BOOKS Legions North
By I. A. RICHMOND
„ * THE ROMAN CONQUEST OF BRITAIN, A.D. 43-57.
"Y Donald R. Dudley and Graham Webster. (Batsford, 30s.)
WHEN authors confess that _a study* is attempted with misgiving, a reviewer may share their embarrassment. The fundamental difficulty, however, of the battles which led to the Roman conquest of Britain is not, as the authors claim, that the accounts of them are both summary and exasperating in their lack of precise •topographical detail. This may, indeed, be awkward for a modern commentator, whose appreciation of fighting depends upon a detailed understanding of the terrain over which it took Place. But since this was impossible for the Romans, in default of both maps and illustra- tions, their authors never attempted the task in the modern manner. Their viewpoint, chosen on quite different principles, permitted an overall account, first of the battleground, setting the stage rather than fixing the position, and then of the fighting tactics, in terms of how rather than Where. This accepted, the accounts are often magnificent; but, as remarked in another context, 'cc n'est pas la guerre.'
The real difficulty, not emphasised in this book, is that the battles in question were only too
4t, often themselves inconclusive. The sole decisive victory which settled, a question in one day was that which crushed the Boudiccan revolt, in the account of which, incidentally, all the demerits in comparison with modern treatment are present, While the description of the tactical side is not to be faulted. But the effect, even of so great a victory, depended for immediate success upon quite a different series of operations which had nothing to do with the pitched battles. Victories could be exploited rapidly and safely, half- victories turned into success, because of the solid organisation of occupied territory by roads and garrisons which had been built up from the first days of landing. Herein lay the Roman genius, unspectacular yet systematic, unrelenting and all; pervasive. The description of such measures occupies much of the book, but the inter- dependence of these and the pitched battles re- quires more emphasis. Nor is it wholly appreciated that a system of the kind, by which occupied territory was pene- trated, garrisoned, patrolled and supervised, was one of the consequences of the development of the standing army of the Roman Empire. Britain, Moreover, was one of the provinces to which it Was first applied de novo as a working concept. Governors might come and go, each of widely different personality and attainment, but the sYstem remained as the frame.work within which .all alike had to operat. The network of roads and garrison posts, and the administration which they facilitated, spelt developing peace and pros- PeritY within its meshes for the subject, but Potential disaster for the raider whom they en- tangled. This arcanum imperil, not bruited abroad, could remain unperceived even by the conquered: for when, just after the lower limit of this book, the Boudiccan rebels, 'neglecting
forts and garrisons of the military,' went
t or
easy loot, they left intact the machine which Presently completed their ruin. Tacitus himself, however, leaves this theme undeveloped, stating the facts but ignoring their implications, which did not interest him very much.
Here emerges a curious paradox. The audience to which Tacitus addressed himself was pre- eminently interested in people and personal motives, and no one exploited this taste more adroitly than he. The modern audience, however, is deeply interested in the facts of organisation and its practical working, but the present authors have been unable to rid themselves of the pert sonal terms and are, indeed, often tempted to carry them well beyond the ancient evidence at their disposal. The reaction of the soldiery to the appearance of ex-slave Narcissus on the plat- form of their general officer commanding is well known, almost predictable; but did he ever make a speech, at the terms of which the authors somewhat rashly guess? We are not told so. and surely it was his very appearance that triggered off the great shout of `lo Saturnalia.' That the landing force was divided into three, lest a single effort should make no headway, is well known. But there is no ancient authority for the main force, the decoy force and the western diversion, here assumed with a disquieting aplomb. What remains certain is that almost immediately all the commanders of importance are engaged in the Medway battle, on a single line of advance. How, again, in that battle may a critical enemy movement be deduced from the fact that the senior commander was almost captured, when his position is nowhere revealed? Equally little relation to ancient evidence of another kind is revealed by the comment on the Bredgar coins as a 'modest hoard': they represented; in fact, well over three years' pay for a Claudian legionary, so that ollicer's pay must seem much more likely. The authors thus tend to waver between insufficient use of the facts that the ancient sources supply and the introduction of statements which they do not warrant. For ex- ample, economic motives of conquest are seen in the subsequent exploitation of British metals, which Tacitus styles 'the prize of victory':, and it is not perhaps wholly inconsistent that restric- tions on extraction should presently be imposed. But the ancient source does not state why, whereas the authors know that it was due to complaints by the Spanish mining proprietors.
