MR. STEAD'S PROJECT. 1/FR. STEAD'S screaminess, and. the entire absence
in his mind of any sense of proportion, always offend us, but in this proposal of his to popularise the cry for peace by an endless series of public meetings he has shown more judgment than usual, and may in the end accomplish some little good. On three points he has been Practical. He has probably strengthened the Czar's hands in dealing with his own advisers and soldiers. The Monarch must have been a little dismayed to find that Europe responded so chillingly to his appeal, and a popular movement in England in favour of his idea, which he will probably exaggerate as Sovereigns exaggerate all popular movements, will give him just the necessary encourage- ment. 'Even the statesmen agree with me in principle,' he will say, 'and the people are enthusiastic ' ; and the tendency of an autocrat who sees all below him as grass a plain is to think a quiver across that plain highly important. Then it is true that what is wanted is a Popular cry for peace. The Kings and statesmen of to-day are not going to war if they can help it. They are too keenly aware how big the risks are, and how imper- fectly their own brains will serve them in directing such huge masses of men in motion. It is the masses who, in their pride of patriotism, their jealousy of the foreigner, Ind their greed of acquisition, egg on their chiefs to defy each other and the world in arms. M. Delcass6 evacuates Fashoda, but a plebiscite of Paris would have given a different result. And thirdly, Mr. Stead does point out that there is one definite steP which could be taken to diminish the frightful eat of preparations for war. He evidently believes ahat if Europe would agree to do the same, Russia would rrest the development of her Navy, thus leaving to Eng land for a time the control of the seas, and sparing he Western world an outlay which may easily reach seventy millions sterling. That is a proposal with meaning in it, all the stronger because at heart Continental states- men are very doubtful about their naval preparations. They greatly distrust the notion of a Continental coalition, they are not certain that even coalesced Europe can make itself stronger than Great Britain at sea—Great Britain, in their belief, being wealthier than them all—and they have a suspicion, never acknowledged but still operative, that even if they created and collected a new Armada, Providence and Drake between them might destroy its efficacy. A race does not acquire the mastery of the sea entirely by money and trouble. Something is due to a genius for sea-fighting, and much to that current in human affairs which, whatever its source, a will or a destiny, proves so often irresistible.
There might be, one perceives, a suspension of activity in this direction ; but, then, will there be ? We heartily wish for peace, but we cannot believe a word of it. The statesmen might be ready to agree to the proposal, but the statesmen, after all, are on such subjects only mouth- pieces, and the nations would not agree. Even the English, who would be left in the best position, would be sullenly suspicious, asking with ever-increasing emphasis what is the use of limiting fleets, and leaving all combinations of fleets still open to the plotters. Suppose all Europe and Japan, at the instigation of some Alberoni, agree to divide our possessions, how are we, if we may not add to our Fleet, to protect them all from assault ? And what is to be done about " con- versions " ? Is everybody to be allowed to build ships for carrying purposes which can be converted at need into men-of-war, with high speeds, dynamite guns, and trained crews on board ? The English would grumble and growl and fall, after their manner, into very costly panics ; and war, which is to be prevented, as well as preparations for war, would become as possible as ever. Even the English, we say, would be slow to entertain a limiting proposal, and the rest of the world would probably reject it with con- tumely. The French in particular would see in the proposal "a consecration of British ascendency," and grow mad with suspicion and spite. They believe already that the British have determined to destroy their Fleet and take away Cochin-China and Madagascar, and they would declare that for them an arrest of armaments meant the final surrender of Egypt and a perpetual liability to humiliations like the evacuation of Fashoda. They would never agree to the proposal; nor, for different reasons, would Germany. The Emperor and his people do not want to fight Great Britain, but they do want to be safe against France, and to be great at sea, and to acquire "islands," and to be able on some fortunate day to seize some calturable land, say South Brazil, where the surplus of their population could create a transmarine Germany, and for all these purposes they desire their Fleet to grow. Even in Russia itself there will be fierce antagonism to the proposal, for Russians will say, and say truly, that if fleets are stereotyped at their present strength, their own position in China will never be safe, and their hopes of Manchuria and Corea will never be realised. They want, too, to be strong in the Black Sea, and able to threaten Constantinople, which they would not be able to do if a fighting Sultan made the existing Fleet of Turkey fit for service, a. plan with which the proposal would not interfere. It is mere foolishness to argue, as a correspondent of Mr. Stead does, that Russia, and France have too many warships for their trade. Nobody denies that ; but they are not thinking of trade, but of safety and aggrandisement. The only people who would be heartily in accord with Mr. Stead would be the Austrian. They have no colonies, and wish for none. Their foreign trade protects itself, like the trade of Holland. They think they can defend Trieste and Fiume from the land, and no other harbour of theirs is ever likely to be attacked, or signifies greatly even if it should be lost for a few weeks. They, therefore, would make their existing ships much better, would build no more, and would sit, as they always do sit, quite con- tented, being well assured that no Power not assailed by them will compel them to put their unlimited supply of brave men into the field. Is to America, she intends to have a great Fleet, and would probably regard a European proposal to limit her shipbuilding as a piece of im- pertinence, or as part of a plot for attacking the Monroe doctrine. She would go on building, and all the Chauvinists in Europe would hold up their hands in horror at the " treachery " of the British, who had in- duced all the world to arrest its measures of defence except her own ally. No, the idea of limiting fleets is a practical one, but it will no more be accepted than the idea of limiting armies.
The plain truth of the matter is that war and, the preparations for war are originally due to the fears and passions and clashing interests of the different peoples, and that there are only three ways in which these effects of those motives can be cured. One is the rise of a dominant Power, such as Rome was when Augustus decreed that all the world should be taxed. That is an impossible condition, for the ruler of the land will never, under modern conditions, be also ruler of the sea. The second way is a federation of Europe, with a clause in its constitution that any State declaring war on another State shall at once be occupied by the armies of the remainder. Does any one hope that this condition will ever be realised ? And the third way is for the white world to turn sincerely Christian. That is not impossible, as we all hope and some believe ; but we prefer to leave it to Mr. Stead to fix the date, which he will not make close at hand, as the Christianisation of the world would make both his proposal and him superfluities in the universe.
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