PRINCE BISMARCK ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF MINISTRIES.
AGREAT part of Prince Bismarck's speech on the Official Organisation of the German Empire deals with matters which have no interest for, and indeed, are scarcely intelligible to, an English reader. But Prince Bismarck seldom speaks at-any length without saying things by the way which throw light upon his character and policy, and so have a real importance for every- one. In this instance, he was more than usually discursive, and many who care nothing about the mutual relations of the German and Prussian Ministries will find their acquaintance with the great Chancellor increased by reading what he has to say on the subject. If Prince Bismarck's receipt for making a working Constitution could be trusted to produce the same re- sults in other hands, politicians might profit by the contrast he draws between the Frankfort Parliament of 1848 and the procedure which has ultimately built up the Empire. At Frankfort, the Prince says, every one had made up his mind how things ought to be, but each man left to his neighbour the consideration how they were to be made what they ought to be. The true German states- man is not ashamed to be continually learning how to improve the Constitution. This same disposition to value ends in pro- portion to their capacity of being attained may be observed in Prince Bismarck's foreign policy as well as in his action at home. It is the explanation of his preference for keeping many irons in the fire at the same time, and of the difference which • is sometimes apparent between the policy that he seems to favour and the policy that he actually pursues. He has an accurate appreciation of the value of second-bests in politics, and he is well aware that the second-best need not belong, indeed, most often does not belong, to the same order of things as the absolute-best. Prince Bismarck does not profess to think the German Constitution perfect. But he sees the superiority of an imperfect Constitution which can be kept in working order over a more perfect one which is continually getting into confusion. He recalls the time when he was urged to allow Baden to annex her- self to Prussia. When he refused to do this, there were some who thought that his decision argued a culpable indif- ference to the growth of German unity. But he can now point to a restored German Empire, and ask whether Bavaria would , have been equally willing to join Prussia in 18'70 if Prussia, had annexed Baden in 1866. In the same way, he is called upon from time to time to lessen the influence of the several Govern- ments in the Federal Council, and to create a strong Imperial Ministry, which shall be responsible to the Imperial Parliament. Very likely, he says, it might be a better thing in itself. But then Germany has got a Constitution, and it does not do to be always tinkering forms of government. The German nation is too much disposed to try new experiments. It resembles a farmer who changes his method of farming every year, and would do very much better if he stuck even to an inferior mode. There are fourteen votes in the Federal Council which may be counted on to oppose any novelty, and which
may therefore be counted on to oppose this particular novelty. What is the good of making proposals which are certain to be rejected, and which are not always forgotten when they have been rejected ? The several States of the Empire have certain rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution, and it would be very bad policy to give these States the power of saying that Prussia is trying to deprive them of their rights.
And what, after all, would be the object of thus alarming and irritating them ? To make the Imperial Ministers responsible to the Imperial Parliament. This is precisely the kind of answer which excites Prince Bismarck's contempt. He .is never in the least impressed by mere phrases, and " responsibility " is, in his opinion, a phrase, and nothing more. A Minister, he says, who can be displaced by a Parliamentary majority has no real responsibility. If his- fellow-citizens are of'opinion that he has blundered in the conduct of affairsc.the- Minister goes about his business, just as if a master dislikes' the way in which his servant does his work,,he dieraisseelhimi- Only in the latter case there is no fine talk about respensibiliby.- The-employer only says that a particular man, deer net oat birth, and that he had better-look for another+ place.- All this is marked by such strong practical sense, that it seems scarcely the utterance of the statesman who has enacted the May laws. If it had suited Prince Bismarck to denounce his own ecclesiastical legislation, what an excellent case he would have made out against it. How he would have pointed to the English Constitution, and praised the English capacity for attaining what is attainable, and avoiding what is dangerous. The relations between Church and State in Prussia, he would have said, are not perfect ; but what profit is there in provoking an intense and persistent opposition, merely to enable the State to say that it has not given the least countenance to eccle- siastical pretensions I When secular affairs are under discus- sion, Prince Bismarck can see as clearly as any one that he who brings too much presumption to the conduct of affairs is in danger of meeting with rocks and pitfalls, from which he may have the utmost difficulty in extricating himself. It will long remain one of the most curious problems in contemporary history why Prince Bismarck departed so entirely as regards Church matters from the cautious and tentative policy which has stood him in so much stead in secular matters.
One suggestion thrown out in the course of Prince Bismarck's speech is interesting, because though it refers, in the first in- stance, to Prussia, it is equally applicable, if it is applicable at all, to other countries. " I consider," he says, " that the Prussian Finance Ministry ought to be divided into two divisions, the finance department and the taxation depart- ment The Minister of Taxation ought not to be the Finance Minister too." The reason assigned for this separation is that the functions of the two Ministers are distinct, and even antagonistic. In finance, the thing to be thought of is the Exchequer, and how it is to be filled. In taxation, the thing to be thought of is the trade and com- merce which are the sources of taxation, and how these are to be maintained and increased. Thus, supposing that this system were in force in England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would, as now, have to receive the Estimates from the Depart- ments, and to consider whether the revenue of the year would be sufficient to meet them. If there was a deficit, he would have to go to the Minister of Taxation with a demand for more money. " I am short," he would say," by a million, and it is for you to consider how this million can best be raised." It is not very clear what Prince Bismarck imagines would be the benefit of this division between two Ministers of the work which is now done by one. The reason he assigns is that the Finance Minister will be sure to work for the public treasury rather than for the interests of trade and commerce, whereas the business of the Taxation Minister will be to consider how the interest of every single trade and profession are affected by this or that impost. This is a perfectly true description of the objects of the two processes, and if the Taxation Minister were free to refuse the demand made on him by the Finance Minister, there would be an obvious advantage, from the taxpayer's point of view, in having the two offices held by different men. An appeal would lie, in fact, from the Finance Minister to the Taxation Minister, and if the latter was of opinion that no more taxes could be imposed without doing harm to some trade or profession, and thus lessening the trade and commerce of the country, the appeal would be allowed. But assuming that the money demanded by the Finance Minister has, under any circumstances, to be provided, the Taxation Minister can but make the best of a bad business, and we do not see why this should not be equally well done by the Finance Minister. It is quite intelligible that the Chancellor of 'the Exchequer should lose sight of the interests of the taxpayer in presence of the imperative necessity of raising money for the public service. But if the necessity of raising money is equally imperative on the Taxation Minister, he will be equally forced to put aside the interests of the tax- payer. The only difference will be that, instead of losing sight of them, he will have to shut his eyes to them.
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