THE ROOTS OF THE SPANISH REVOLT

Commonwealth and Foreign

By BASIL BUNTING

THE Communist post-master of Orotava was not too pleased with the election : the Centre looked like winning. He had

on his desk two batches of returns from outlying polling- stations, certain to be Centre or even Right, waiting to be sent to Santa Cruz to complete the voting. He addressed

the bundles to " Don Fulan Fulano, La Corufia : to be left till called for." Before theY could be retrieved the Communist candidate had taken his seat in the Cortes, there was a Left majority, and no chance of the " error " being adjusted.

The majority in February was small, but its first action was to purge parliament by annulling the election of many Catholics and Monarchists and arbitrarily appointing their defeated opponents to sit instead. The process is traditional in Spain, but apt to mislead foreign observers who judge the state of parties in the country by their representation in Parliament.

No one doubts that the popular vote was neither for Socialism nor against the Catholics, but for an amnesty.

" Why," asked our Valued washerwoman, in tears, the day the prisoners returned, " Why did they lock up So-and-so ? Poor fellow, he never did any harm ! He only threw a bomb into a tank "—destroying the water-supply of some hundreds of people and putting some scores of irrigation peones perma- nently out of work. Spain is always against prisons and police.

The enthusiasm for the red flag developed after the election, when the U.G.T. promised immediate work for everybody. A few months later, with rising prices and no great amount of work after all, enthusiasm was abating.

At first the Right was merely cowed. The worst oppressors —landlords and a few politicians—fled to escape the vengeance inevitable after every change of government in Spain. Thou- sands whose consciences were not quite bad enough to drive them into exile were imprisoned illegally, but without rousing much indignation. An uncertain large number were killed. But real trouble began with the Reinstatement decree.

Azafia ordained that everyone who had been dismissed for " political reasons " during the past two years should be immediately reinstated and compensated for a part, sometimes for all, the wages• he had missed. As with the amnesty, it proved impossible to distinguish political from other reasons. In practice everyone had to be reinstated : even those who had been dismissed for fraud or ceased work of their own accord or been evicted by governmental decree had to be compensated at the employer's expense. Many businesses went bankrupt, creating a new and rapidly growing unem- ployed, or were confiscated by the State or seized illegally by the workmen. Those who failed to pay were imprisoned.

Small employers who had voted Left—for the amnesty— were annoyed when they found themselves, in effect, fined large sums merely for being employers. At the same time many workmen engaged after the Asturian rebellion had to be dismissed to make room for the reinstated.

When at last the Cortes had purged itself sufficiently it was expected to legislate the definite programme of the Popular Front, to which the Government was pledged. Unfortunately Azafia betrayed an unsuspected hankering for splendour. The president was deposed—on the absurd legal ground that • the election. had been unnecessary—in favour of the, for the moment, omnipotent leader, who moved into the palace at once and set about redecorating it. The astonished Press hurriedly discovered the need for pomp, to give prestige to the Republic. President Alcala had been content to live as a private citizen in his own house, remitting a large part of his salary in aid of taxes. Azalia announced his intention to live in state, occupied the ex-Queen's suite, reorganised the Guards, reopened the summer-palace in the mountains, and shook the respect many people had begun to feel for the Presidency.

Still the Cortes did nothing but take revenge on obnoxious individuals. Up to the end of June not only the decrees of Seiior Casares but many 'of Azaiia's own had not been legalised. No progress had been made with the programme, 'unless a few purely destructive decrees be reckoned as progress : for instance, abolishing the remains of catholic education without offering any substitute. Hundred of new schools were promised, none opened and no funds provided. No new teachers were being licensed, many old ones suspected of lack of enthusiasm for the Popular Front were dismissed.

Meanwhile it was understood that the Socialist and Communist militias might do pretty much as they pleased— and two years of Right government had left them plenty of heavy scores to pay off. Even before the election Azafia said that after a popular victory the Government must shut its eyes for a period. The period lengthened until it was too late for his successor, Casares, to intervene. The extreme Left, armed, was crying daily for abolition of police and army. The Right, disarmed, found its local leaders in gaol or exile. To avoid punishing transgressions of the Left, the Government attributed every outrage to agents provocateurs. More than once the priest of a gutted church was accused of having burned it himself " to discredit the regime."

Casares spent his time in the War Office juggling the Commands, trying to find a combination that should be powerless to act. The officers, never very hearty republicans, were unnecessarily irritated. After the mutiny' at Meal& de Henares it was easy to foresee the outcome.

Fascism was negligible in Spain before the election. After a month of Seilor Casares's rule Gil Robles complained that great numbers of his Catholic Youth had gone over to Falange Espailol. It is impossible to say what strength the forbidden organisation may have gained in the past few months; but the present revolt is not a Fascist one.

General Franco, who is believed to be a moderate republican, may be forced into the arms of the Monarchists, or driven to disguise a purely military dictatorship as Fascism. His manifesto commits him to nothing. Every government for a decade has feared him and sought to keep him as far from the centre, and from reliable troops, as possible. His brother was one of the founders of the Republic. He is not likely to bring Don Alfonso home if he can help it.

In February there was a small majority for the Left. In March or April it would have been enormous, but much has been lost by governmental incompetence, by the feud of the Socialist leaders, Prieto and Largo Caballero, and by the un- willingness of Anarchist syndicates to co-operate with Socialist trade unions. They strike alternately, not together, and fight each other almost as much as the enemy. There is still a substantial Left majority, the extremer section armed. Against it, the disarmed Right, the officers and the few regular troops—foreign legion, guards. Their discipline counts. Their union, if they can avoid jealousies between the generals, counts. On the whole the forces seem balanced. There may be a long war.

For even if Franco triumphs for the moment he can neither conciliate nor disarm half the nation, and the murder of Calvo Sotelo which precipitated the revolt has deprived the Right of its only able civilian. There would be constantly new Astu- rias, and the moderate men, friends of ex-president Akan Zamora, are not likely to support a military usurper.

If the Popular Front triumphs, it must fall wholly into the hands of the professed Marxists. The Right cannot be kept from arming itself in a country as chaotic as Spain since the Republic. The Civil War will be renewed many times. In my opinion, the Left has the better chance in the long run, for it has, in Spain, the better cause. You cannot starve a nation forever. But the long run may be a Marathon of blood; The problem of government in Spain is to feed the people. The peasants are half-starved and half-clothed, yet it has always been impossible to get a quorum in the Cortes for any economic debate. Spanish Socialism is independent of econo- mics. Could Franco, could Largo Caballero, give the Canary peones, the • Andalucian cowboys, enough to eat and a few coppers for the cinema ? There is no reason to suppose that either of them has the slightest idea how to set about it.