Commonwealth and Foreign
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS
By S. GRANT DUFF
Prague.
WHEN, two weeks ago, three German Army corps crossed the Austrian frontier and marched south eastwards with incredible speed, it was feared that they had but one objective —the South Bohemian. frontier. It was calculated that only for the sake of immense profit would Herr Hitler thus trample on Austrian feelings. It was realised that Hitler had solved the problem of secret mobilisation, and with great skill had not only mobilised his army but even directed it towards a new and hitherto unfortified front. In spite of anxious German enquiries about Czech intentions to counter-mobilise, in spite of mutual assurances between the Czech and German Governments that no troops would be marshalled near their frontiers, it was feared that the German attack on Czecho- slovakia was a matter of hours. The hours passed and no attack was made, and people began to draw the conclusion that Germany was weaker and Czechoslovakia stronger than had been thought.
It is now obvious that the German attack on Austria took place after long deliberation and according strictly to plan. The very number of the troops calculated as necessary " to keep order " in a country which, it is declared, was over- whelmingly grateful for the Fiihrer's intervention, seemed to an outsider wholly exorbitant. But it now appears that Germany was really afraid of the outcome of a forced inter- vention. Her gratitude to Italy is only explicable as relief for an attitude not formally agreed upon. It seems that the history of the Rhineland repeated itself almost exactly, except that this time the opposition of the army was overcome by the purge of February 4th, and it is not known whether this time the troops had orders to retire in the event of French mobilisation. It is only known that Germany was afraid, and knew that the risk she was taking was enormous.
More than this, it is now known that the military position of Czechoslovakia is stronger than had been supposed. It seems that the Czechoslovak General Staff had calculated in its plans for defence on the Anschluss. The South Bohemian frontier, so far from being unfortified, was found to be almost as strong as the northern line and simultaneous defence on the two frontiers perfectly feasible. Further- more the Czechs, so far from starting a panic, coolly and calmly took all the measures necessary for adequate self- defence. Within a few days their position had been reinforced by declarations on the part both of the French and of the Russians, that any attack on the integrity of Czechoslovakia would find these Powers immediately at her side. This is no idle boast. No Cabinet crisis in France would continue if Czechoslovakia were attacked, no French Government could possibly accept this vital attack on French security. As for Russia, it is now known that Stalin's purge of the old Communists has strengthened rather than- weakened the military force of Russia, and that the Russian Army is under first-class technical direction.
Militarily, therefore, the effect of the Anschluss on the position of Czechoslovakia is less disastrous than was at first feared. Czechoslovakia is affected only to the same extent that England and France are affected. She is of course threatened, as England and France are threatened, by the fact that the Axis Powers now have a common frontier, and between .them command an unbroken Central block from the Baltic and North Seas to the Mediterranean. But the Czechoslovak Government has never deceived itself upon the meaning of this and has always held that the pre- vention of the Anschluss was a European and not a Czecho- slovak affair. She has learnt nothing in the last two weeks which she did not already know. But if the military position of Czechoslovakia has not changed very considerably, her economic and political situation has taken a rapid turn for the worse. Economically, Czechoslovakia is not theoretically at the mercy of Germany. Her prosperity depends entirely on her export trade, and the only outlets for this are Trieste and Hamburg. Now that the south-eastern as well as the north-western system of communications is in the hands of Germany, there will be no possibility of playing Trieste against Hamburg. Further- more, Germany now takes over the close economic relations which existed between Czechoslovakia and Austria, so that her power to strangle Czechoslovakia is doubly increased. But it must not be forgotten that Germany's power to strangle Czechoslovakia economically is dependent on Germany's capacity to do without the Czechoslovak market, to do without the Czechoslovak raw materials and food supplies, to do without the foreign exchange which comes to her from the transit of• Czechoslovak goods to Hamburg and Trieste. Germany's capacity to dispense with these advantages is far from certain and is certainly not growing. She can apply her strangling methods only by degrees or she will damage herself. It may therefore be assumed that Czechoslovakia can hold out for several years against German economic pressure.
Politically, however, the situation has also deteriorated seriously. Internally, the agitation of the crypto-Nazi Henlein party has been tremendously strengthened by the success of the Austrian Nazis. Enormous faith is again put in German intervention, elections (plebiscite) are seen to open up large possibilities, and a wave of terrorism has been let loose against the German Activist parties who continue their co-operation with the Government. Henlein has issued a call for unity, and new members of the Henlein party are to be admitted only up to June 1st. At the same time, the defeatism of the Czech Right Wing elements who have long demanded a Beckian policy towards Germany has been encouraged.
Germany's strongest weapon is defeatism. Those Europeans, from whatever country they may come, who are convinced that it is in their vital interest that the strongest Military Power should not dispose of the resources of South Eastern Europe, are told that Germany cannot be stopped, that her inevitable progress is towards world-domination, and nothing can be done about it. When England and France stand inactive in the face of the German-Italian advance on all their strategic positions — on the Rhine, in the Mediterranean and in Central Europe, the smaller States of Central Europe incline to accept this preposterous sugges- tion. First the Poles and the Yugoslays, now the Rumanians and Hungarians, hasten to further the German advance, so that at least German gratitude may give them recompense. Thus Czechoslovakia is isolated for the very reason that she represents Anglo-French interests in Central Europe. It is not to be supposed that she will do this forever, nor gratuitously. Sooner or later, she, like the other countries of Central Europe, will choose to count on German gratitude rather than on Anglo-French support. We are bargaining on the assumption that all Czechs, like Masaryk, prefer death to slavery, but we have forgotten that those of a like mind in Germany and Austria have already met their death, and that those of a different mind in Central Europe will soon meet slavery. With Czechoslovakia will go down the last resistance to German aggression in Central Europe. What will happen when Germany can spare all her troops for the Western front, all her bombers for Paris and London ?
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