AUSTRIA AND VENICE.
THE great project of expelling the stranger from Italy, begun with so much effect in 1859 by the aid of French arms' and carried so much nearer to completion in 1860 by Italian arms, by Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel, must be pressed forward to its legitimate termination. If the Italian Government had the will to stop, it is obvious that it has not the power. No movement so purely national has been seen in Europe since 1792; the only approach to it was the Hungarian insurrection of 1848. The whole Italian people passionately desire freedom and independence, and a vast force of this kind cannot be arrested until it has achieved its aim. The next step in the heroic business is the liberation of Venetia, and, unless means can be devised to effect that liberation peace- fully, war must arise. It is impossible that the Italians and their rulers should remain insensible to the agonies and supplications of Venice ; and, indeed, until Venetia is free, Italy will not cease to be a source of European danger. Three motives combine into one great impulse—the noble passion of the people, the forecast of the statesman as regards Italy, and the forecast of the statesman as regards Europe. By one means or another, by dexterous diplomacy or desperate warfare, Venetia must be freed.
Now the title of Austria to Venetia is by no means of ancient date. In its origin it is not pure. Napoleon Bonaparte, in 1797, surreptitiously possessed himself of Venice, expressly for the purpose of employing it as a means of making peace. Venice be- came French by the same means that Genoa became French. The troops of Bonaparte entered to sustain a democratic revolution, and forthwith became masters of the place. Then, when the time came to make peace, Bonaparte handed the ancient Republic over to Austria in exchange for Belgium, just sixty-three years ago. This treaty of Campo Formio is the most ancient title-deed held by Austria to the territories of the Venetian Republic. Purists may say that the title is invalid because it is tainted with fraud. The objection is a piece of hypercriticism; and, even if it were valid, the treaty of Vienna covers the treaty of Campo For- mio. England has no more right to the Cape of Good Hope than Austria has to Venice. On purely diplomatic grounds Austria has an abundant title to her Venetian possessions. She received them from Bonaparte when it was the fashion to effect a peace on the basis of compensations. She conquered them back when the power of Napoleon was rent in pieces, and at the great diplomatic satur- nalia in Vienna her ancient and modern titles to all ber old and new Italian possessions were set forth afresh. As against Govern- ments her title is good, but as against the Venetians her title is worthless • for the Venetians have never acquiesced in the va- lidity of her titles. They have been kept in subjection, as, for years, Ireland was kept in subjection, by the sword. The Aus- trian was a stranger, like the Briton ; but, unlike the Briton, he has not ceased to be a stranger. While Ireland has become English in language and in law, Venetia has remained steadfastly Italian ; her pulses have ever throbbed sympa- thetically with the heart of Italy, and she has yearned to become de facto as well as de jure a part of an Italian nation. When Venice became part of the Austrian domi- nion, even French Republicans bartered provinces like sheep, and the idea of a national Italy, as we now conceive it, had no existence except in the minds of the imaginative few. Austria did nothing unusual in accepting, and Bonaparte did nothing unusual in giving away, Venetia. The critical historian may re- view and condemn the transaction, but he cannot destroy the fact that Austria has a good treaty right to Venetia, and another right pretty well as valid—possession. As reasonable creatures, we are bound to recognize this serious fact. On the other hand, Aus- tria's title is bad, not because she obtained it originally from one
who seized by fraud the territory he afterwards ceded, but be- cause the people of that territory, whose voice in the matter must be heard, have never signed it with their consent. They are the best judges of their own affairs, and they have over and over again declared against the Austrian. In fact, their common daily life is a protest to that effect. Having never acquiesced, they are free to break from subjection, and any nation is free to aid them. There is nothing whatever to limit their action, except the limits of the practical. If they can fling out the stranger, they have a moral right to fling him out. If they can levy war upon him they have a natural right to call in aid; and if the new King of Italy, rightly interpreting the desire of his people and rightly es- timating the consequences to Europe, thinks fit to make war on behalf of fellow citizens held in durance, he would be justified in so doing. The mere fact that a lieutenant of the Austrian Em- peror is at Venice is a valid cams belli for an Italian King. But war in this, as in all other eases, should really be the ultima ratio. The question is, how to get Austria out of Venetia. Can she be got out without recourse to arms ? She stands there at this moment by the classic Italian streams and in the classic Italian towns armed to the teeth, quartering her northern con- scripts in the anoient cities and fair villages of this noble country. Everything seems prepared for war. Forts are armed ; armies are posted as if in campaign; harbours are blocked up, and shore batteries frown upon the sea. Need all this deadly apparatus be set in motion ? Must Italy fight for her full freedom ? Can no means be found, other than those of war, which will clear the country of those who feed upon it and oppress it, and whose pre- sence mars the unity of the great nation rising into existence under our eyes, with Roman obstinacy and mediaeval energy ? Would it be more profitable to Austria in every sense, the highest as well as the lowest, to sell the rights she has acquired during the last sixty years from potentates and from possession ? In the lowest sense, clearly a war would be her ruin ; and no war, but armed expectation, will be ruin almost as surely. In the highest aspect, a war could bring her no credit, no honour, no moral weight in Europe. If successful, she would still be an impossi- bility, an European nuisance in Italy. In the lowest sense, a sale would put money in her empty purse, and would relieve her of a dependency which does not pay. She could, besides, secure fair terms for international commerce, which Italy would be very willing to grant. In the highest sense, she would gain morally a far better position than that she now holds in Europe, if it were only that, by seeing her true interests in regard to Italy, she im- pressed the many races under her sway with some hope that they too would be rightfully dealt with, and permitted to grow happy, prosperous, and free. Austria should remember that Italy will not be her enemy in perpetuity unless she chooses to make her so. Even the Vienna papers, gagged as they are, begin to see that Austrian interests—we may say German, and indeed European interests—dictate a reconciliation. Germany has nothing to fear from an united Italy. In the lowest and the highest sense, Austria would find her profit in an arrangement which would restore Venetia to Italy, and restore Austria to her proper sphere of action.
The best mode of getting Austria out of Venetia would be by a treaty of cession for a pecuniary consideration. But where is Italy to find the purchase money ? Where could Italy find it more readily than in England ? Why should not England ad- vance the sum required or guarantee its payment, taking, of course, adequate security ? Foreign loans we know stink in the nostrils of capitalists, but what country has ever before offered the securities that Italy could offer ? We say nothing of the po- litical motives that might be set forth to warrant the investment. They are manifest. It is said that we have done nothing for Italy, a misstatement of fact, which any Italian who chose might correct. But if we have done nothing heretofore, we might now do what no other nation could do—strive to induce Austria to part with Venetia, and supply Italy with the consideration. If Austria refused to get rid of her burden, if moved by pride and pride alone, and a false estimate of national dignity, she insist on being beaten out of Venetia, on her head be it. She cannot escape her doom. By peaceful means or warlike means, she must be expelled from Venetia, so that Italy may be one ; and, as to the part that England is likely to play, it is certain she will not fight against, and it is not improbable she might fight for, the utter expulsion of Austria from the Italian peninsula.
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