CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S CHANCES
By RICHARD FREUND
THE political discussions of the Imperial Conference have given new weight to the view that Britain should stand aloof from the quarrels of Central Europe—a view which appears to find more support in the new Cabinet than it did in the old. But few of those who wish to see this country free to develop a common Empire policy in line with the United States have faced the question whether " isolation " is possible. That problem is not to be solved by loose talk of" allowing" Germany to spread her influence in Eastern Europe. Although Britain's advice carries much weight, Eastern Europe is not hers to give away.
A glance at the military situation shows the fallacy of the argument that British neutrality would permit Germany to expand by peaceful means.
Czechoslovakia holds the key position. "A fortress erected by God in the heart of Europe", was Bismarck's. description of that mountain rampart which has stemmed both Germanic and Asiatic thrusts for twenty centuries. Germany cannot expand down the Danube without first removing the flanking threat from the Bohemian hills. True, the threat would be tolerable if Czechoslovakia stood alone ; but it is a matter of life and death for France to maintain her hold on the German rear. No amount of advice from England can persuade France to surrender what is as vital to her as Gibraltar is to the British Empire. It follows that Czechoslovakia cannot be subdued by diplomacy alone. Could she, then, be reduced by indirect intervention on the Spanish model ?
• Germany could probably stir up a rebellion of the Sudeten Germans, though she could no longer count on the Hun- garian minority, which voted solidly for Dr. Benesh at the presidential elections. Of the 3,200,000 Germans in Czecho- slovakia, about two millions live in more or less compact areas adjoining the German frontier. The spearhead of the rising would be the Hertlein Party, which has a sort of S.A. of 30,000 youths. But there is not the slightest doubt that the revolt would be quickly suppressed unless German " volunteers " and war &applies could cross the frontier in sufficient quantities t-3 disorganise the Czech forces.
For the past four ycars the frontier organisation has been heavily reinforced. Blockhouses dot the whole of the hilly, well-wooded border. The most elaborate precautions have been taken to prevent gun-running. Any substantial gaihering of Germans, or any undue influx of German visitors to the Bohemian health resorts, would be countered at once by concentrations of police and troops. If trouble should arise, the Government would immediately mobilise all Germans liable to military service, and both German and Czech opinion holds that few would refuse to join their regiments. The areas affected would be . occupied by military forces, which are entirely adequate to suppress, disorder even if, which is unlikely, as many as roo,000 German "volunteers-"- should get across the frontier.
Indirect intervention of this kind could be effective only as a prelude to open invasion by regular German forces. It is now, I believe, widely admitted that air raids alone are unlikely to enforce surrender. Invasion by land is still the decisive factor. On purely strategic grounds, the best German plan would 'or. to rush the Moravian Gateway, that gap in the mountain ring which has been the traditional point of entry into the Bohemian Basin for thousands of years. Advancing southwestwards from the direction of Ratibor, the German invaders could take Minn and throw a cordon across the " waist" of Czechoslovakia, which at that point is only too miles wide. They could then advance on Prague, while other. German armies, having forced an entry over the Bohemian passes, would take the Czech Army in the-rear.. In practice the scheme has its difficulties. One half of the " Gateway " is held by Poland. The German operations would be based on a bottleneck of 25 miles width, the safety of their flank dependent on the good will of Poland. The risk is well realised in Germany. Moreover, the Moravian Gateway is said to be the most heavily fortified stretch of frontier in Europe. A broad attack on the Bohemian passes seems, therefore, more likely to promise success. That frontier is only lightly fortified, and the Czechs do not intend to hold it in force. They would fight delaying actions, for which the country is suited, and in which the army has been trained for years. If necessary they would give up the whole of Bohemia, including Prague.
The retreat would come to a halt on prepared positions on the two central hill ranges. This would leave Czechoslovakia in possession of a sufficient part of her industry, mineral resources, and food supplies to hold out for some time Competent military circles both here and elsewhere believe that on these lines Czechoslovakia could resist a German attack single-handed for three or four weeks, and that serious guerilla fighting could continue for another three months. The estimate is based on the knowledge that although the Czech air force is not at present in prime condition, the equipment of the army is second to none in Europe, and the fighting qualities of the men are very high. It is further based on the assumption that Austria and Hungary would remain neutral, and that neither France nor Soviet Russia would enter the war. But this is the crux of the problem : if Germany could win in a week, the war might conceivably be localised ; but if Czechoslovakia resists even for the minimum period of three weeks, a European war is inevitable.
Leaving aside treaties and promises, all calculations must begin with the fact that Germany would need one half of her regular army for a war with Czechoslovakia, and another quarter to man the Polish frontier. As she could not be certain that France would remain inactive, she must take precautions on the French frontier as well, and this could not be done without at least partial mobilisation. It is un- thinkable that such a move, however secret, should not lead at once to mobilisation in France. The French and German staffs would then be faced with the knowledge that great advantages will fall to the side which strikes first. The temptation might well be irresistible.
As for Soviet Russia, her obligation to assist Czechoslo- vakia becomes operative only if France moves. For all the blustering of Soviet diplomacy, the Red Army Command has never been in favour of engaging large forces outside. Russian territory ; and the latest crisis seems to have strength- ened the isolationist school of thought. At the same time, hesitations might be swept away, as they were in the early stages of the Spanish war, by an outbreak of public feeling. Poland's attitude cannot be foreseen, for Colonel Beck is not Poland. Hungary would not stir for fear of Rumania and Yugoslavia, who would march to repress a Hungarian move even though they might not—and need not, by their treaties—intervene against Germany. The Austrian regime might succumb to the emotions aroused by the war ; but the Czechs are fully prepared against a German thrust across Austria, while this would make French intervention more certain. Italy would remain neutral whatever happened in Austria ; but she would not go to the length of threatening Yugoslavia and supporting a ',Hungarian mote against Czechoslovakia. - Even if Soviet -Russia did not intervene, it is more than likely that -France would. In that event the recent Locarno agreement, which presupposes 'an " unprovoked:attack 7 On France, would not operate. But would this country really look on to see France defeated and Germany established at the Channel ports ? Only those who are prepared to face that issue hate any right to advocate aloofness from Central European affairs.
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