BOOKS.
IMPERIAL OUTPOSTS.*
This book has made us feel two things first, that we should like to see every officer in the British Army with the wide vision and interest in the strategical and commercial organisation of the Empire which Colonel Murray displays ; and secondly, that we should desire more evidence before accepting all the very definite conclusions of the author. Not many military writers could have made a book of this sort an even passable success. The facts given are nearly all well known, or, if not at the fingers' ends of the ordinary reader, are at all events immediately available in the Statesman's Year-Book and in gazetteers and encyclopaedias. Bat Colonel Murray does not tell us these simple facts about our Imperial possessions for the sake of repeating a traveller's information under the delusion that it is new. He tells us only what is essential for conducting a strategical argument which embraces the globe. He went round the world by way of Gibraltar, Malta, the Suez Canal, Colombo, the Straits Settlements, China, Japan, and Canada. He gives us here a sweeping bird's-eye view of his journey, and we can recommend it as offering a very interesting non-technical explanation of the problems which present them- selves in order at each of the places visited. Lord Roberts has written a preface to the book, in which he earnestly pleads for universal military service in Britain. We ourselves, as our readers know, join in that demand, for we hold it to be entirely distinct from conscription. The opinion of Lord Roberts is entitled to so much respect that we should like to be quite clear as to his meaning in the following passage from the preface:- " A. notable feature of the higher military organization in Japan is the complete separation of questions of defence from politics. The higher Military Council, which is the supreme council of imperial defence, is composed of Admirals and Generals only, to the exclusion of politicians. The usefulness of the Committee of Imperial Defence, as now constituted in England, is to a large extent neutralized by the inclusion in its deliberations of politicians whose responsibility, as members of the Government of the day, dominates the counsels of the committee, and prevents the free expression of expert opinion. National defence in Great Britain, as in Japan, should be kept apart from party politics."
We agree that on purely strategical problems a civilian's opinion may not be sound, but at some stage expert naval and military opinion on the defence of the Empire has to be fused and harmonised with the civilian opinion of the Cabinet, and the result is presented to Parliament by the Secretary for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty. That is an inevitable process in a democratic country. It seems to us that the Committee of Imperial Defence is the best available laboratory, so to speak, for this process. The only logical alternative to that or some very similar expedient is to dis- pense altogether with the civilian bridge between the naval and military experts and the taxpayer. That would mean that the taxpayer must put his hand respectfully in his pocket at the bidding of an expert who has nothing to do with Parliament. We do not think that Lord Roberts means that ; but if not, we should be glad to know what plan would be better than the present one. Of course we accept the principle that national defence should be as far as humanly possible "above party."
In discussing the Suez Canal and Cape routes to the East
Imperial Outposts: from a Stratsairal and Commercial Aspect, with Special INforence to the Japanese Alliance. By Colonel A. M. Murray. London: John Murray. [12e. ant.]
Colonel Murray argues strongly in favour of the former as the better for war
"Looking at this question from a strategical point of view only, it may be noted that Germany has no naval base in the Mediterranean, but has a well-equipped one in the Cameroon: while the French are installed at Gores as strongly as at Oran and Biserta. Naval opinion has ceased to wobble' on this question, the writer of this chapter having the best reasons for stating that two distinguished naval authorities—Prince Louis of Battenberg and Lord Charles Beresford—have, since the completion of the Admiralty shipbuilding programme, both changed the views which they formerly held, and now believe not only in the necessity, but in the practicability of protecting British commerce along the Mediterranean route during time of war."
As to the possibility of cutting a second and all-British canal to the Red Sea, we agree that it is almost out of the question.
Our moral, if not our literal, obligations to France would make such an enterprise an unfriendly act. As it is, we must be content to exert pressure on the French majority in the administration of the canal in the old way. The administra- tion has been by no means unprogressive, even if it has not
introduced reforms as quickly as Britain desired. The tariff is lower now than it has ever been, and there is good reason to hope for a still lower tariff, as well as for a further broadening of the canal.
