THE WAR-CLOUDS.
HAS any Great Power in Eastern Europe an interest, an immediate and pressing interest, in getting up a war scare / It may be so, for the dynasties have sometimes interests which it is impossible for outsiders to trace, and the statesmen of the Continent, with an end clearly before them, are not scrupulous as to means; but there is little or no evidence to justify such a charge. The Governments of the Continent are all exceedingly anxious not to offend the Money Market, exceedingly sensitive as to the price of stocks, and exceedingly averse to making the burden of universal service heavier by false alarms ; and they must, therefore, if they only pretend to believe in danger, have some serious motive. Where is it 1 The Russian Government, even now suspected by its subjects of weak- ness, would redouble that suspicion if it talked of war, and then, when war seemed imminent, suddenly drew back. It is perfectly safe from invasion if it will only keep quiet ; and it can have no conceivable interest in compelling Germany and Austria, or even Austria alone, to stand on the qui vise. The German Government was from the first certain that its Land- wehr Bill would pass, and needs for that Bill an increase of revenue of only £200,000, too small a sum to induce it to lay plots, and discompose the business of half Europe. Moreover, if Prince Bismarck wished, as alleged, to wake up Austria to more active preparations, he could have urged them on by letter, without running the risk of irritating Russia and warning France to be ready for mobilisation. The Austrian Govern- ment, as it happens, has funds in hand from the last loan. needs no new statute from its Parliaments, and has decided that, unless war should actually arrive, it has no need to apply to the Delegations for fresh supplies. We can see, therefore, no adequate reason for a suspicion to which we think optimists who dislike war are far too ready to give currency and belief. If. however, no Power is manufacturing a scare, then it is certain that, whatever the cause of the danger, the danger does exist. Two Governments at least are acting as if they dreaded or intended war. We leave minute calculations to the experts ; but unless innumerable persons are deliberately lying, the Russian Government has been for some time past accumulating forces in Poland out of all propor- tion to the necessities of that country. It is believed to have 200,000 soldiers west of the Vistula, with an abnormal proportion of cavalry, to be building huts for them —a profligate waste, unless they are required—and to be collecting, rid the Vistula, a whole fleet of pontoon-boats such as may be used for creasing rivers. Immense quantities of food and forage are being stored, the fortresses are full of ammunition, and, in short, all the appearances are present which precede a Russian war. That war, of course, may not be immediately intended. Owing to the great distances to be traversed, and the insufficiency of her railway system, Russia is obliged to concentrate her resources some time in advance ; and if she meant war in spring, would be in her present apparent stage of forwardness. That stage, however, may be more forward than appears, and in any case is sufficient greatly to alarm the Austrian Monarchy. The military chiefs of that great federation of States are always afraid of a rush, partly because they know their permanent arrangements to be always behindhand, and partly because a first defeat exercises such a terrible effect upon the energy of their composite Army, half of which has an inner feeling that the Slav Empire, when once in motion, must be irre- sistible. Consequently, the Austrian Government is straining every nerve to make Galicia defensible, is moving troops steadily towards its Eastern frontier, a fact sufficiently proved by the sudden doubling in price of all ready-sawn timber, and has, it is credibly • reported, prepared a scheme under which, if the pressure becomes too severe, it can take the initiative, and transfer the first horrors of actual war from its own to Russian territory. The two Empires, therefore, stand face to face, both nearly ready, and separated by nothing except a few miles of easily passed territory. Both of them may be merely on the defensive, or even acting on mistaken information ; but the motive of their move- ments hardly affects the danger more than the motive of approaching thunderclouds affects the risk of a deadly discharge of lightning. Armies so placed can bring on war almost of themselves, and there are hundreds of Pan- alavist officers on one aide, and of Hungarian officers on the other, who would run serious professional risks, if only they could thereby make the probable war an in- evitable one. The two Governments, be it remembered,
have bitter grievances against each other, they are both aware that their schemes of ambition conflict irreconcilably, and they are fettered to the last degree by the feeling that they must keep the "honour," as honour is understood among duellists, of their Armies absolutely intact. They might survive defeat, but they could not survive the contempt of their Armies, and to retreat before menaces would be to incur that contempt. They must make peace, if it is to be peace, with honour ; and that, with Armies waiting a signal, and the newspapers thundering at each other, and highly placed observers, like Prince William of Germany, now almost on that great throne, and the Governor-General of Poland, and the King of Servia, all stating publicly that the "times have become serious," or that war is at hand, or that "the present moment is fraught with danger to Europe," and Servia shall not be Slavonised, is not so easy to secure. We do not wonder that Lord Salisbury, as he looks on, apologises for having been " rash " when he spoke of peace on November 9th, markedly abstains from repeating that rashness, and points to the drawing nearer and nearer of "clouds charged," nay, "overcharged with the electricity of war." Not only are they charged clouds, but they are sentient clouds, ready often to denounce any peace as made on terms inconsistent with the sacrifices demanded of them. It is a terrible thing for a Continental Government to order a mobilisation without sufficient reason ; if there is mobilisation, there will be war ; and yet no Government dare venture to mobilise even three days too late.
But we shall be asked,—As there can be no war without a pretext, what is to be the pretext in this particular case / It is not so certain as Englishmen imagine, that a formal pretext. is absolutely needed. A great many wars have begun, as the British Intelligence Department recently showed, before a pre- text had been formulated ; and if either Russia or Austria mean war, a simple demand that the visible preparations. shouldbe explained or should cease, would be amply sufficient- ground for an advance which would be, in fact, the beginning of a campaign. If, however, a pretext is required, it would, in the present situation of affairs, be easy to invent one. The Russian Government has only to demand at Constantinople that the arrears of the War Indemnity should be paid, or Eastern Roumelia be handed over as a material guarantee, and there would be war at once, Austria holding that demand equivalent to the occupation of Bulgaria, which her Ministers have twice assured the Hungarians they do not intend to allow. On the other band, Austria has only to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance against Russia with King Milan, and the Czar must take up the glove thus, as it were, defiantly thrown in his face, or proclaim to his entire people that he fears war.
Os- the two Governments may quarrel over their present subject of uneasiness, the extent of Russian claims in Bulgaria, a subject on which the interests of the Monarchies are, except through the grand partition, said to have been given up by the Austrians, nearly irreconcilable. There is, however, little need to talk of pretexts. There can be no war unless either Russia or Austria finds the present situation unbearable, or thinks the moment convenient for settling old quarrels ; and if either is in this attitude of mind, she will find nominal-, reasons fast enough. The real question is whether there is such pressure, or such sense of convenience ; and upon that all that can be said is that, in the judgment of men with every means of knowing, and with the most vital interest in judging aright, the symptoms look most ominous. As to the time, the natural time for war has always been assumed to be the spring ; but Russia knows how to fight in winter, and suddenness has in modern war assumed a por- tentous and most dangerous importance. If either Power. thinks or fancies the other has decided, it will strive for a. position of vantage without the slightest respect for seasons, which, indeed, have been deprived by railway communication. of at least half their value as causes of delay.
It will be noticed that we have kept Germany out of the dis- cussion, and we have done so intentionally. The first quarrel- is between Russia and Austria; and it is by no means certain that Germany, with France on her flank, will move at once. All she does at present is to give Austria courage by assuring- her that the Treaty holds, and that in any event no defeat shall leave her other than a first-class Power.
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