TOPICS OF THE DAY.
LORD SALISBURY'S "APOLOGIA."
WE are surprised that Lord Salisbury's speech at the dinner of the Constitutional Club has received so little attention, for it was in many ways a most remark- able utterance. It contained what was, in fact, an apologia for the Premier's conduct of foreign affairs. As regards the latter part of that apologia we are in the most hearty agree- ment; but as regards the first part we find considerable grounds for difference. Lord Salisbury, in effect, meets the accusation that his foreign policy has not been in many particulars firm erough by saying that a. Minister cannot go beyond public opinion. He admits the tremendous force which is possessed by the Government when the country is unanimous ; but he says that the converse is also true, and that unless you can be sure that the country is unanimous you dare not take a bold and forcible line. "I have often," says Lord Salisbury, "heard exhortations to deal in a drastic manner with this or that difficulty. They are questions not of any very great public interest. You cannot excite public feeling upon them at all. Is it not true that, if a Minister were to threaten war—and, of course, if he threatens, he must be prepared to carry it out—on these comparatively trivial subjects, he is liable to be left in the position of finding that he has threatened that which he cannot do, and that popular opinion is not prepared to carry it out? That may be no hurt to the Minister; he may retire and nothing may come of it to him ; but it is a tremendous blow to the prestige of your country." Lord Salisbury speaks of trivial questions, but, of course, he means in this context questions that appear trivial to the country but not to the Minister,—i.e., questions which are in reality not trivial, but important. If the Minister thought them trivial as well as the country, no question would arise as no one would want to take strong action in regard to them. What Lord Salisbury means, then, is to say that even though he may think certain questions of moment, he cannot act strongly thereon unless the country will also think them momentous. In fact, Lord Salisbury shelters himself behind an uninstructed, and so indifferent, public opinion. Now this seems to us a most dangerous position, and also a most untrue one. We do not believe for a moment that if a Minister were to appeal to the country in regard to a question which, though it seemed small, was really, in his opinion, great, he would have the slightest difficulty in obtaining public support. If a Minister in Lord Salisbury's position seriously and deliberately tells the country in regard to a matter of foreign policy that it is of importance, that instant the matter becomes important, and the nation ranges itself behind the Ministry. What the country wants on matters of foreign policy is leadership and direction. If it trusts the Foreign Minister, as it undoubtedly does Lord Salisbury, it expects and desires that he shall inform it if and when a question has become of real import- ance. The country knows that it cannot judge foreign politics as it judges home politics, because full information is necessarily not within its reach. There- fore it expects its agents, when it trusts them, shall lead, not follow, on external questions. Imagine an agent saying to his principal : I think you should have taken a very firm stand on this point, and even risked a lawsuit on it ; but as I knew you thought the matter not worth bothering about, I refrained from pointing out its gravity to you, and advising you to hold firm.' Surely an agent who spoke thus to his principal would be regarded as taking a very erroneous view of the duties of his position. No doubt it is very human to take shelter from criticism, as does Lord Salisbury, behind public opinion, but this is a most dangerous doctrine. If really acted upon, it would demoralise Ministers and destroy all confidence in the country. What the British people ought to say, and, we hold, do say, to their Ministers in * regard to foreign relations is this Go wisely and sensibly into all foreign questions, and then report to us what are the important points, where an effort is to be made. If you have to report that this or that point is important, we will support you in regard to it, even though we should have considered it, from our lesser knowledge, a matter of little moment. Advise us according to your fuller knowledge, and we will not let any appeal from our trusted servants go unheeded.' This is the only pein_ ciple upon which foreign affairs can ever be safely conducted. If not, and if Ministers wait on the the country, and the country waits on Ministers, for a, lead as to what is important, there is certain to be a weak. ness, or even paralysis. Take the case of the ordinary sensible Englishman who knows nothing of the details of foreign affairs, but wants the best done for his country. He ought to be able to feel that whether the newspapers are silent or screaming, excited or indifferent, Ministers will be sure to warn him if some big matter requires to be dealt with,—and not say : "He's sleepy, and so we had better not disturb him unless and until the house is actually being burgled."