On the archteological side, a great deal of new material has come to light, much of it due to the work and inspiration of Dr. Webster, and is here usefully stated for the first time. The picture will gain something. however, from a strict comparison with knowledge elsewhere. If the plans Of Waddon and Hod Hill (the latter excavated by the reviewer and not yet pub- lished, but fully, if somewhat erroneously, com- mented upon here) are compared, not with each other, but with such contemporary continental parallels as Hofheim or Valkenburg, the transient nature of their buildings becomes apparent and their function, as temporary holding points only, becomes clear; just as the volume of the con- tinental finds in comparison with the yield from these British sites speaks of the paucity of developed resources that characterises a short initial occupation. It emphasises also the rapid swing towards forward positions- on the fringe of the Lowlands which soon rendered these early positions out-of-date. The authors make the in- teresting suggestion that Ham Hill may perhaps be added to the list of early garrison posts, but it is perhaps fair to say that the scale-armoured jerkin from the site is, in fact; a museum-made piece: the scales were found at different times and even different places on the hill, and a com- parison of photographs published over the years will show how the object grew and how the original fragments have been gradually built into new but not authentic positions.
In this early advance, the work of the fleet becomes important and emphasis is -rightly to be laid on the stores bases. The authors are doubtful how much of the Richborough sea base has been eroded, but enough has, in fact, dis- appeared to allow for at least a doubling of the accommodation. The structural character of the earliest Fishbourne buildings deserves more stress: but most important of all is the potential base on Poole Harbour, with its early north- ward road to Bath and beyond. Its significance lies in the fact that this was the last major northward route, excepting the westerly Fosse Way, before seaborne supplies had to round the Lizard. Once in the Bristol Channel, the early interdependence of sea and land forces becomes apparent. Sea Mills and Gloucester are the only coastal or riverine sites of substantial military garrisons yet discovered: but the signal stations on the high cliffs of North Devon have their part to play. Their siting shows that the sig- nalling went along the coast, as did that of the Yorkshire signal stations 300 years later: with their lofty outlook, these posts were the eyes of an interceptor fleet. But the evidence for early seizure of the Usk valley must raise the question whether, as at Chester, the Flavian legionary fortress of Caerleon may not cover an earlier fort and port, which would ensure entire command of the great estuary. In this frontier world of rough-and-tumble, the Seven Sisters hoard of cavalry metalwork is brought into the picture of retaliation; and the apposite passage of Tacitus, quoted in another context, about the distribution of Roman booty and captives among the tribes, might have been cited here for atmosphere, though not direct connection. The threat of extinction aimed at the Silures did not, however, originate in the province, if Tacitus is carefully read: it proceeded from the imperator, who can only be Claudius. Thus, whatever Ostorius may have felt, and some space is allotted by the authors to his otherwise un- recorded feelings, common talk assigned this pronouncement to higher quarters.
Behind the forward frontier post lay the legionary fortresses. Here more recent work on the Lincoln rampart than is retailed certainly suggests a high vertical back forming a timber box-rampart. At Gloucester, again, the legionary rampart, with its military ovens, has been pub- lished and had revetments of turf of the kind described on Figure 36, though that picture itself can hardly with honesty be claimed to illus- trate such an arrangement. Wroxeter is, however, the crucial site. Emphasis is rightly laid upon the pre3ence of the Fourteenth Legion: but such pottery as has been found did not arrive until Claudius was dead and only just, if at all, within the limits of this book. This means that an earlier position for the legion awaits discovery in the Midlands, with an auxiliary fort first at Wroxeter, as is surely the explanation of the double sites at Gloucester and Kingsholm in relation to Ermine Street. The Deceangli of North Wales, whose name survives in the Flintshire Tegeingle but not in Carnarvonshire Deganwy, were not an immediate objective.
The book does not deal with the corollary of civil development. But the figure of Cogidumnus deserves further consideration. His highly excep- tional position, as rex et legatus August! in Britannia, is not so different from that of the contemporary client-king Herod in relation to the provincial governor, and it will be recalled that Herod received prxtorian rank from Claudius. Nor is the title of legatus necessarily equivalent to that of the governor, whose rela- tion to the legionary legati is to be remembered, and it is with these, rather than the governor, that Cogidumnus is to be compared.
Previous page
