THE GROWTH OF MODERATION IN FRANCE.
ATARSHAL MACMAHON'S meeting at Sevres with M. .01 Gambetta has already led to various speculations on the possibility of M. Gambetta's jnining the Government. Of course, there is as yet no substantial ground for such specula- tions. M. Dufaure, though too Conservative for the reat majority of the Republican party, is not likely to be dismissed just at a time when the Senate is showing itself too Gonserva. jive for the Assembly ; and till M. Dufaure resigns, there will be no question of infusing a more Liberal element into the Cabinet, be it M. Jules Simon or M. Gambetta. Still it is, to our eyes, a very significant and very healthy political symptom in France that there should be so much approximation between the Con- servative and the Republican party as is implied in any discussion of the question how far Marshal MacMahon could afford to ask M. Gambetta to join his Government, and how far M. Gambetta could afford to accede to such a request, if it were made. We do not assume that either step would at present be considered safe by him who had to take it. We dare say the Marshal will consider long before he identifies his Govern- ment with one who has so dangerous a reputation for extreme views as M. Gambetta, and that M. Gambetta will consider long before he risks offending the Radical element in his party by consenting to take office under Marshal MacMahon. Even if M. Gambetta himself considers, which is probably not the case, that he has already, as the French journals say, "cut off his tail" by his recent moderation, it would not follow that he could afford to cut off more than his tail ; and of course co-operation with Marshal MakMahon's Govern- ment might imply a rupture with political friends who have not as yet been in any way alienated by his wise moderation. Still, as we have said, it is a great advance that such an approximation as this should now rank at least amongst the discussable possibilities on either side. That is the first step towards its becoming really feasible and gravely practicable. Let the minds of the pious Roman Catholics and the minds of extreme Free-thinkers once become accustomed to the notion of their chief statesmen acting together, on grounds, not, of course, of moral sympathy, but of common practical convictions, having re- gard to the general state of public opinion in France, and we shall soon see an end to those intense and intolerant political antipathies whisk are the explanations of revolutions and reactions and the violent swings of the pendulum between the political dreams of the past and the political dreams of the future. What France mostly needs is that her Liberal statesmen shall cease to think of Conservative policy as a mere dream of wicked tyranny and superstition, and shall begin to think of it as a policy of pardonable timidity and illusion, which should be as much as possible moderated by a wise conformity to the actual convictions of French politicians, journalists, and men of science ; and that her Conservative statesmen, on the other hand, shall cease to think of Liberal policy as a mere dream of wicked impiety and license, and shall begin to think of it as a policy of somewhat too audacious innovation, which should be as much as possible checked by a wise conformity to the earnest convictions of French Catholics, peasant proprietors, and officials. Any ap- proximation like that between Marshal MacMahon and M. Gambetta tends to bring this desirable state of political feeling nearer than before, and its approach would be the best possible omen for the stability of French political institutions.