But though Lord Salisbury has given verbal support to this mischievous view, we are glad to think that he has not acted on it. We fully believe that he would warn the country if there were some matter of importance upon which it ought to take a firm stand, and not pass it over because, before it was informed, the country seemed indifferent. The real reason why he has not made a firmer stand, has not threatened war, and has not roused the country on certain minor questions. is that he himself does not regard those questions as vital, — because he regards them as trivial. It was because he knew that they were not worth fighting about. and not because he thought that the country would no back him up, that he did not raise these questions. Ia fact, if not in theory, he took the responsibility of deciding what were vital matters and what not, and he did well in doing so. The responsibility was no doubt great, but it was his duty to bear it, and borne it he has. Practically the passage in Lord Salisbury's speech which. follows that quoted above is an admission that it is the business of the Government to decide what questions are important, and so to be prosecuted, if necessary, by war, and what are not. Lord Salisbury dwells upon the need of seeing things in their true proportion and of judging foreign policy as a whole. The "other point," says Lord Salisbury, which he would wish to draw from the year's experience is to urge on his critics that they should consider his foreign work altogether. "They should not consider this one case or this other case or this third case, but what has been the result when the whole issue is hung together. When the account books are totted up and the balance ascertained, then form your judgment ; but do not form your judgment on the individual passing items. It may be quite true that there are some matters on which you do right to go to war and yet the extreme step was not taken, but you must be sure before you take that action that there were no other possible or immediate complications within view which made it necessary to economise the force that was at the disposal of the Government. These things are matters of calculation." That is as good sense and sound judgment as was ever spoken by an English Minister, and states, we believe, the only proper principle upon which the success or failure of foreign policy can be judged. The only sound plan is to choose a wise man as Foreign Minister, and then for first the Cabinet and next the country to trust him to look at foreign affairs as a whole, to judge events and questions in their true proportions, and to give definite and precise advice,—to lead the public mind, in fact. Judged by this standard, and by the plan of looking to the general result rather than to the items, we hold that the present Government has during the past year a record of which any Govern- ment might be proud. Lord Salisbury has steere.d the ship under the most difficult circumstances and to very troubled and dangerous waters without a single mishap. Consider for a moment what his year's achieve- ment has been. In the first place, by his firm yet un- exciting and nnprovocative policy during the international crisis that preceded the American-Spanish War, Lord Salisbury avoided a collision with the Continental Powers, and yet entirely neutralised the attempts then made to form a coalition against America. The result was the beginning of a real and lasting understanding with America. His handling of the China crisis was equallY, masterly. In spite of all the screaming and complaining, ?' 1 the talk of Russian aggression, and of the alleged utter rill of British trade, Lord Salisbury kept his head and refuse@ to plunge into a perfectly useless war,—a war which ivoul have been as idiotic as that waged in the Crimea. The result has been that not a single British interest has been really injured, that our position in China is in no way impaired, and that peace has been maintained. In West Africa we have without war made an arrangement which gives, if not all we asked, or perhaps all that we had a right to expect, all that is essential. In Egypt Lord Salisbury has apparently been •,ilent, but in reality our rule there has been immensely consolidated without any complications having arisen with France. We have raised our own flag in the Soudan, and we have granted British money for Egyptian objects, and France has not tried to hinder us, or even to get us to say that these things mean nothing. That is a result that cannot be proclaimed officially, but one which is ex- tremely significant. In the case of Fashoda we have obliged France to withdraw, with the result that the world has learned that when they really mean business no men are so unyielding as a British Cabinet. Take, lastly, Crete. Here, by means of patience, tact, and firm- ness, Lord Salisbury has beaten not only the Sultan, but all the Chancelleries of Europe, and given Crete freedom. No one abroad, except perhaps the Czar, cared the least what happened to Crete ; but in spite of this indifference and the Sultan's constant twists and turns, Lord Salisbury has won the day. Pure diplomacy—i.e., the diplomacy of conciliation and management—never earned a greater triumph. The result is that England is recognised as the helper of the misgoverned subjects of the Porte.
Taken as a whole, then, our Government can show a year of substantial successes in foreign policy. They have won a triumph in a field far greater than that of diplomacy by helping the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race to under- stand each other. They have refused to plunge into a mad war in the case of China. They have shown, when that was required, iron firmness,—i.e., in the case of Fashoda. When what was wanted (as in Crete) was pure diplomacy and management, they have used effectively diplomacy of the most persuasive and delicate kind. The result is that at this moment England's position in the world is one of enormous strength and influence. Judged by what it has done, and still more by what it has avoided doing, the Administration is worthy of our fullest confidence. Lord Salisbury need not excuse his policy by inferring that he was obliged to wait upon public opinion. His actions want no such excuse, but carry with them their own defence.
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