April in Portugal
David Rudnick Lisbon The Portuguese are a sentimental people, which is perhaps why they like to choose 25 April, the anniversary of the military revolt that ended the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship, to hold their elections. The question of w.ho—if anyone—is going to win this month's legislative elections is vital for the country's peace and stability. The biggest danger is that a deadlock between the contending parties could open the way to renewed authoritari'anism of either left or right.
The initial revolutionary euphoria died long ago under the impact of managerial incompetence, ideological excesses, and foreign disapproval. Portugal now, after its unaccustomed and heady draught of democracy, is suffering what with hindsight appears as the inevitable post-revolutionary hangover. The milestones back 'towards 'normalcy' need no detailed recounting: the triumph of moderate 'operational' groups over left-wing 'politicos' in the Armed Forces Movement ; the rueful restoration of nationalised firms back to private ownership; the removal of 'progressive' elements from the mass media; and soldiers appearing clean-shaven, collared and tied, instead of in beards and battled ress.
But tidying up the mess has not removed the formidable problems confronting Portugal, many traceable to the long economic stagnation and futile colonial wars of the Salazar regime. If decolonisation has gone sour on the Portuguese it is because there was no preparation—material or psychological—to soften the blow. And if there has been a haemorrhage of the country's (still healthy) money reserves, it has been to achieve a long overdue transfer of resources to the Portuguese masses, far and away the poorest in Europe. But whoever is to blame, Portugal's new government will have to wrestle with a triple-headed hydra: the economy, agricultural reform, and the problem of decolonisation.'
Without continuing and regular transfusions of foreign financial aid it is hard to see how democracy can hope to survive in Portugal. Hitherto, the country has been cushioned from the logical effects of its political disorder by sizeable reserves and gold holdings, used as collateral to raise international loans. But, as with Italy, her creditors want to see evidence of effective belt-tightening measures; so whoever wins the election will have to impose austerity and clamp down on consumption. But if this is the way to economic salvation, it may also be the path to political ruin, in a country so recently released from the cramping restrictions of the former regime. Austerity will, inevitably, primarily hit the wageearning masses, and if the ensuing shortages cause civil disorder, the politicians may be tempted to call in the army not only to quell it, but even to govern the country.
The young political parties, it is sometimes alleged, do not feel confident enough to survive the general opprobrium swingeing economic policies would entail. If true, it is a depressing thought, but unfortunately a little evidence already exists to support the theory that the parties are as yet unwilling or unable to take responsibility for unpopular measures. When in January the coalition government decided that food subsidies and price controls would have to be phased out, the Socialist Finance Minister (Zenha) argued that the job properly belonged to his Popular Democrat colleague (Mota) at the Internal Trade Ministry: not surprisingly, Mota promptly passed the buck back to Zenha. In the event, food subsidies and price controls were retained until May—
• that is, until a month after the elections.
Agriculture is the key sector, upon which all else depends. Agrarian Portugal is really two countries roughly divided by the river Tagus. To the north, especially around Oporto and Braga, peasant smallholders farm a few acres of land, display a strongly kulak mentality, and are desperately anxious, as they see it, to get the Communist— and Socialist—expropriators off their backs. The South—the Algarve and Alentejo—is a land of large estates or latifundias, many of which have been—and are continuing to be —collectivised by the state. Collectivisation and workers' take-overs have been widely blamed for a sharp fall in agricultural output, but many latifundistas have also contributed by selling off their herds (often in Spain) and capital in anticipation of expropriation, leaving Portuguese agriculture seriously under-capitalised. The mild winter was a godsend to Portugal (and her problem-ridden government), prompting the observation that God must be a Socialist. Nevertheless, Portugal's need to import food substantially adds to her payments difficulties, a problem which the rise in world food prices has done nothing to lessen. Agrarian reform remains a main plank of the Socialist minister Cardoso, and although the northern peasants have been reassured that they are not ripe for expropriation, fears of future government landgrabs remain a potent electoral force. them—are also a significant factor, account'
ing for some 8 per cent of the electorate. An embittered—and potentially explosive-group who feel betrayed by the motherland. the retornados from Africa are swelling th.e ranks of the right-wing parties and contbuting to the growing mood of disenchant' ment and disaffection. They are also adding to the burden on Portugal's already over. strained economy. Political seers are united in forecasting defeat for the left, further weakened hy in' ternal divisions. The Communists are 04; pected to take the worst beating, with Me5 —if not all—of their former votes going t° the Socialists. Communist appeals for Id Popular Front with the Socialists to war off the counter-revolution have fallen 0t1 stony ground, and there have even beell clashes reported between the two parties in the Alentejo. The Socialists have good rea: son to reject the Communists' advances, tail are still stung by their taunt that Socialistst are providing a plank over which the rightls parties will soon walk to victory, yet Socialist leader Mario Soares has alwaYs sisted that if his party failed to win a deo' sive majority, it would go into oppositieri rather than enter a coalition governmenl'e The Socialists are virtually certain to 1°51. their commanding position-38 per cent ° the vote in last April's Constituent Assay bly elections. The intriguing question which of the two main right-wing Partic will take the cream of the Socialist vote-e the conservative Social Democratic Centii (CDS) or the liberal (in the contine0, sense of the term) Popular Democrat; (PPD)? The CDS, led by their elocluezil, leader Diego Freitas do Amaral, are coon, dent of increasing their vote (from April's 74 per cent) to a percentage Wit will provide a respectable coalition barga'. ing base. The PPD, they argue, are diserr dited by their participation in the predonl' nantly leftist government, and by their fre; quent displays of political expediency. si,,ce the PPD (26 per cent last April) led bY thl'e glamorous Francisco Sa Carneiro, is t' more obviously militant of the two Partici': more likely to attract the determined righ ist vote. (The CDS, which has close tacts with the British Conservative par and the CDU in Germany, has a centrist Christian Democratic flavour.) On present indications, the odds are th301 the CDS and PPD will form a coalitie4 government, if the socialist promise--; threat—of self-exclusion from any P°'Necri sharing is genuine. The problem then---ix top of all the economic problems—will, ft, to run a right-wing government on a le ,d wing constitution. The leftist majoritY the present Constituent Assembly has.!, pushed through such a document agni"0. the opposition of the CDS and PPD. Inteof ded to guarantee the Socialist characteriii the revolution, the new Constitution rnig,ot shortly torn out to be (yet another) thri to political stability in a situation fratig, enough as it is.
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