TOPICS OF THE DAY.
HOW TO MAKE A " SUBORDINATE " LEGISLA- TURE IMPRACTICABLE.
IT appears to us that the Government are aiming at the very compromise which is most certain to excite every kind of friction between the Supreme Parliament and the Irish Legislature. If there could be any good working ex- periment in the successful co-operation of two legislative bodies,—one supreme and one subordinate,—it is not difficult to lay down the conditions which would best pro- mote smooth mutual relations between the two institutions. Certainly the separate spheres of the two authorities should be as clearly and sharply defined as possible. There should be no sort of doubt as to what the subordinate Legislature might do or what it might not do. There should be no needless ambiguity in the definition of the two spheres, no excuse for saying that the sub- ordinate Legislature had transgressed its proper sphere without intending to transgress it, and had thereby brought upon itself a dangerous and needless con- flict without any guilty inclination to invite such a quarrel. This is the plainest of all the conditions of smooth co-operation,—that there should be no diffi- culty in avoiding a dispute, if it were the hearty wish and purpose of both the Legislatures to avoid it. Nothing can be conceived more fatal to harmony than to leave it open to the subordinate Legislature to attempt, per- fectly innocently and in good faith, an exercise of its supposed rights, with regard to which it would be liable to receive a sharp and humiliating snub from the supreme Legislature, and that too without any reason to apprehend the wound it was preparing for its own natural and legitimate pride. Yet that is precisely what the Constitution-making of the last week has been deliberately aiming at, and, as we should say, rendering all but absolutely inevitable. For example, yesterday week the clause was debated prohibiting the Irish Legislature from making any law to deprive any person "of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accord- ance with settled principles and precedents." The Irish Members were irritated to the last degree by the con- cession of these last words by the Attorney-General ; and whatever may be said, either in favour of or against them, —and a great deal may be said very plausibly on both sides,—no one can reasonably maintain that they are very easy to interpret, that they lay down clearly and sharply a province of legislation on which it is quite illegitimate and dangerous for the Irish Legislature to enter. Any amount of controversy may be raised, and may be quite reasonably raised, as to what is, and what is not, "in accordance with settled principles and precedents." We are perfectly willing to admit that it would be very dangerous to let the Irish Legislature deprive any Irish subject of his life, liberty, or property, in a manner not "in accordance with settled principles and precedents ; " but can a more thorny and difficult discussion be imagined than what is, and. what is not, in accordance with settled principles and precedents ? To make a question of that kind the pivot on which a dispute between the two Legisla- tures may turn, is like constructing a deliberate trap for a quarrel between them. It is a point which the lawyers might discuss for ever, and one concerning which lay- men could hardly, by any amount of prudence and precaution, avoid getting into heated controversy. It is hard to conceive a more elaborate provision for a multitude of bitter disputes, than this attempt to define the field on which the Irish Legislature is to be forbidden to enter. Not only might the Irish Legislature enter upon forbidden ground without any evil intention, but it might trespass on what the Supreme Legislature would honestly bold to be forbidden ground, with the most deliberate and sincere desire not to cross any such boundary. Again, consider the deliberate permission given to the Irish Legislature, under certain circumstances, to enter upon ex post facto legislation, and to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act, without the assent of the Supreme Legislature. We are quite willing to admit that a Legis- lature which is to be in any real sense responsible for the order of any country, should have power to pass an ex post facto law, and to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act on its own responsibility. At the same time, these are very great powers to concede ; and to concede them while denying that they ought to be put in force except under the most urgent conditions,—to concede them while warmly asserting that the right to use them should be promptly vetoed by the Supreme Power unless they are very wisely and forbearingly used,—is to provide carefully for quarrels of the most cruel and dangerous kind. The simple truth is that we are building up a Constitution which the Irish are sure to interpret in one sense, and the English to interpret in another sense. The Irish Members intend the Irish Legislature to be practically independent and supreme. The English Members intend it to be practically dependent and subordinate. And we are taking all the pains in the world to justify both parties in their opposite and contradictory views. Nothing can be clearer than that the power to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act will have been confided to the Irish Legislature, if the Home-rule Bill should ever pass. And nothing can be clearer than that the English Members were encouraged to believe that if it were used, except under very critical circumstances indeed, —and those, too, circumstances clearly showing the justice and impartiality of the Irish Legislature and Administra- tion,—it would be the duty of the Supreme Ministry to advise a veto of the suspending measure. Is it possible- to conceive a more careful preparation for serious quarrels than such an understanding as this ? This is precisely the sort of question on which the national pride of the Irish will be keenly excited, and the national pride of the Union be most sensitive. Yet the Irish Legislature is- positively invited to do what the Supreme Administration and Legislature will understand that it is expected and almost required to forbid. Nor can either the one or the other Legislature be blamed for the inevitable quarrel. The Irish Members may say, and may justly say, that the language of the Attorney-General clearly pointed to their right to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act whenever Ulster might show a disposition to set the Acts of the Dublin Legislature at defiance. The English Members may say, and may justly say, that the interpretation put on Sir Charles Russell's words by the Unionists was disputed both by himself and the Prime Minister in language which raised the greatest doubt as to what those words really meant. And both parties will be quite honest in their view of the matter. Now, here, we do not hesitate to say, is what looks like a most anxious provision for the most serious and fatal misunderstanding which could possibly take place. The Irish Members will maintain that the whole meaning- of the debate was that if Ulster proved self-willed, the Dublin Legislature was to deal with Ulster just as the Westminster Parliament has, under similar circumstances, time after time dealt with Ireland. The English Members will say that this meaning was all but denied by the chief authorities of the Government, and will maintain that the passive resistance of Ulster is precisely a case in which it was never intended that the Dublin Legislature should. have the right to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act. And both parties will have a plausible, indeed a highly plausible, ease..
Again, there is the permission to pass laws seriously in- terfering with the law of contract. It will be shown that the Government deliberately refused to incorporate in the Irish Constitution the provision of the United States Con- stitution forbidding the attempt by any State Legislature to traverse or undermine the binding character of contract. That will be interpreted, and not unreasonably interpreted, by the Irish Legislature, as an implied permission to pass statutes exempting tenants who have joined any such com- bination as the "Plan of Campaign" for instance, from penal consequences. But, of course, that interpretation of a mere omission, a mere negative act, will be denied, and must be denied warmly, by all the friends of law and order both in England and Ireland, and if any such Act is passed to-render tenants joining in a "Plan of Campaign" safe from penal consequences, there will be the most vehement and perfectly justifiable appeal to the Supreme Parliament to veto such a statute. And here again is a veritable pre- paration for a conflict of the most desperate kind between the two Legislatures. On the whole, we have no hesitation in saying that the whole political controversy of this last week has been as fruitful of internecine struggles between. the two Legislatures, in case the Home-rule Bill should ever pass, as if the Irish Legislature had been devised for the express purpose of indefinitely multiplying and intensifying the quarrels between England and Ireland. instead of for the purpose of bringing about a "Union of Hearts."
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