Labour's shabby project
Hugh Trevor-Roper
The referendum is upon us. The Scots — that is, those at present resident in Scotland— are to vote on the Devolution Bill which the Government has contrived to pass on that condition. Few of them know more than the slogans. The arguments have been ventilated over their heads ad nauseam. Postures have been struck, joints have stiffened, voices are cracked and lifeless with repetition. Is there anything further to say? Will anything now said have any effect?
Probably not; but perhaps, since we have all been drenched with this swirling matter, we should now lift our heads above the flood and take a last glimpse of the general points which still rise above it. For this project of devolution, by which at the moment of decision we are all bored stiff, is nevertheless important. It can affect the whole future of Scotland, and of Great Britain.
First of all, how did it ever arise? However it may now be dressed up, the essential fact is that its origins are not Scottish. It was devised in England, by Englishmen; and they devised it not to satisfy any Scottish demand or interest but solely to buttress a failing parliamentary position at Westminster. Both parties yielded to a momentary panic caused by the electoral success of Scottish and Welsh nationalists; and both, without thought, set out on a course of appeasement.
Particularly the Labour Party. For Scotland (like Wales) is largely a Labour fief. It sends more members to Parliament than its population warrants, and those members are predominantly Labour. If those fiefs should be undermined by nationalism, Labour might never again rule in Britain. Therefore (the Labour argument ran) the nationalist thunder must be stolen by the spontaneous offer of half their programme: of devolution.
Such was the sole origin and purpose of the present project. It springs not from the known needs of Scotland but from the supposed needs of the Labour Party. To some, of course, that may be sufficient justification. But even in their terms, is the reasoning sound? To answer this we have to pose another question. Why do Scottish electors vote for the SNP? Some, of course, — the hard core of the Party — believe in its central aim, the break-up of Britain. But others do not. They vote for the SNP either because it is more active in community politics than the tired and complacent monopolists of the local Labour Party, or simply as a protest, to record their distaste for the equal spinelessness of the two major parties. In England, such people vote Liberal. To deduce from this that the major parties could reclaim such persons, in Scotland, by a diluted nationalism is no more rational than to suppose that they could reclaim them, in England, by a diluted Liberalism. A charge of spinelessness is not refuted by removing still more of the spine.
Thus my first general point is that the project is tainted at its source. It did not originate in Scotland. It is not a national response to Scottish needs. It is a device to preserve an electoral fief. And even as such, it is based on wrong premises.
If this is so, it can hardly lead to right conclusions. The advocates of the present programme, while admitting its faults (in general terms), declare that it will nevertheless provide the basis for orderly development. Scottish national aspirations will be satisfied with an Assembly; the SNP, with its radical aims of separation, will wither away; and there will be no more tears. Unfortunately, to this comfortable argument there is one fatal objection. If it were true, the SNP should obviously oppose devolution as an infamous trick to frustrate all their plans. In fact — as anyone can see who reads the Scottish papers — they are its most vocal supporters. It is their organisers, their publicists, their prospective legislators who take the lead in calling for the fulfilment of a programme whose avowed purpose is to block them. Clearly they are confident that it will not, and they do not conceal the reasons for their confidence. They see devolution not as a block but as a springboard: a springboard to separation.
Who is to judge between such opposite predictions? All we can say about the cosy prophecies of the devolutionists is that they have never been supported by reasons. We are not told why their solution will work, only that it will work. We are given bland assurances like those other assurances that only a Labour government can control strikes, or keep down inflation, or get on with the Russians. Such assurances are difficult to ansWer, but they are also difficult to believe — and for the same reason. They are at best a declaration of faith, at worst eye-wash, but in no sense rational arguments, for they do not face undisputed facts or reasoned objections based on those facts.
For what are the undisputed facts? It is undisputed that devolution as planned will entail a great increase in bureacracy in Scotland. It is undisputed that there will be areas of potential disagreement between Assembly and Parliament which can be dangerously exploited. It is undisputed that there will be anomalies which are bound to lead to reactions in England. None of these difficulties are faced by the devolutionists. We are simply asked not to look at them, so that they may go quietly away.
Most important, in the long run, are relations with England. Sometimes it seems that British governments, in their zeal to appease Scottish and Welsh nationalism, forget about England; for English nationalism is seldom expressed. But if insulted, it may be aroused. At present it is being insulted. Why, for instance, does the government, in pushing its project, never face 'the West Lothian question'? Why (except to preserve Labour fief) should the Scots both be over-represented at Westminster and have a separate assembly in Edinburgh? Why should these superfluous and under-employed Scottish MPs be further privileged to legislate in internal English affairs while internal Scottish affairs are reserved from Parliament altogether? Why should Scotland be treated more favourably than English regions? If friction develops between the two legislatures — and we can foresee many occasions for it — the privileges of the Scots will soon be resented; and the sovereignty of Parliament, which devolution is designed to preserve, may founder in the end not through Scottish nationalism but through English hatred. In that case, it would be better to separate amicably now.
The devolutionists state that their present programme is a viable middle course bet ween the strains of Union and the dangers of separation. We may remark that their expert advisers appear to be less certain. The programme is justified, ultimately, by the report of the Kilbrandon Commission in 1973. But two members of that Commission, who signed the majority report, having looked at its consequences, have since changed their minds. Lord Kilbrandon himself now speaks as a separatist. Mrs Trenaman has declared her conversion to unionism. These are the real alternatives.
gerry-built, gerrymandering half-way house of devolution rests on rotten planks slung precariously across the chasm between them.
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