The League of Nations

Geneva and the Kellogg Pact

[Our readers already know the writings of the editor of the Journal de Geneve. We cannot agree with him that Sir Austen Chamberlain's explanations regarding the Peace Pact need have any adverse effect on American policy. But M. Martin undoubtedly represents a serious element in European opinion.—En. Spectator.] FROM the League point of view the Kellogg Pact is of the highest importance for two reasons. First, it will contribute to increase the sense of security throughout Europe and thus promote disarmament. Secondly, it will tend to regulate one of the most delicate questions with which the League is

confronted, namely, the Monroe Doctrine. It has often been said that the problem of European peace is a problem of dis- armament. Disarmament itself is a question of security. We must, then, first give to the peoples of Europe a confidence that • their security is based on international safeguards ; thereafter it will be comparatively easy to ensure the re- nunciation of the supplementary security of their armed forces.

The League cannot diffuse this sense of security unless the nations concerned are convinced beforehand that Article 16 of the Covenant will be respected in the event of war, and that the Council of the League will name the aggressor State and apply to it the sanctions provided for in the Covenant. Should a catastrophe such as war come to this Continent, it will be too late then to ask ourselves how Article 16 will work.

What is wanted is that the nations should know that it really will work in order that dangerous and adventurous policies shall be discouraged. Every country should know that in case of its being adjudged an aggressor, it will receive no help from any quarter and find itself confronted by an universal coalition against it. No State to-day can make war on its own resources. It must depend on others for its finance, for its equipment and for its raw material : the cutting off such supplies would render modern war impossible.

It was on these lines that the Covenant was conceived, and it would have worked well enough had not the abstention of

the United States from the League upset its very foundation. Up to the present the nations of Europe have not believed—

much less have they had any certainty—that the United States would recognize the verdict of the Council of the League as to who was the aggressor nation in the event of an armed conflict ; and they doubted whether America would participate in the sanctions, and whether she would even abstain from provisioning a State that had broken the Cove- nant. This possibility kept alive a doubt as to the efficacy of Article 16, and might have encouraged some nation, some day, to embark upon an aggressive war.

The abstention of the United States from the Covenant,

has, in a measure, naturally affected the attitude of Great Britain. Could your country have been certain that in ease

of a blockade the American fleet would collaborate with her, such a measure would have been child's play, but if there was a possibility of the United States demanding a complete neutrality within the very wide definition that the Americans place upon neutrality, then there was the risk of a conflict; and the enforcement or attempted enforcement of the sanc- tions of the. League might have brought about a series of complications within the English-speaking World of far graver moment than those difficulties which you sought to assuage by your adherence to the League. This consideration has, without doubt, played an important part in the rejection by

Great Britain of the Geneva Protocol, a rejection which has had all sorts, of unfortunate repercussions in Europe. If

European Security is not yet established, if Disarmament has made little progress, this is due directly to the rejection of the Geneva Protocol by Great Britain, and indirectly to the rejection of the Covenant of the League by the United States. Will the Kellogg Peace Pact change this situation at all ?

Do the United States, in signing it, come nearer to Europe, and do they offer any guarantee of Security ? Legally, they do not. When American statesmen insist that the Pact does not in any sense involve their country in European interven- tion they are absolutely right. But we must view political institutions in a practical rather than a theoretical light. Humanly speaking, what will happen if the Kellogg Pact is violated ? The other signatory States will be free of all obligation towards the violator. The Council of the League will take action, designate the aggressor and apply the sanctions. What in that event will be the moral position of the American Government ? It is difficult to suppose that it could decide against the League and in favour of a State which would have broken a treaty signed in common. The force of circumstances would compel the United States not perhaps to intervene actively against the aggressor State, but at any rate not to furnish it with any kind of help. That would be all, but that would be everything. It is not necessary for the security of Europe that the United States should par- ticipate in the sanctions of the League. For that purpose the Powers of Europe are sufficient unto themselves. But what is indispensable is that the United States should not seek to abrogate those sanctions, and should not assist the belligerent State with raw materials, food-stuffs or credit.

With regard to the Monroe Doctrine, the League is paralysed with regard to some of its members by the reserves made in Article 21 of the Covenant. The nations of Latin America, have several times asked the League, whose Covenant declares that the Monroe Doctrine is compatible with the obligations undertaken by its States-Members, to define more exactly its attitude towards that Doctrine. Quite recently Costa Rica has asked this question officially. It is impossible to give a reply to that country, because the Monroe Doctrine has never been defined internationally. Only by a misuse of words does Article 21 of the Covenant sustain the position that the Monroe Doctrine is an international engagement for the main- tenance of peace ; the Doctrine has never had any inter- national character in practice and has never been recognized by the States to which it applies.

The States of Latin America are warm adherents of the League of Nations, in which they find both an additional guarantee of their independence and a heightening of their international prestige. But the League cannot and does not give these countries the political support to which they are entitled, nor can it apply its principles to the Continent of America without incurring the risk of a veto from the United States. The Monroe Doctrine, in short, is a brake on the progress of the League in one of the most important parts of the world.

Does the Kellogg Pact bring with it any abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine ? On this point the Pact makes no effort at

precision. But Mr. Borah, who is, as all the world knows, the real author of the Pact, has declared through his friend Dr. Morison that the American Government considers the Monroe Doctrine incompatible with the new peace proposals.

Indeed, this is implicit in the Peace Pact itself, because the Monroe Doctrine could only be applied by a war, or at least by the threat of a war, and one cannot do or threaten to do a thing whose performance one has most solemnly abjured. Without therefore expressly discarding the Monroe Doctrine, the Pact should cause it to remain in abeyance.

Unfortunately a new element, which we at Geneva cannot but regret, has entered into the negotiations. I refer to the

reserves introduced by the British Government on the subject of its interests in various parts of the world. These clauses have without doubt been inserted on the assumption that mental reservations were made in the United States concerning the Monroe Doctrine. But by your reservations you have prevented the Peace Pact from having that destructive effect upon the Monroe Doctrine which we had a right to hope for, and you are supporting, indirectly at least, that section of American public opinion which is attached to that Doctrine. These British reserves concerning the Pact are therefore, unintentionally no doubt, working against the League and contributing towards the abandonment of Latin America to the all-powerful influence of the United States.

We ask ourselves in Geneva if British public opinion has well weighed the consequences of the action of its Government on