GERMANY'S AIMS
NOTHING is to be gained by disguising the gravity of the situation created by Germany's action regarding Spain, even if it remains limited to the with- drawal of Germany and Italy from the naval patrol. The suddenness with which the crisis has arisen is bewildering. Everything up to a week ago indicated a relaxation of international tension. The exchanges between Field- Marshal von Blomberg and British Ministers at the time of the Coronation had been markedly friendly. Germany was believed to be ready to co-operate sincerely in the withdrawal of foreign troops from Spain. The return of her representatives, and the Italian, to the Non- Intervention Committee after their temporary absence consequent on the Deutschland '-Almeria incidents was reassuring. And when the British Government invited the German Foreign Minister, Baron von Neurath, to visit London and discuss the relations between the two countries, particularly in regard to Spain, and the invitation was cordially accepted, the outlook appeared more hopeful than it had been for months or even years.
On Monday of this week everything was transformed. On Saturday reports were circulated in Berlin of attempts, completely unsuccessful, on the previous Tuesday and Friday, to torpedo. the German cruiser 'Leipzig' in Spanish waters. On Monday, in accordance with the procedure agreed on less than a week earlier, British, French, German and Italian representatives met in London to discuss what concerted action, if any, should be taken. The first necessity, manifestly, was to establish beyond possibility of doubt the facts regarding the Liepzig ' incident. But that obviously involved enquiry. The captain of the ' Leipzig ' did not claim that either submarine or torpedo or track of a torpedo had been seen ; the presence of the torpedo was said to have been detected by the ship's listening apparatus, added to which some of the crew reported having heard a sound of scraping on the vessel's hull and a diver was said to have found a dent on her plates. The Spanish Government declared that all the Government's sub- marines were in harbour at the time, and offered to prove its statement—though how it could be proved on evidence that was not ex parte is far from clear.
There is, therefore, no conclusive evidence of any torpedo attack on the 'Leipzig' at all—to say that is not to call in question for a moment the Captain of the 'Leipzig's' belief that there was zn attack ; mistakes on such points were frequent during the War—and no proof that if there was it was directed intentionally, at the 'Leipzig' or emanated from a Spanish Government submarine. The last thing the Spanish Government would be likely to do after the ' Deutschland ' episode would be to embroil itself again with the German navy. It was essentially and manifestly a case for investigation. But Germany insisted that. Britain and France should join in a naval demonstration against a Government with which they were in diplomatic relations and which had not been proved at fault. When that was refused Baron von Neurath's visit to London was cancelled by Germany, and Germany and Italy have again withdrawn from the naval patrol.
The seriousness of the situation thus created needs no emphasis, and it is the more serious in that the Made:- quacy of Germany's ostensible motives for acting as she has done inevitably raises the question of what other contributory motives there may be. Germany cannot complain if her policy appears to external observers to be based on pure expediency and opportunism rather than on any fixed principles. That has been so time after time since 1914, when she deemed the moment favourable for tactics that plunged the world in war because she believed, with a fatal lack of perspicacity, that the situation in Ireland was such as to render Great Britain impotent. In the present case there were obvious superficial reasons for supposing that Germany would find it easy to achieve her ends. The news of the execu- tion of eight Russian generals had just shocked the world., and it was natural to suppose that the efficiency of "the Russian army would be considerably impaired, for a time at least, in consequence." Simultaneously France was plunged in a political crisis. The hostility of the Senate to M. Blum's financial proposals was revealed on Friday. The attacks on the ' Leipzig ' were announced in Berlin on Saturday. M. Blum actually resigned in the small hours of Monday morning. While Germany was demanding immediate action on Monday and Tuesday France was without a Government.
Now Germany and Italy have withdrawn from the naval patrol. As result of their defection the whole future of non-intervention is in the melting-pot. Even before the disagreement of the four naval patrol Powers regarding the ' Leipzig ' incident and its sequel had been announced, Lord Plymouth, as chairman of the Non-Intervention Committee, had declared the profound dissatisfaction of the British Government with the failure of various countries to honour the non-interven- tion agreement. The non-intervention principle is unquestionably right. The British Government was unquestionably right in doing its utmost, in concert with France and many other lesser Powers in Europe, to make non-intervention a reality. Not only was the endeavour justified, it has attained a large measure of success. The danger that the Spanish War in its early stages might broaden into a European War was grave, and it has been averted. That there have been breaches of the non- intervention agreement, from which both sides in Spain have benefited, is notorious, but they are nothing to what would have happened if no agreement had existed. The fact that violations of the agreement have to be surreptitious has limited them enormously.
But there comes a point at which the patience of countries which, like Great Britain, have honoured the agreement themselves and watched other States dis- regarding it is exhausted, and that point has been reached today. The Spanish War must either be restricted in scope and duration by the withdrawal of all foreign help, or protracted and possibly expanded alarmingly by external assistance to both sides. Mr. Eden has insisted from the first, and most rightly, that the only proper Government for the Spanish people is the Government the Spanish people want. That doctrine has never been accepted by the German or Italian Dictators. They claim the right to impose a veto on a Government of a particular political colour in Spain, and are going to intolerable lengths in support of the insurgent General who promises to create a. totalitarian State. Non-inter- vention is, in name at least, an endorsement of the British thesis. If non-intervention is to be discarded openly a situation charged with alarming possibilities will be created.
• Hostility to this country is being assiduously fomented in Germany, where it had been too rashly assumed that Britain and France would concur in any steps Germany might propose in retaliation for the reported attack on the 'Leipzig.' Herr Hitler has discovered his mistake, and he has.to reckon with the fact that the French political crisis is over, and that M. Chautemps' Cabinet, with M. Blum as Vice-President of the Council and all the key-Ministers in their old places (except at the Treasury, where the change is for the better), will be at least as strong as its predecessor. The choice lies with Germany. Her spokesmen have repeatedly quoted a recent speech by the new British Ambassador in Berlin. But the essence of what Sir Neville Henderson said was that a Germany standing for peace in Europe would find Britain her best friend. That is still true. But Germany is disastrously mistaken if she thinks, as she sometimes seems to, that democracies will dance to any tune the dictatorships may call.
Previous page
