WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
11"E 4 failure of the Government to denounce the Anglo- Japanese Treaty is already bearing its poisonous fruits. The situation is a perfect example of the sound- ness of the principle " Of two things, one." We ought to have said either—though of course we are delighted that this was not said—that there was nothing whatever in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty which offered any kind of threat or even the mildest cause of offence to the United States, and that therefore, regarding the Treaty as a pledge of peace and safety for all, we proposed to continue it ; or else that, as we desired to enter the Washington con- ference with perfectly free hands, we proposed without a moment's delay to denounce the Treaty in order to avoid even the appearance of partisanship. Unfortu- nately, the Government decided to let things drift. By discovering a technical ambiguity in the wording of the Treaty, they gave themselves a year's breathing space. They announced that as the Treaty had not been de- nounced it had not lapsed, and that it would continue automatically for another year. Now look at the results. Vis-a-vis America we have not cleared ourselves of the appearance of partisanship. It is perfectly true that the Treaty could never be used against America, and we all know that if we went into a war on the side of Japan against America the British Empire would instantly fall to pieces. But we have to deal with American public opinion as we find it ; a great deal of it, owing to skilful manipulation or to the ignorance which comes from geographical remoteness, is uninstructed and passionate. The fact is that a large numb_tr of Americans will never believe that pro-American feeling in this country extends as widely as it actually does so long as the Anglo-Japanese Treaty exists. It is most regrettable, but there it is. Americans have before them an image of John Bull preparing to go into the Conference arm in arm with his Japanese friends.
Vis-a-vis Japan the results are equally unfortunate. The Japanese are a chivalrous race, extremely careful about points of ceremony and honour. We think we are correct in saying that they would take a far more serious view of the breach of a military treaty than of the breach of commercial treaty. In the circumstances, though they cannot of course point to any violation of the Treaty-- both Japanese and British have been scrupulously faithful to their pledges—the Japanese have a vague and uneasy feeling, if we may believe a large part of their Press, that they are going to be left in the lurch. The actual denun- ciation of the Treaty could not have produced this feeling more plainly. Indeed, denunciation would almost cer- tainly have had a far more composing effect in Japan, because she would then have known exactly where she stood. There is no more pitiful outcome of diplomacy than to produce the very effects which your policy is designed to avoid. Yet that is happening now. If the Japanese think that the Anglo-Saxon world is " getting together " in order to squeeze out the Asiatics of the Far East—though this is, of course, a wildly untrue description of the facts—we may expect to see those Japanese who have hitherto been marked by moderation joining forces with the extremists who have preached the need for the strong arm of militarism. We must remember that the Japanese have a kind of Monroe Doctrine of their own, and it is perfectly natural for them to have it. Of course— what else could one expect ?—Japan does not like it when our policy is represented to her, however wrongly, as challenging that doctrine. And we undertake to say that all the time the majority of Englishmen would not dream of disputing the reasonableness of the argument, which has already been put forward in the Spectator, that room must be found for the expanding population of Japan. It would be pure madness to deprive her of what the ex-German Emperor used to call a place in the sun. Where that place shall be it is not for us but for the Washington conference to decide. Everything, in fine, might have been different if the Anglo-Japanese Treaty had been denounced. There was a magnificent opportunity when President Harding issued his momentous invitation. We ought then to have said that we regarded our acceptance of the invitation as requir- ing the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in order that we might go into the conference quite without prejudice. Whatever might have been the feeling in Japan, we should have been under no necessity to apologize for our act. The facts would have amply justified it, and we should, of course, have fortified our statement by pointing out that a new order of the world was being ushered in, and that the Anglo-Japanese Treaty had been obviously and admittedly framed to deal with a state of affairs which has quite passed away. We hope and believe that Japan will not work up her political discussion with such heat and alarm as to feel it due to herself to refuse to enter the Washington con- ference. That would. be a disaster—a disaster not least of all for Japan herself. Civilization will not be salved if the new order does not function. In a dangerous situation the safest course is to recognize the dangers, and we are bound to say that the dangers, though they might easily have been avoided by denunciation of the Treaty, are great and plain. Japan declares, for example, that under the Treaty of Versailles Shantung is secured to her, while the Americans, still riding their wave of altruistic feeling, dislike nothing in the Treaty of Versailles more than this Shantung arrangement. They point out that Japan has promised to evacuate the peninsula, and they demand that the promise shall be fulfilled. Then, again, there is the question of Yap, the Pacific island of considerable importance as a cable station. The Americans complain that the Japanese mandate virtually gives Japan possession of the island, and we admit that the manner in which the affair was.settled without any reference to America was a fine example of how not to do these things. Yet again, there is the question of the open door in China, and America seems to expect that Japan will claim superior rights there. After all, Japan would have a pretty good basis for doing so because the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917—an agreement which was never brought before the American Senate, and therefore has had little publicity—assigns to Japan " special interests." No doubt there is plenty of room for differences of opinion as to the interpretation of this phrase, but it is one of the explosive materials the existence of which must not be ignored. Still another dangerous clement may be found in India, where some newspapers have been protesting lately against the words in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty victory might have been accelerated is a matter of con- jecture. The majority praise Admiral Sims for his prompt. itude in recognizing the value of the convoy system, and they support all along the line his case that the Navy Department withheld for a considerable time the destroyers, submarines, and other small craft which were urgently needed in European waters. The general. sense of the Majority Report is that the man on the spot, the man not only of ripe experience but of full local knowledge, was impeded by theorists who were really the slaves of which provide that Japan shall help Britain in the case • political considerations. The Minority, or Democratic, of a grave rising in India. A final specimen of the mis. chievous elements which have been called into life by the failure to denounce the Treaty is a leading article which appeared in the Daily Express of Tuesday. In this article it was stated that the facts " compel the suspicion that America stands under the menace of an attack [from Japan], and if that suspicion hardens into a belief the whole British Empire will be on America's side." It is quite true that if America were ever hard put to it the British Empire would be found at her side, but that fact does not remedy the extreme inopportuneness of making accusations against Japan. Yet perhaps we have no right to complain. This kind of thing is the inevitable result of the Government's decision not to denounce the Treaty.
What might have been " is a sad subject of reflection in any case. Sad it is to think how many difficulties might have been ended, and how many others might not have been revived, if the Treaty had been denounced. Denunciation would have been wise for us, agreeable to America, and fair to Japan, to whom, of course, we all wish to be scrupulously fair. There is no risk of people here underrating the intricacy of Japan's problems and her very real and proper anxieties. Fortunately, it is not too late to correct the mistake. It may be said that even if we denounced the Treaty to-morrow it would still be in force when we went to the Washington Conference. No doubt ; but there is a vast difference between a treaty which one intends to continue and a treaty which is in process of lapsing. A treaty which is under a year's notice is as good as a dead treaty.
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