THE LEAGUE OF THE THREE EMPERORS.
SPECULATION upon the future results of this war is very useless, and yet it is very difficult to avoid it. The consequences, as every diplomatist is saying or thinking, may be so inconceivably momentous to the whole of Europe. We none of us, whether journalists or diplomatists or Ministers, really know the facts which are the keystones of the position,—what is the secret motive which dictates the apparently eccentric and vacillating policy of the German Emperor, whether the Austrian Emperor agrees with his Cabinet in rejecting a partition of the Balkans, or what is the hope of the Russian Emperor as to his coming opportunity. It is doubtful if any one in Europe at present sees the whole of the chessboard, and certainly no one does who is in the least likely to make his insight common property. The Greek King speaks as frankly as any man, and ought, from his connections, to know something of the objects actually influencing the great Courts ; but it may be doubted if even he could state clearly what he would expect from victory, or what consequences of ill to him would flow from defeat. Yet, as we say, it is difficult to refrain from speculation, and two facts are coming out of the imbroglio with some clearness. In spite of the ridicule thrown upon it by the actual outbreak of the war it tried to prevent, a desperate effort is still being made to keep the Concert together, doubtless with a view to the dictation of terms at a later period to both the combatants. That is evident from the decision to main- tain the international blockade of Crete—which, by the way, must be costing everybody except Germany a pretty penny in coals alone—a decision for which it would, we fancy, be hard to find justification in international law. Still, it has been agreed to by Powers of irre- sistible strength, and of course if they can hold together, and will use force, they can impose any terms upon the combatants they please. But then will they ? It is quite certain that if Turkey wins, as has been from the first most probable, the Western Powers will not agree to give her part of Greece, and nearly certain that the Imperial Powers will not consent to deprive her by force of all fruit of her victories. The Sultan, if victorious, would hardly dare to retire voluntarily with nothing in his hands, for his own soldiers would think that shameful, while the alternative to territorial gain which is already discussed, a heavy payment in money, would be the merest subterfuge. Greece could not pay it if she would, and as for the Powers guaranteeing her, three of them have from the first been ready to do anything except spend one penny they could help without receiving some sort of equivalent. There will be serious disputes over the terms of peace, leading, it may be, to quarrels, or, if they can be glossed over, leaving the Concert of Europe very much where it was, with a recalcitrant Crete upon its hands, with Greece burning with open or latent Republicanism, and with all its difficulties at Constantinople intensified by the new courage and exultation aroused in the Mussulmans by the events of the war. What need,' will the Sultan say, 'of reforms when I am so obviously com- petent to hold my own, and my subjects show such devotion in the field ? ' We can hardly imagine a worse position than that of the Concert if it should hold to- gether immediately after it has dictated terms of peace.
