[To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR. " ] SIR, — Your review of Colonel
Callwell's book, printed under the above title in your issue of September 16th, appears to me to include almost every fundamental item of a military policy suitable for the British Empire. Put in a nutshell, what you assert is that our existing system, or lack of system, fails to give us an Army large enough or good enough for our needs ; that, thanks to the advantages of sea power, we do not, however, require to have forces numerically equal to those maintained by Continental States, but only sufficient to " wear down" the enemy; that "without an Army organised for this
purpose our superiority at sea will never bring an enemy to his knees."
Now, Sir, I do not understand you to suggest that the required Army is to be obtained by a necessarily expensive increase of our voluntarily enlisted Regular Forces, or by the application of any system of compulsory service. Upon the contrary, your views have too often been defined to render any misunderstanding of them now possible. I take it that you are in favour of a com- paratively small Regular Army, certainly not larger, though very much better, than that we now have. For the expansion necessary in case of offensive operations against a: Great Power you would look to the Auxiliary Forces—the Militia and Yeo- manry for units, and the Volunteers for individuals—and mean- while give thanks to the Navy for the privilege of being justified in postponing our final preparations for war until the war was actually upon us. I do not think that I am misrepresenting your views, but at all events I have accurately given my own.
The question naturally arises whether a Militia Army, polished up at the last moment from partially trained materials, can be relied upon to fight Continental conscripts. I reply 'unhesitatingly in the affirmative. I may be wrong, of course ; but of this much I am quite certain, that if a Militiaman who has been properly trained for six months as a recruit, and sub- sequently qualified annually as " efficient," on Volunteer prin- ciples, is not fit to fight Continental Regulars, then neither are our own Regulars. I do not pretend that a Militia- man trained as I have suggested would be an ideal soldier ; but I do assert that a recruit, Militia or otherwise, if properly trained for six months, should then be a more skilful fighting man than the modern British Regular of whatever length of service. Nowadays we do not train Regulars, but waste time and money in abortive attempts to work miracles on a large scale with men who have never learned the alphabet of soldiering. Every disaster in South Africa, from Nicholson's Nek to the last failure to catch Do Wet, is a monument to the
inefficiency of our system and of our Generals,—both of which have been steadily deteriorating since the days of Sir John Moore. The famous Light Division owed its incomparable reputation to the fact that Moore's system was the training of the individual officer and soldier, so as to ensure afterwards intelligent, and consequently efficient, co-operation. Sir Harry Smith was almost " the last of the Generals,"—and he was a very apt pupil of Moore. In the present day, the British soldier is never trained unless when his corps happens to be where there are neither Generals nor Stag Officers to prevent it; elsewhere, by misguided efforts to train (?) masses, the real training of individuals, an essential preliminary, is rendered absolutely impossible.
I am well aware that "expert" opinion, professional and amateur, is absolutely contemptuous of my assertion that a British Militia recruit could be trained sufficiently to fight Continental conscripts within a period of six months. But opinions, however august, definitely decide no question without proof. Why not put this matter to the proof ? I would myself undertake to train one hundred recruits and produce in six months the following results:—(1) The recruits shall be as good at drill, at gymnastics, and at musketry as any Regular of the same length of service ; (2) on a tactical exercise the recruits shall show themselves tactically more proficient than any company selected from any battalion of the Regular Army serving in the United Kingdom, provided that the company chosen to represent the Regular Army shall not be selected more than forty-eight hours before the trial takes place.
The reservation made is necessary, because the worst Captain in the worst battalion now at home, if allowed meanwhile to train his men without let or hindrance, could so improve his company that the recruits would stand no chance against it. People are fond of ascribing the inefficiency of the Army to the laziness, stupidity, and general ineptitude of the British officer. Popular opinion is utterly wrong. There would be little cause for com- plaint if the regimental officers were encouraged, or even allowed, to do their own work. The knowledge and intelligence of the nation, of War Ministers, and of Generals stand in far greater need of improvement than the capacities of the average officer, however " stupid " the latter may be.
The inclusive cost of training one hundred recruits for six months would not exceed £3,500. The Government will not try the experiment ; therefore let us hope that some wealthy and public-spirited individual may yet feel disposed to do so.
—I am, Sir, &c., A. W. A. POLLOCK, Lieut.-Col.
Wingfield, Godalming.
[Colonel Pollock's summary of our view of the Army that we need is in essentials correct. We do not agree with his wholesale strictures on our Generals ; but we greatly wish that some man of wealth would provide the means for trying the most interesting and valuable experiment he proposes. We fully believe with him that out of the material now only " half baked" -in the Militia an efficient infantry soldier could be produced in six months by careful and intelligent training. Will not some patriotic rich man, or group of rich men, come forward and allow the experiment to be made ? Should he or
they be willing to do so, we will do all in our power to facilitate the undertaking.—ED. Spectator.;
Previous page
