EAST OF SUEZ

Pining for the palms

LAURENCE MARTIN

Mr Edward Heath's speech in Bristol last Friday and his remarks during his recent successful tour of Asia made it quite clear that he still wants to argue the case for an active British military presence East of Suez.

Whatever the form and merits of Mr Heath's ultimate proposals, there is certainly room for some further debate for, with its talk of 'general capability' and its plans for ex- tensive exercises in Asia, even the present Government's ostensibly all-European policy obviously retains a potential for second thoughts.

Two or three years ago I would have been an eager supporter of Mr Heath's in- clination to persist East of Suez. Beyond an unabashed taste for a little grandeur my main interest would have been in support- ing and trying to have a little influence on the American effort to create an orderly balance of power in Asia. The present Labour leadership, so far as I can see, never really abandoned this view; it simply per- suaded itself that the country could not afford the price. There is little sign that the country disagrees with this assessment. I doubt very much whether any British political leadership will actually shoulder much of the East of Suez burden again and I am increasingly convinced that it would be foolish to try. The arguments that have hastened the process of retreat seem much more persuasive as reasons not to ad- vance again.

A variety of purposes made up the case for staying East of Suez. There is the re- lationship with the United States already mentioned. There are our treaty obliga- tions and the uncertain relationship with the larger Asian Commonwealth countries. There are investments and our trading in- terests. There is our so-called contribution to world order. All of these arguments have become less persuasive. • American policy in Asia has clearly be- come an uncertain star by which to steer. The United States is pessimistically reassess- ing the place of military force in its own Asian policy and is doing so under pressures unlikely to be much affected by what Britain does. A role as auxiliary in Asia seems as likely to afford opportunities for discord as for harmony in the Anglo-American relationship.

Our treaty obligations are proving to be adjustable, not without some friction, but apparently without catastrophic resentment. The larger Commonweahh countries in- creasingly rely either on alliance with America or rapprochement with Russia or China for their security. These, again, are relationships on a scale too vast to be overidden by British policy.

We are left chiefly with our overseas in- vestments and world order. Given the virtu- ally unanimous agreement that military action to compel favourable investment policies on developing nations is neither proper nor—more conclusively—practicable, the investment and the international order arguments tend to blend into something called preserving a stable world environ- ment. This one hopes to do by bolstering amiable and rational regimes against foes both foreign and domestic. Britain, declared the 1966 Defence White Paper, 'shares with other countries a general interest in seeing peace maintained, so far as possible. throughout the world. It is this interest above all which justifies our military pre- , sence outside Europe.'

This argument is difficult to refute. It is no answer to point out that most other nations share an interest in peace and man- age to trade and invest without a military presence, for this does not prove that con- ditions for all will not deteriorate if Britain quits. Nor can the suspicion that an alien military presence frequently stirs up as much trouble as it resolves be conclusively demon- strated, though there is not a little evidence to that effect. What has driven the Labour government into retreat has not been an in- tellectual conversion to believing that -the British presence is useless, but a growing conviction that it is too expensive.

Mr Heath has now put a tentative price of £100 million a year on his proposal. Mr Healey has maintained that £300 million is a more realistic price for even a modest presence East of Suez, because of the logisti- cal tail which any specialised force re- quires for its maintenance. It is worth remembering that all the planning, research, development and procurement related to operations East of Suez stopped two years ago, and that starting again becomes more and more expensive as time goes by. But in any case these estimates of what a pre- sence would cost in quiet times are not the most important point. What matters is the potential costs that would be incurred if the force were challenged and found itself in- volved in a sustained campaign, requiring major reinforcements—and these could easily exceed even Mr Healey's figure. To leave these considerations out of account is about as logical as to assess the con- sequences of joining the Foreign Legion by asking the price of the uniform. (I have developed this argument at greater length in a recently-published pamphlet on British defence policy for the Institute of Strategic Studies.)

All the lessons of the recent past are of the rising cost of military interventions. Modern armaments in local hands and mod- ern guerrilla techniques call for expensive countermeasures. The confrontation in Malaysia, of which the British armed forces are justifiably proud, showed how substantial are the forces required by even relatively small operations. Vietnam demonstrates the same point on a gargantuan scale. It also shows the fallacy of believing that one can limit one's liability by offering assistance only with the more sophisticated arms. Once embroiled in a war, especially with allies, it is hard indeed to get out.

Much the same danger attaches to the present official British policy of playing a world wide role with the incidental 'general capability' of the forces we buy for use in NATO. In origin this 'general capability' seems to have been chiefly verbal. After the 1968 Defence White Paper had declared that Britain would no longer maintain any 'special capability' for operations outside Europe, it was politically desirable to say something to our associates East of Suez. The linguistic alternative to a special capa- bility was a general one.

Such a capability has the advantage over a permanent. presence that it can be more

readily withheld. But the more the general capability is flaunted and made the basis of relations implying commitment to others, the less this distinction holds. Once com- mitted, the general capability, like a small presence, will suffer from shortness of wind unless an expensive tail has been provided. Moreover, intelligent foes will know this and may very well doubt the eagerness of a British government to commit the force. Thus it may lack even the deterrent power that might start off the moment of entangle- ment or humiliating inaction.

The fact that the back-up for a standing presence would have to come, as the general capability does by definition, from forces with a role in Europe, is a specific aspect of the tension that must arise between any East of Suez policy on the cheap and our relationships with our European allies.

Some mourners of the East of Suez role have been willing to sacrifice our European effort in their cause, either from a general aversion to the European movement or from a conviction that Europe is militarily stable. Leaving aside the fact that this strategic assessment is certainly enormous and that such a policy would do more to annoy America than any defection East of Suez, it is hard to believe that either Mr Heath or Mr Wilson would reduce Britain's stand- ing in Europe by such an irresponsible policy.

Thus a military role East of Suez must be an addition and not an alternative to our NATO responsibilities. It is an addition that, if it is to be more than a façade that crumbles at the first blow, will entail a sub- stantial running cost and the ever-present possibility of even more expensive involve- ment in actual warfare. Britain could cer- tainly afford to reassume this burden if it wanted to do so. But the cost is likely to be a good deal greater than most en- thusiasts admit. A worthwhile role East of Suez cannot be assumed as a minor correc- tion to the present course of British policy. It would require nothing less than a national decision to devote substantially greater re- sources to defence.