BRITAIN'S ROLE IN 1965

Reflections on Three Kinds of Power

By IAIN MACLEOD

E are not, except in moments of extreme

aberration, an isolationist people. Ever

Osince we passed from feudalism into nationhood, we have been involved in mankind. Long ago, cramped on to the edge of the world map, we ,expended our energies on bullying our neigh- bours. Later, when geographical discoveries placed us on the main route between the New .and the Old Worlds, our ambition and our absent- . mindedness combined to create the greatest of empires. Yet it is many centuries since Britain was able to guarantee her own security. Small in population and vulnerable to blockade, our island safety and livelihood have depended on alliances. Today the threat of Communist' expan- sion is global and the weapons nuclear as well as conventional. But the principle remains the same. It is the principle enunciated by Edmund Burke: 'When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a comtemptible struggle.'

In the great confederacy against Communism Britain can scarcely be accused of dragging her heels. After all, it was Winston Churchill who ;lint suggested the alliance--amid considerable tcepticism at home and abroad. Without America's overwhelming strength it could not, $4 course, have been brought into being. But trteither could it have been kept in being if Aritain had not for sixteen years been carrying in the defence of freedom a burden second only to America's. In particular. we have maintained large forces on the European continent in corn- Dletc contrast with our traditional military dis- Positions, whilst our nuclear capacity has made xt valuable contribution to the western deterrent

and will apparently continue to do so, despite our change of government.

Alone among America's allies Britain is a member of all„three collective security alliances: NATO, SEATO and CENTO. Beyond these, we fulfil widespread defence obligations inside and Outside the Commonwealth. By ourselves in Malaya, and with America's preponderant forces in Korea, we have fought Communist aggression and beaten it back. When India was attacked by Communist China, Britain reacted at once With military aid. Malaysia, the new Common- wealth bastion against Communism in South- fast Asia, has for months been the scene of British defence operations on a substantial scale.

Meanwhile, in the entire sea area east of Suez zieross the Indian Ocean. the Royal Navy plays the leading role in safeguarding the free world's wmmerce and security.

Someone pointed out a while ago that Britain

exports no fewer than 50,000 trumpets a year. 'But, by God,' he added, 'we don't seem to have Much wind to blow them!' For one of the reasons why people say that Britain has not found a 3/41ern role is precisely because she is fulfilling it without ostentation. Were we dramatically to abandon our world-wide responsibilities over- night, or pursue policies calculated to put the Maximum strain on western unity, it might be, Paradoxically, that we should get a better press. Commentators, already infatuated by similar movements elsewhere, would surely be prepared to salute the spectacle of 'Britannia • Resurgens.' but Britannia, who is a very grown-up and de-

pendable lady, has no desire to become the maverick of the West. For a quarter of a cen- tury she has accepted that she and Uncle Sam must be, in Churchill's words, 'somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for the mutual and general advantage.' This remains the broad consensus of moderate British opinion. There are, of course, voluble extremists of the left who cannot bear to see the success of America's capitalist economy, just as there are some on the right alienated by the persistence of 'colonialism' as a trigger-word in the American dictionary. But for most of us, whatever our politics, America -is Britain's natural ally.

Of course, between allies, as between friends, there are bound to be differences and divergences of view. But our fundamental interest is identi- cal. It holds good, or should do, not merely in treaty areas, but right around the perimeter of freedom. In particular, we cannot be allies in SEATO and neutrals in Vietnam. For unless aggression is held there, the Communist tide will be free to roll on to Thailand, to Burma, and to Malaysia. Throughout most of the world British and American interests run side by side.

This fact profoundly influences our attitude to the European Economic Community. For many years, an intellectually vigorous current of opinion in Britain has held that our future lay in close association or unity with our continental neighbours. 'I look forward to a United States of Europe,' was what Winston Churchill wrote to his Cabinet colleagues whilst the Second World War still raged. In the early days of the post- war European institutions, however, this line of thought was pursued somewhat gingerly. We were prepared to maintain what was for us a large army on the continent of Europe : we were not prepared to join a European .army. We warmly welcomed participation in OEEC: we were not prepared to join the Coal and Steel Community. Successive British governments were thus prepared, indeed anxious, to co-operate with European countries on a functional basis, mili- tary or economic. But they felt unable to sub- scribe to the essentially political goal of full European integration under common institutions.

