TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE FRENCH AT FASHODA. THERE is little definite fresh news since we last wrote on the subject of Fashoda, but during the past week it has become generally admitted and understood (1) that the white force at Fashoda is the French expedition under Major Marchand; (2) that they are there only in small force; (3) that General Kitchener has been sent to do what we have always declared he would be ordered to do,—namely, insist that the whole course of the main stream of the Nile from the sea to the Lakes must remain in Anglo-Egyptian hands. Here, then, is the situation in a nutshell. We have an overwhelming force on the spot, and though we mean to use it with the utmost respect for French feelings, we also mean to use it firmly and conclusively in order to -prevent the French exercising any sovereign rights at Fashoda, and in order to place Fashoda finally under the British and Egyptian flags. There have been rumours and suggestions in certain quarters that our Govern- ment has not the necessary backbone for playing this strong and simple game. They will trim and hesitate, it is asserted, and allow the French to negotiate about essentials. We do not believe a word of such talk. We believe, instead, that Lord Salisbury and his colleagues will show all the firmness required. But then we have -never given any credit to the wild and ill-founded talk about the present Ministry's lack of pluck, and therefore do not expect the Cabinet to act otherwise than with the requisite courage on an important occasion. After all, what is the foundation for thealleged weakness and pusillanimity of the Cabinet? They wisely refused to hamper France in Madagascar, they acted generously in Tunis—we think too generously, but generosity is not necessarily weakness—and they steadily resisted the efforts of an excited Press and of a cynical Parliamentary opposition led by Little Englanders -to rush them into a war with Russia over a railway panic in China. In our opinion, the members of the present Government have not always shown themselves perfectly discreet in their public utterances, but weak they have not been, nor will they be on the present occasion. Major Marchand, that is, will not be allowed to retain possession of Fashoda. When this part of his task has been accom- plished by the Sirdar, it will be for the French, if they think fit, to withdraw their Ambassador, mobilise their Fleet, and prepare to attack England by land and sea.
But seriously, are the French likely to rush into such a struggle without allies, for allies they would certainly not lave We do not doubt the courage of the French, nor their willingness to fight on a point of honour, but even "Frenchmen do not fight without some reasonable prospect of success ; and what prospect would there be in a war with England? If we had a land frontier with =France, the French Government, in a moment of annoyance _about even a place like Fashoda, might hurl their men across the frontier and take their chance. But in the present instance there would be no opportunity for such daring acts. During a. war with England the Army must sit with folded hands while the French Navy engaged our own. Now, the French Navy is brave and efficient and _large, but even granting, for the purpose of argument, that the French ships, officers, and men are as good, or even a little better, than ours, it is hardly possible that the French could destroy our fleets and leave the way open to invasion. When every possible deduction is made we have an overwhelming preponderance of naval power when compared with France alone. What would almost certainly happen in a maritime war between England and France would be, first the loss of the French fleets, then of the French commerce, and finally of the French colonies. No doubt meantime France would inflict great losses on our commerce, but that would be a small matter in comparison to the injury done to France. Can we then suppose that France will run the risk, and the very grave risk, of such injuries merely in order to try to drive us out of Fashoda, —for that will be the situation as soon as the Sirdar with his vastly superior force has taken possession of all the territory upon which Major Marchand's men are not actually standing? France, unless her statesmen are mad, will not go to war about Fashoda. What, then, will France do in the matter ? Negotiate ? Unless we are grery greatly mistaken, France will use her enforced acquiescence in the occupation of Fashoda by the Sirdar, and the consequent evacuation by Major Marchand, as the ground for a demand that she shall be allowed to retain certain posts and positions on the Bahr-el- Ghazel. What are we to say to such demands Advo- cates of a policy of "Thorough" will tell us that the Bahr- el-Ghazel is part of the Upper Nile Valley, and that we not allow France to take any country in which the waters run down to the Nile. We do not of ourselves consider that such a. heroic policy is necessary. We have always urged in these pages that the necessary an essential thing is to preserve the coarse of the main stream of the Nile,—i.e., the White Nile. That done, and all fear of any band of French territory being interposed between Khartoum and -Uganda being removed, we may examine sympathetically any reasonable proposal on the part of France to keep a portion of the valley of the Bahr-el-Ghazel. We do not suppose that France will make much use of posts on the Bahr-el-Ghazel, or that they will be anything, indeed, but a source of expense. That, however, is the affair of France. If she desires certain posts on the upper waters of the Bahr-el-Ghazel, she may, in our opinion, be allowed to acquire them. The question is, of course, in the last resort, one of how much,—i.e., of how far the French posts can safely be allowed to extend down the Bahr-el- Gliazel. Clearly, they ought not to come right up to the point of junction between theBahr-el-Ghazel and the White Nile. That would be an impossible concession. We have no doubt, however, that it would be possible to find a suitable point some two or three hundred miles up the course of the Bahr-el-Ghazel which could be agreed upon as the northward limit of the French Congo,—for that would be the Colony which would receive any addition of territory on the Bahr-el-Ghazel. These, however, are matters of detail. All we desire to point cut now is that there is no reason why we should not meet any reasonable requests of France in regard to the Bahr-el-Ghazel. The only absolutely essential condition is that we must have the whole course of the main stream of the Nile, and that in no shape or form can we allow any attempt to break the continuity of Anglo-Egyptian territory between Uganda and the Delta.. That- condition once firmly established, we can, and we think ought to, make things easy for France in the matter of the upper waters of the Bahr-el-Ghazel.
One more point remains to be dealt with. The French, it is said in some quarters, hope to use Fashoda as a lever for raising the whole Egyptian question. They will, it is suggested, inform us that they will retire from Fashoda, but only on condition that we discuss the whole Egyptian question. It is hardly necessary to say that any such sug- gestion is entirely inadmissible. No British Government could now possibly discuss the Egyptian question in the French sense, and to pretend that it could would only breed mischief. Our occupation has become permanent, and it would merely be deceiving France to give her any other impression. Even if the Government wanted to do so, which they do not, they could not venture to enter upon evacuation negotiations with France. No Government could live a week that had seriously compromised the country in the matter of leaving Egypt. The British people mean to remain in Egypt, and will no more leave it than the French will leave Tunis. That is a formula which, we fear, wearies some of our readers, but it is nevertheless a true one. Evacuation has, in a. word, passed completely outside the region of practical politics, and no attempt to enter upon negotiations with France based upon any suggestion of evacuation could now possibly be permitted. For good. or ill we are in Egypt, and shall stop there.
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