ZULULAND.
IT is mere nonsense, and dangerous nonsense, to talk of the " revolt " which has broken out in Zululand. Even if the official account, which denies an actual outbreak, is too optimist.
Zululand has never been annexed, nor is it a British province, although a British representative holds within it a certain position as amicus curiae and general referee. The truth of the situation is, not that an insurrection has broken out, but that an arrangement, necessarily made in haste on the conclu- sion of the war, has broken down. Sir Garnet Wolseley, on retiring from Zululand, left all power to the leading chiefs who had obeyed Cetewayo, added another or two—one being the Basuto leader Hlubi—and conferred a sort of primacy on John Dunn. He evidently expected that disputes would break out, but he hoped that so shortly after the war a skilful British Resident would be able to keep some sort of peace, and that he would be backed by Dunn, who, though belonging to that dangerous class, the Europeans who prefer savage life, still understood in some vague way the ultimate power of Great Britain. The arrangement worked for a short time, but the Zulus, accustomed to a King who could hold the chiefs in check, never cordially liked it, a famine desolated part of the country, the chiefs, John Dunn in particular, showed themselves oppressive, and, at last, the system gave way. A deputation of influential Zulus asked for the restoration of Cetewayo, and a brother of the ex-King, named Dabuko, resolved, according to private accounts hitherto correct, to clear the way for him. He attacked two of the principal chiefs, and either because he possesses the military capacity of his family—which has for four genera- tions played in Zululand the part of the Hohenzollems in Germany—or because he has been joined by the best fighters in the country, he has, it is stated, defeated his opponents. The territories of one chief (Usibebu) have been occupied, while another (Ohara) has been driven into a cave stronghold, and Dabuko proposes immediately to attack John Dunn. If he defeats him, as is most probable—for Dunn has been taxing his subjects to the skin to make a purse for himself, and is hated on account of his faithlessness to Cetewayo, who made him a chief—Zululand will be in his hands, and he can mount the throne either in his own name, or as Regent for his brother Cetewayo. The provisional arrangement comes to an end, and the old arrangement devised by the people themselves—a military monarchy, with succes- sion confined to a single family—is once more veinstated. It will, of course, be supported by military institutions, and tend to become more or less the organisation so bitterly denounced by Sir Bartle Frere. It is quite clear that this is the organisation which suits the Zulus. It was originally self-developed, it was accepted by all the subdivisions of the race, thousands of whom died in its defence, and when it was swept away by external power, the people lamented its fall, and are now, to all appearance, volun- tarily re-establishing it. They are said to be under the delu- sion that they can restore Cetewayo, and, at all events, they are following the brother, whose first claim on them is that he has once more rebuilt their stringent mili- tary system. Nor, in spite of Sir Bartle Frere's opinion, is it clear that that system is so utterly bad. There is a stage of civilization in which savages benefit greatly by military discipline, and under it advance by degrees to a regular, though often a low kind of settled order. We do not consider the organisation of Sparta monstrous, nor is there any reason to believe that the Zulus with their system suspended are one whit more orderly, or less bloodthirsty, or more inclined to the steady industry which, in English opinion, is the single virtue, except reverence for white faces, to be demanded of black men.