On the other hand, if the Concert breaks up, how will the Powers regroup themselves ? There may be a dozen answers to that question, but only one seems to us in the least degree convincing. The three Emperors will be drawn together by similarity of position, of convictions, and, in a great degree, of interests. They are all three, in different degrees, autocratie qa regards all foreign affairs. They are all convinced that their duty is to themselves and their subjects rather than to the world, and that general considerations of humanity, even in an extreme case like that of the Armenians, ought not to be permitted to deflect their policy. And they all desire to utilise the events which have occurred, or may occur, for their own aggrandisement. They all, in different degrees and for different reasons, dislike Great Britain, and they all distrust the movements and aspirations of the West, which in their view is governed by Parliaments which are in all serious crises influenced by demagogues. They are all aware that, if they agree, it would be most difficult to resist them, at least in any design not requiring posses- sion of sea-power, and they all admit, even publicly, that a mighty spoil lies before them to be distributed according to their will. And finally, they all desire to avoid the terrible risks and losses which would accompany any great war among themselves, and to gain what they wish to gain, if they can, without paying too large a price. They see these considerations, in part at least, themselves, and with a war already in progress are making opportunities for private consultation. The German Emperor is already at, Vienna, and the Austrian Emperor on Tuesday next starts for St. Petersburg, where he is to be received as a most honoured guest with all the magnificence of the Monarchy. It seems almost impossible under such circumstances that the astute gentlemen who advise the Emperors should not perceive the advantages of an agreement, should not suggest an alliance, and should not define very clearly the objects to be secured by the alliance if formed. The three Powers can, if they unite, compel both Greece and Turkey to resume their ancient status, or they can, within certain limits, compel them to accept new terms of peace, or they can redistribute European Turkey and the Balkans as they please, even dividing the whole among themselves. They are, when united, practically unassailable, except at the cost of a war which no nation, unless its existence were threatened or it was insulted past human endurance, would dream of undertaking. Nobody would fight to prevent a return to the status quo ante bellum. Nobody would fight to resist ordinary terms of peace, with moderate advantage to the victor. And nobody could fight to resist a partition of Turkey with any reasonable hope of success. The Drei kaiser bund, the League of the three Emperors, is, we re- peat, as we said three months ago, the natural outcome of. the situation, the arrangement towards which events, and the proclivities of the Monarchs, and their interests, all alike obviously tend.
But it is said this League involves one great allege— a rupture between Russia and France—which will not happen. Russia will not give up France, and France will not give up Russia. Why not ? Russia has no natural affinity for France, and what has she to gain from her in the way of support, or tranquillity, or aggrandisement which she would not gain in a far more complete degree from an alliance with Austria and Germany, to whom she is already bound by their common necessity for keeping down Polish aspirations ? France has money to lend nu doubt, but Russia is just now in no pressing need of money, and it is very doubtful if France is disposed to lend her any more. Russia desires the friendship of France to prevent attack by Germany and Austria while she is settling the Eastern question, and that attack is prevented equally by the alliance. As for France, what has France to gain from Russia which she could not obtain from England without difficulty ? She has prostrated herself at the feet of St. Petersburg. She has lent Russia fifty millions. She has helped Russia to deprive Japan of Corea and all other fruits of her victories except the indemnity and Formosa, and she has aided Russia to baffle Great Britain in Constantinople, and in return has received what ?—a regretful assurance that Russia cannot at present help her to reconquer her lost provinces. That alliance has no basis except a hope of vengeance, and the vengeance is the one thing which it certainly will not secure. Frenchmen, perfervid as they sometimes seem, have a business side to their heads, and they are already discontented with an alliance which yields nothing, and cannot, unless Russia enters on a great war solely from fraternal feeling for a Republic, ever be made to yield anything. Already Frenchmen are muttering that they are being dragged at the heels of Germany, anti already the Government finds it most convenient to make the Parliamentary recess as long as possible lest liberal feeling should explode in the Chambers, and blow up the Russian alliance.
It is quite possible that the League of the Emperors may be delayed, that it may be hidden under the Concert of Europe, as Prince Bismarck's secret treaty with Russia was hidden under the Triple Alliance, or that it may only be discussed and not made. It is the first note of the present hour that no arrangement gets out of the discus- sion stage, that no man or Power, if really great, ever resolves on action, that no one who is not small will run any considerable risk. The world is not governed by inferior men, but it is by men who see so clearly round them, and are so conscious of the dangers lurking in every bush, that they shrink from entering on any path out of which there is no outlet except going straight ahead. It is therefore useless, or comparatively useless, -to speculate ; but still most things go on their accustomed way, and if they now go on their accustomed way, we cannot help believing that three Sovereigns who are con- sulting together and whose interests bind them to avoid disaster by uniting, who recognise no compelling force except expediency, and who are forced to arrive at a decision of some kind, will when the hour of decision arrives be found to be united. That would be for Europe a very serious, if not altogether lamentable, discovery, while for Turkey it would counterbalance a thousand times over the victory of the Malouna Pass.
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