And for our own part we should say that it would be at least a not inferior, probably a greater, gain for the Liberal party in France to have their chief spokesman accepted by the present head of the French Govern- ment as one of his official advisers, than it would be for the Conservative party to have thus formally recognised that all its opponents are not mere wild and subversive dreamers. As regards the moderation gained,—the power of appreciating at least the practicable character of each others' political ends,— the gain to both parties is equal. But the French Liberal leaders would probably gain more by being set before the nation as capable of co-operating with a Conservative chief, than the French Conservatives would gain by being set before the nation as not afraid to recognise the reasonableness of the more moderate of the Liberal hopes. For what the Liberals have to fear is the intensity of the French panic about revolution. Fear is a far more powerful political motive in France than hope, and in the party of fear, the Conservative party, fear is very much more active and urgent than it is in the party of hope, the Liberal party. Thus, to relieve the Liberals of the disadvantage under which they suffer, owing to the unreasonable panic which their names excite, is to relieve them of a much more dangerous repute, than it would be to relieve the Conservatives of the repute of favouring stagnation, or even reaction; The Conservative fear of revolution is much more lively and active than the Liberal fear of reaction. If the Conservatives once ceased to fear a revolutionist in M. Gambetta, he would gain much more chance as a statesman by being disembarrassed of that reputation, than M. Buffet, for instance, would ever gain by convincing the Liberals that they need not suspect in him a reactionary leader. M. Gambetta's chief existing political im- pediment is, in all probability, the panic his name excites amongst the small landed proprietors and the religious party in France. He has done not a little, both by his many sensible speeches on general politics and by his recent defence of the French embassy to the Vatican, to dimininimh this panic, but nothing would so completely convince the nation that he is not a revolutionist as his taking his place in the Cabinet of Marshal MacMahon. The only countervailing consideration for him is the danger that such a step would so far rank him among the Conservatives as to divert from him the confidence of the Liberal party. But we do not believe that such would be the result. With colleagues like M. Leon Say, and perhaps M. Jules Simon,—for there is no reason in the world why the accession of M. Jules Simon to office, if it preceded that of M. Gambetta should not rather prepare the way for the ex-Dictator than bar the way against him,—the Cabinet would be quite Liberal enough to dispose of any suspicion, founded simply on the ground that he had joined it, that he had gone over to the enemy ; and for the rest, the use of his influence in the Assembly, and the new impulse and drift he would be able to give to the policy of the Govern- ment, ought to be quite sufficient to vindicate him from any imputation of the kind in future.
It is curious and interesting to note by what a gradual process the French are being educated to reach that most im- portant stage in the development of true political freedom, in which the virulent and naked strife of one hostile principle with another is exchanged for a discussion of practical ends, which can be more or less pursued in common by men who hold at bottom different principles. Till this stage is reached, political stability is never secure. There may be and is, no doubt, something morally ennobling in the naked strife of absolutely hostile principles, principles so hostile that men who hold the one are half-justified in believing that those who hold the other must be morally evil. But while this condition of mind remains, there is no hope of that tolerant concession and mutual compromise which is of the very essence of political stability. Besides, we know by our own experi- ence, and also by the experience of France, that the violent assumptions of what may be called the "Crusader" school of politics are very seldom even approximately true. The Ultramontanes are not in general the virulent enemies of human freedom and liberty which they are sup- posed to be, but only men very much misled by the higher aspects of ecclesiastical doctrine. The sceptical Republicans are not in general the poisonous enemies of all religion which they are supposed to be, but only men very much misled by their horror of the crimes and tyranny which they have recognised in the worst acts of the Church. And this at last France is beginning to find out, through those oscillations of the political pendulum from side to side which seem likely to end in proving to sensible devotees of the Church and sensible devotees of humanity, that they really have objects in common, and may reasonably make allowance for those who hold the views of the opposite party. First, the ascendancy of an honest soldier, who was a thorough Conservative, was de- cided on which soothed the panic of the extreme Conserva- tives. Then that honest soldier was compelled, by the very necessity of the case, to accept the popular or republican prin- ciple, which, however, he pledged himself to work in a purely Conservative direction. Then it became apparent that he must modify the sense in which he used the word " Conserva- tive," and must accept more or less Liberal counsellors. Then these Liberal counsellors found themselves compelled to concede so much to his fears and the fears of the country, as to sanction a more or less Conservative constitution. Thus the fear of Conservatives for Liberals had been somewhat dimi- nished by finding the Liberals not so dangerous as they had ap- peared, and the contempt of Liberals for Conservatives bad been somewhat diminished by finding Conservatives not quite so much given up to superstition as had been supposed ; and so it has gone on, till now at last it appears possible that M. Gambetta may one day become one of the Ministers of Marshal MacMahon and that while the Marshal may accept some of his popular measures, he may help the Marshal in putting down that unreasonable craving to wound needlessly the Catholic feeling of France, which is the worst characteristic of the Extreme Left. If this result should ever be really reached, we think we might feel tolerably satisfied that the violent political gyrations in France had at last settled down into that steady ebb and flow of popular feeling on political subjects which truly reflects the mind of a growing nation,
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