At all events, the opinion of Zulus is clear, and they are prepared to act on it. Sir H. Bulwer himself reports that the Deputation which entered Natal to petition for the restoration of Cetewayo included the King's brother, his four half-brothers, four old chiefs of tribes, three appointed chiefs, and the repre- sentatives of eleven chiefs and five heads of sub-tribes not personally able to attend. With the exception, indeed, of John Dunn, Oham, and Usibebu, the three chiefs now threatened, the Zulu nation was there present, and it is the nation which is now declaring its will in arms. It is evident that under such circumstances the policy of dividing Zululand, and holding its chiefs together through a Resident, has broken down, and the British Ministry must initiate or sanction a new one. So far as we can perceive, there are just three courses, as usual, which it is possible for them to pursue. The first is to withdraw the Resident, and leave Zululand to settle its affairs for itself. We have nothing whatever to do with its affairs, and no responsibility for its fate, except such as attaches to any people who in a war with another have broken up their organisation, a responsi- bility which ceases as soon as the right of self-government is restored. The only objection to that course is, that its results are uncertain, that we do not know who will conquer, and that if, as appears probable, Dabuko is victorious, he may prove aggressive, either against the Boers or Natal. It is not likely that, with his brother's experience before him, he will so prove, but he may. The second course is to restore Cetewayo, who we know can rule, who is not aggressive, and who will be willingly accepted by the people. The only objec- tion to that course is, that it is in the opinion of the colonists of Natal "humiliating," and will lead to great excite- ment among the natives in our own dominion, an objection which will be raised against every plan except the third, the annexation of Zululand. We can, if we please, we suppose, restore order, by sending 5,000 soldiers, defeating any local opposition, removing recalcitrant chiefs of tribes, and declaring the Resident the Governor of a new British province.
It seems to us that the restoration of Cetewayo is the only reasonable course. Simply to abandon the country is to take a leap in the dark, while to annex it is to in- crease the national burden in a very perceptible and onerous degree. It is foolish to annex without garrisoning, and we have no men to spare. We do not want the province, which is no place for settlers, which possesses no geographical or strategic advantages, and which, for half a century to come, could not be made to pay its own expenses ; while if we re- duced it to such order that the Zulus ceased to be warriors, it would within ten years be invaded by new swarms of fighting blacks from the North-West. The electors, though they would submit, would view such an addition to their burdens in South Africa with dismay, rather than gratification ; while all the enemies of Great Britain would be delighted to find that we had voluntarily imposed upon ourselves such a necessity for occa- sional expeditions, sure to be demanded, as now, just at the moment when we had work on hand. With Egypt to protect, we are asked to send an army to arrest a Zulu pretender. If we annex, we must keep order, must do justice, must intro- duce civilisation—must govern, in fact—and we are doing that already among a quarter of the human race. We do not believe the House of Commons will sanction any such extension of responsibilities ; and if it does not, the best alternative is Cetewayo. He, we know, can govern ; he, we know, has felt and understood what British power means. Him we can bring to England, to show what manner of State it is that he has dreamed of re- sisting, and him we can restore without any waste either of treasure or of troops. With Bishop Colenso's appeal for pity to Cetowayo, we have very little sympathy. If it were clearly for the benefit of all South Africa that a savage king, fairly captured in war, should live his life as a prisoner of war, we should hold him captive, only solicitous to harass him as little as the necessity would admit. But we maintain that his detention is of no use, that it is better for English interests that Cetewayo should rule Zulu- land than that Dabuko should rule, or that we should annex the country. It is said he is a black brute, but granting that statement—which is absurd, when we remember how Cetewayo organised his people and negotiated with ourselves— what is that to us ? He is not our choice, but the choice of the Zulu tribes. It is said that he defeated us, but it was in fair fight; and we defeated him in return, broke his kingdom to pieces, and now hold him a powerless captive, threatening suicide because he is not allowed to come to England. It is said that he will execute all "friends of England," but guarantees can be taken for the safety of Hlubi, who has his Basutos behind him ; and John Dunn can be offered permission to retire, with the pro- perty he has accumulated. He is the only man against whom Cetewayo is bitter, or, except the Basuto chief, who was of any assistance in the war ; and we utterly decline, when consider- ing the interests of Great Britain, to think of the interests of John Dunn. He has fought for his own hand throughout, he has failed in the work he was foolishly chosen to do, and if he dies a wealthy settler in Natal, he will have at least as good a destiny as he deserves. As for the danger to Natal, why is it greater from Cetewayo than from Dabuko, or from any other member of the ruling family who may happen to come to the top ? We can protect Natal as easily against the one as the other, indeed more easily, for Cetewayo, like Charles II., will have one definite decision in his mind, that nothing whatever shall induce him to set out on his travels again. His restora- tion will content the Zulus, and between contenting and con- quering them there is, if the rising has occurred, no alternative.
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