Out of the Headlines
By T. R. M. CREIGHTON
CENTRAL AFRICA has vanished from the C headlines almost as suddenly as it appeared in them. In the Federation all representative in- digenous leaders have been effectively muzzled. Kenneth Kaunda of the Northern Rhodesian Zambia Congress spoke for all of them in a recent letter, carried 400 miles from his place of banish- ment to be posted in a large town. 'Everything here is limited—news, writing materials, etc. It is difficult to get news of what is happening even outside this district. We are restricted in twos and threes in parts of the country where we are little known, away from our own homes. We were all taken at night and flown to various places where we are now. I know they will keep us here as long as suits them. But we are still as determined as ever. This type of restriction just convinces us that we are right.' Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesian leaders, even more incommunicado in prison, are no doubt drawing the same conclusions.
There must be no illusion that any problems have been solved, or grievances redressed. The present airless breathing-space should he devoted to considering the future rather than forgetting it till more trouble arises. From the evasions and misrepresentations that have surrounded Federal issues since 1953, a few clear facts emerge. The doctrine of partnership in the Federation has failed to satisfy African hunger for a place in society consonant with African self-respect, for fair politi- cal representation and for a swifter approach to economic equality with Europeans. The Federal Government supports 'European leadership for the foreseeable future' and a very gradual African advance at a tempo set by European judgment. It maintains that an expansion of the economy on its present discriminatory lines will raise the Afri- can standard of living (and hence, since admission to the franchise is controlled mainly by economic qualifications, African political influence) at the 'right' pace, and will meanwhile quieten political opposition to Federation by demonstrating its economic advantages. But even if Federation can bring Africans the promised economic benefits and even if it can be made clear to the recipients that the benefits are directly due to Federation (which is a hard thing to do), it remains a pro- found miscalculation to believe that the demand of a majority for political representation can be met by filling its belly. The quickest rate of Afri- can advance the Federal Government seems pre- pared to envisage is so immeasurably slower than the slowest the Africans are prepared to tolerate that there seems to be no area of agreement. It is 'a colossal edifice of misunderstanding,' as Guy Clutton-Brock wrote from prison.
Mr. Garfield Todd described the situation less politely in a recent article in the Central African Examiner. No territorial government, he wrote, could of itself win African confidence because of the reactionary policies of the Federal Govern- ment. The Federal Prime Minister has made no secret of the fact that the official policy of partnership would never be allowed to threaten the supreme policy of European domination. The Federal Electoral Law, while providing a veneer of respectability in allowing African representa- tion, was designed to retain power in European hands. It was recognised that if racial policies were retained, full authority must be wrested from the British Government without delay. 1960 was set as the year in which this must be accom- plished and complete authority over seven and a half million people would be in the hands of about 80,000 European electors. . . . As the British Government made no effective reply, Africans believed that Dominion status would be granted in 1960.
Mr. Todd has been Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and must be well informed. He was a benevolent conservative in office and would
probably be a middle-of-the-road Tory in British politics. He stood well with Lord Malvern and publicly attacked Clutton-Brock. If recent events have brought this traditionalist to such conclu- sions, there can be less doubt than ever that some- thing is seriously wrong. The simultaneous chal- lenge and appeal he makes to Britain cannot be evaded.
How can it be answered? Much will depend on which party gets in at the general election. But it would be over-sanguine to expect a new Labour Government to be able to transform the situation overnight; and still more to hope for such a development from the Conservatives. Britain has already given up too much power in Central Africa to be able to assert all she may think desir- able or to insist upon ideal principles of govern- ment. The Colonial Office has tended, at least since the middle 1940s, to abdicate to the growing local European population in Northern Rhodesia, and has almost completed this process with the recent constitution and the government that has resulted from it. The Federal Government's view seems to have prevailed in the Nyasaland troubles. And Britain's hands are tied by the 1957 Convention between the Secretary of State and Sir Roy Welensky in Federal matters, which lays down that Britain will not use the rights she constitu- tionally possesses to legislate for the Federation except at the request of the Federal Government. We have renounced the possibility, for instance, of revoking the Order in Council establishing the Federation and separating it into its various parts again, or of suspending the constitution and intro- ducing a new one.
Events in Central Africa have created a deeper public concern in England—and more especially in Scotland, owing to its ties with Nyasaland— than has ever been given to any colonial African issue, but it would be unrealistic to imagine that it could ever turn an election or defeat a govern- ment here. The only hope for a change of policy lies in the maintenance and extension of an en- lightened body of opinion in this country. A bi- partisan policy on this matter may not be possible in the House of Commons, but it should be among the general public.
The, aim should be, first, a reassertion of the power of Britain. This means a determination to use, at need, all the sanctions we possess for the protection of Africans in the Northern territories, so that the will of Parliament prevails there; and the repudiation of the 1957 Convention. Sir Roy has already indicated that he would regard this as
the signal to `go it alone.' This is an attempt at intimidation and should be treated as such. The economic as well as the sentimental objections to
unilateral defiance of Britain are so strong that his electorate would hardly support it and his bluff
should be called. Second, the Government should make up its mind that Dominion status for the Federation in 1960 is out of the question after the recent crisis. It shows that the time is nowhere near ripe and raises rather the question of whether Federation should not be replaced by some much
looser administrative links between independent States. Federation in fact is on trial, and we should reserve the full right to revise it. So far the Federal Government has blustered, and Britain has given in. It is time to be firm; for the 1959 emergency is a beginning, not an end, and only firmness can avert more serious conflict, strife and destruction.
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