parliament consists of representatives of those political organisations, not all of them Communist organisa- tions, which were already licensed by Soviet Military Govern- ment. Their leaders are all committed to the National Front camoaign, to the preservation of the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent " f ront ier of peace" and to membership of the "Anti-Fascist Demo- critic Block "—a kind of extra-parliamentary coalition designed to
ensure their unanimity on all important issues. And if the worst comes to the worst the Communist-controlled Socialist Unity Party can always count on parliamentary representatives of " mass- organisations " like the Communist Free Trade Unions to provide them with an absolute majority in Parliament.
In practice, however, the East German Parliament's peculiar customs should spare them the trouble and embarrassment of rallying. their supporters in public. Parliament meets once a month (" twice if necessary ") and is then expected to deal unanimously and rapidly with Government business for the next four weeks. So far Govern- ment legislation has been distributed to deputies on the morning of the day on which Parliament is due to meet ; they may discuss it at their party meetings, which usually last all the morning, but in the afternoon, when Parliament meets, there is rarely time for more than one prepared speech of welcome from each party's spokesman. In any case the party leaders are always expected to agree in private to confirm in public that their opinions are, as usual, identical. This system provides the Government of Mr. Pushkin with ample oppor- tunity for persuasive private conversation with recalcitrant deputies, while providing Parliament itself with the minimum opportunity for constructive or critical debate.
But in any case the deputies are powerless ; ever since the end of the war the Soviet authorities have been organising a civil service designed to make any parliamentary system completely superfluous. That civil service is now remarkably efficient and is led by remark- ably competent men, most of whom are loyal Communists. Although the Soviet Zone was divided, in 1945, into five Lander, each with its own provincial Diet and Government, the Russians centralised those departments which they were anxious to control themselves.
Most of Mr. Pushkin's work has, therefore, already been done by his predecessors, who have provided him with a manageable Parliament, a well-trained civil service and a great many armed policemen. He should now find it easy enough to consolidate the Communists' position by causing confusion among the Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats, by judicious encouragement of the Russia-sponsored National Democrats and by installing Com- munists in the few important positions in the civil service still occupied by members of other parties. He can also ensure that the new Government fulfils its promises to the electorate. With Russian help it should be easy enough to abolish rationing (except for fats and meat) by next autumn, to repatriate German prisoners of war from Russia and to release most of the inmates of Russian concentration camps in Germany. And while there is still unemploy- ment in Western Berlin Mr. Pushkin and the Socialist Unity Party will undoubtedly continue successfully to exploit what they describe as a typical example of the capitalist system at work.
Meanwhile some of Mr. Pushkin's colleagues, notably General Chuikov's political adviser, Mr. Scmeonov, still seem to hope that the National Front campaign and organisations like the Nauheim Circle will win support in Western Germany. They have fewer grounds for optimism than Mr. Pushkin. Ultimately, no doubt, they must want to see the whole of Germany subject to a Govern- ment similar to that which now rules the Soviet Zone. In any case they are anxious, for security reasons, to persuade the United States Army that its task in Europe is over. By supporting the National Front and the Nauheim Circle the Russians have nothing to lose, in Germany at any rate. Neither movement has made much progress in the last six months, and their very limited successes have all been due, not to the Russians, but to the Western Allies and the West German authorities.
By slowly dismantling factories in the Ruhr (long after the Russians' own, far more effective, dismantling programme had been completed) the Western Powers did much to further the interests of the National Front ; by allowing unemployment in Western Berlin to exceed a quarter of a million, the Federal Government (and the Western Allies) have done much to restore the failing fortunes of the Socialist Unity Party. And finally, by trying to prevent this week's meeting of the Nauheim Circle, the Prime Minister of the provincial Government in Rhineland-Palatinate has endowed it with an importance it cannot conceivably deserve.
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