A FEDERAL PALESTINE
By A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
THE Middle East, lying in the centre of the civilised world, at the cross roads of three continents, is of vital importance to the British Empire. Her main artery of com- munications with the East by land, sea and air, passes through it, and the security of her African possessions would be imperilled if she lost effective control. It seems probable that in a future war the main responsibility for the defence of the Western Mediterranean would fall on France, and of the Eastern on Britain.
Defence of the Eastern Mediterranean can be conducted from three bases—Egypt, Cyprus and Palestine. The recent crisis revealed that Egypt was eager to play her part, for she is acutely conscious of the dangers of Italian expansion from Libya and Abyssinia. She will, however, be fully occupied in defending her western boundaries and the Suez ('anal, for roads of strategic importance have already been constructed in Libya running up to the Egyptian border, while the Canal is within striking distance of the Italian air- base at Benghazi. Cyprus, again, is very vulnerable to air attack from the Dodecanese, where the nearest base is only 200 miles away, at Castelrosso. Italian submarines and speed-boats will also operate from these islands.
Palestine is strategically the most important of the three. She is furthest removed from the danger of air-attack, while Haifa, in addition to being a valuable port, must be the depot for the British Navy's oil-driven Mediterranean fleet. The route to the East overland to Akaba, the important but undeveloped port at the head of the Red Sea, provides a valuable alternative to Suez,— and Akaba itself is a natural naval and sea-plane base, and is easily defensible from air-attack by suitable gun-emplacements on the plateau that surrounds it. Should existing schemes for large-scale colonisation of the Negeb be successfully undertaken, Akaba's importance will increase and good motor-roads will link it with Gaza and Jerusalem. Palestine has valuable mineral resources, of which potash and magnesium are the most important. She is already becoming industrialised, and existing industries could be readily adapted in time of war to the production of mechanical and other armament equipment. Given a period of peace the expansion or industry would proceed apace.
It is obvious, however, that on the outbreak of war the bulk of the British troops in the Eastern Mediterranean would have to be concentrated on the Western border of Egypt and around the Suez Canal. It would be impossible to leave in Palestine the two and a half divisions that are now there, and the safety of the country, and consequently its usefulness as a base, would to a great extent depend upon the ability and willingness of the inhabitants to co- operate on land with British air and sea forces and upon the goodwill of neighbouring Arab States.
The neighbours of Palestine and Transjordan are the French Mandated territories of Syria and Lebanon in the north, Iraq in the east, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt in the south and west. With Egypt and Iraq Great Britain has close Treaty relations which incorporate military conventions. Saudi-Arabia is, in general, well-disposed, but, in common with Egypt and Iraq, she has Pan-Arab aspirations which she feels to be impeded by the continuance of both the French and British Mandates. Friendship towards Great Britain in all the independent Arab countries would, in fact, be strengthened by any action on our part which would facilitate a union of the Arab world.
The Jewish community in Palestine could be counted upon to remain loyal to the Western democracies—they have received little encouragement from Germany and Italy to adopt another attitude. But if the Arabs in Palestine and Transjordan were in revolt, the Jews would be fully occupied in protecting themselves, whereas in different circumstances they might fill an entirely different role. There are something over four hundred thousand Jews already in Palestine, and the percentage of young adult males is higher than in any other country owing to immigration, so that in a Palestine at peace within itself their assistance to Great Britain might be quite considerable. In addition the stabil- ising influence that a modern Jewish community would have on a backward and rather fickle Arab world should not be forgotten. Arab co-operation in Palestine will depend upon the extent to which we can grant Arab demands. These may be summarised as—cessation of Jewish immigration ; no partition; independence. The first is incompatible with our promises in the Balfour Declaration and our obligations to the Jews, and the second—partition—has been abandoned by the British Government. But the granting of indepen- dence is feasible provided it does not rule out further Jewish immigration, at any rate within a limited area and makes provision for the security of the existing Jewish community.
In Iraq the Assyrian minority was massacred shortly after the withdrawal of British support, largely because the Assyrians were regarded as Great Britain's protégés and were identified with the imperial yoke. In Palestine, unless special safeguards were introduced, the position might well be similar, for the Arabs feel that the policy of " the National Home " means control by the Mandatory Power and has postponed independence. Both Arab and Jew are Semitic, but the one is backward, uneducated and indigent, the other highly trained and Europeanised. That, given a period of apprenticeship, the races can settle down together is proved by the Jewish community in Iraq, which lives at peace with the Arabs around. But it is impossible to fuse two such widely-differing communities into one homogeneous nation within a few years, and the government in Palestine must in the meantime be bi-national.
Faced with this dilemma of reconciling Jewish and Arab aspirations, the Woodhead Commission suggested that a form of federation might be the solution—economic in its first stages, political later when community of interest and growing goodwill makes closer co-operation feasible. Federation would have very great advantages over the two separate States—One Jewish, one Arab—suggested by the Peel Commission, for it arouses no sentimental opposition to the idea of partition. Technical boundary difficulties such as are presented by the port of Haifa would not arise, for Haifa could be made a federal port, and financial subven- tions from the Jews would be easier to justify in a Federa- tion in the shaping of whose policy the Jews had a share.
If Great Britain made it clear that Federation in Palestine could be the forerunner of a much wider one, and that the eventual union of all Arab countries would be warmly approved by her, she would be assured of the friendship and co-operation in time of war, not only of the Palestinian Arabs but of the entire Arab world; while, by providing for the including of a Jewish autonomous area in such a Federation, she would retain Jewish goodwill. Arab fears of Jewish domination would disappear, for, whereas half a million Jews are a formidable minority in a State with a population of a million and a half, they would represent no danger in an Arab Federation of many million inhabitants.
Such a Federal Palestine could in time of war play a most important part as a store-house for provisions, a repair-shop for naval and aircraft, a munition-factory for arms of all kinds, a source of oil and other minerals, and a granary. Arab and Jewish manpower, no longer employed in civil strife, would be of the greatest value in defence, and a prosperous and strong Palestine would have an influence in the whole of the Near and Middle East out of all proportion to its size.
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