The strongest criticism in the book refers to Aden. Colonel Murray can discover nothing in the government of Aden but a
lamentable policy of drift. It is true that the Bombay Presi- dency, to which Aden is attached, has always been inclined to regard this station as "an extra" in the labours of govern- ment. A soldier is sent there in the ordinary course of pro- motion to govern it. It is felt that under a safe man of routine, who does not conceive that he has been appointed with a special mission, the possibility of trouble may never become a reality. But we should like to know exactly how much we should "bite off" before we accepted Colonel Murray's recom- mendation of a forward policy among the tribes who are at present bribed into a peaceful acquiescence in our rule at Aden. The penetration of turbulent districts requires to be done thoroughly or not at all, as our earlier experiences in the Soudan proved to us. Colonel Murray sketches a bold policy, giving very few data, and mentioning no difficulties. But it is not enough to compare the enterprise of the French at Djibuti with our indifference at Aden. The conditions and motives are quite different.
We must now give the words with which Colonel Murray writes of Anglo-Russian relations in Persia. Both countries are still negotiating with Persia, and the attitude of Russia towards us is a matter of the first importance. We can only hope that our improved relations may produce results very different from those described here:— " A stronger assertion of diplomatic pressure seems to be required for the protection of British commercial interests in Persia. The new Customs tariff which was forced on Persia by Russian pressure, and which came into use in 1903, has been carefully drawn up to favour Russian and exclude British imports. The results of the tariff are making themselves felt on British trade with Persia. During 1904 there was a decrease in imports from the United Kingdom amounting to ..629,708, while there was a corresponding Russian increase amounting to £21,935. Owing to the 100 per cent. ad valorem duty placed on tea, there was a decline of 61 per cent. of tea imported into Bonder Abbis as compared with the previous year. In the face of these and other figures, is it not time for Great Britain to give up her laisser-faire policy, and assert her power by requiring a revision of the Customs tariff which was secretly negotiated by Russia when the hands of our people were full with the trouble in Smith Africa?"
The chapter on Ceylon does justice to that excellently governed Crown Colony ; but the financial comparison between Ceylon and the self-governing Colonies is a lapse unworthy of Colonel Murray's general good sense. There can be no comparison of any value between the conditions of life among Cinghalese and Australians or Canadians. When we have Crown Colony government applied to people who could govern themselves if they would, or if there were enough of them, we see apathy like that among the British unofficial class in Singapore, which Colonel Murray is himself the first to deplore. We must pass over his strictures on the un- necessarily expensive arbitration on the Singapore harbour works, and can only mention his warnings about the dangers of the "yellow peril" at Shanghai. He thinks that the difficulties of the self-governing European community at Shanghai might end if by a kind of coup d'etat the present British Consul-General were set-up as Governor. This is- a proposal which,.in our opinion, could not very well come from the British population, though it is notorious that the work of administration is chiefly British. As to the comments on the withdrawal of British battleships from the Far East, we agree that we should never make Japan, merely because she is our ally, responsible for doing what we ought to do ourselves. But we are not quite sure whether Colonel Murray generally approves of Sir John Fisher's redistribution of the Fleet or not. In the earlier part of the book he appears to speak of it with satisfaction, and yet in its present form it is impossible without the abandonment of several old stations. That abandonment no doubt caused too little questioning among the British people. Here is a case in point:— "Till recently Halifax has always been regarded as an important Imperial naval base, large sums of money having been expended from time to time to bring its fortifications and armament up to date. When, under Sir John Fisher's redistribution scheme, the North American and West Indies squadron was reduced to five cruisers, the Admiralty decided that it was no longer necessary to maintain two naval stations in the North Atlantic Ocean, and as Bermuda occupied a more central position for general naval purposes than Halifax, the latter was given up. Both dockyard and fortifications have now been handed over to the colonial authorities. Since Canada has no navy, the gift was in the nature of a white elephant, and, failing other use, the dockyard establishments have been given to the Department of Marine and Fisheries, to serve as a base for its operations in connection with aids to navigation.' The British nation certainly places more trust in Admiralty than War Office 'administration, since the most powerful maritime fortress and naval base on the American Continent has been abandoned by a stroke of the official pen without a single word of justification being demanded by the public or offered by the Government."
Although Colonel Murray has paid special attention to Japan, we shall not follow his example, as his remarks mostly confirm information which has become rather familiar. It is worth while, however, to note the extraordinarily strong assurances which the Marquis Ito gave to him personally of the unalterably pacific intentions of Japan. We should have appreciated a great deal more information about Japanese rule in Korea. We must leave this interesting book with just one word to dissociate ourselves from the author's conception of Mr. Cbamtberlain'e fiscal schemes as a kind of strategical means of linking up the Empire. We desire the linking up quite as ardently as Colonel Murray, but here is a kind of strategy which we are competent to judge and in which we do not believe.
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