Their attitude was a disappointment, not only to Europeans, but to Americans as well. Since federation had proved its worth in the United States, why, it was asked, should not all the countries of western Europe be pressed into the same mould? The analogy was scarcely exact, but the argument proved simple and appealing: and throughout this period European union figured

consistently as an aspiration of the United States Congress, as expressed in its resolutions. The State Department refrained from open pressure, but many a Senator made many a speech rebuking Britain for its hesitancy and sloth. The truth is that, however eloquent the appeal, we were not then to be moved.

One of the principal reasons for this is fre- quently overlooked. It has, however, been accurately diagnosed in a recent book by Mr.

F. S. Northedge, the Reader in International Relations at London University. He points out how the British feared that behind much of the American pressure lay an assumption, conscious or subconscious, that if Europe could settle its

problems through federation, the need for Ameri- can involvement in Europe would disappear. This suspicion alone made the British adamant not to yield.

Throughout the inter-war years uncertainty as to how the United States would act in an emergency had bedevilled all British thinking about security. Now that America was com- mitted to Europe, the British government wished to give isolationism no pretext to return.

By 1961, when a British Cabinet of which I was a member decided to negotiate on entry into Europe, circumstances had altered cases. Many of the technical arguments against our partici- pation—arguments' about Commonwealth trade and farm price guarantees—had been turned on their heads. Emergence the world over of chronic surpluses of primary products was going to force us to modify our system of free entry for Com- monwealth foods and our methods of agricul- tural support, whether we were inside or outside Europe. Meanwhile, the continent was about to overtake the Commonwealth as Britain's biggest customer--a trend which emphasised the central importance of tariff advantage in Europe to our future as a commercial power.

But these new facts of world economics and trade paled in significance beside the new facts of world power. For in 1961 the generation of New Frontiersmen had assumed leadership of the free world. Their political Grand Design for the western alliance was that it should rest upon two equal pillars--the United States and a steadily uniting Europe. Thus the consistent anxiety of post-war British governments for a permanent relationship between the United States and Europe was to be fully satisfied. But it was clear at the same time that unless Britain became an integral part of the European pillar of the alliance, she might well find herself at the margin of power rather than at the centre. It is all on the record: Ernest Bevin's speeches, as Foreign Secretary on the need to organise Europe within the framework of a larger Atlantic entity; Harold Macmillan's declarations, a dozen years after, that a leap into Europe was best calculated to fortify relations with America. It is only against the background of these sentiments that Britain's present exclusion can be clearly seen. For when in January 1963 the French President ,rejected us as a partner in Europe, he did so first and , foremost on account of our Atlantic leanings and our American connections.

We have always made it quite clear that we do not mean to give up these at anyone's behest. We do not share the view that the United Stales is destined to withdraw from European affairs, or that this would be intrinsically desirable. We are totally opposed to the concept of Europe as an inward-looking, tightly knit, exclusively con- tinental grouping, detached from liberal and pro- gressive forces in North America and the world outside. We do not wish to see Europe develop

as a Third Force. Our aim is that she should become a genuine and strong Second Force; but a Second Force on the same side--an equal partner committed to the same basic values and objectives as is America.

I myself believe that once the anti-Atlantic heresy has been abandoned or exorcised, the last

insuperable barrier to our entry into Europe will be crashed. The negotiations at Brussels, to ensure the livelihood of British farmers and the interests of our Commonwealth partners, did not break down because they were going to fail. They broke down because they were going to succeed. Until there is a genuine will on both sides of the Channel to succeed, it is no good trying to re- open such negotiations. But much can be done meantime to pave the way, and to make clear to our continental friends that we desire whole- heartedly to go forward with them in building up the new Europe.

This historic move would bring great benefits. It would provide for our insular economy the stimulus of heightened competition and the ad- vantages of a greatly expanded home market. The restrictive practices and the restrictions on trade which strangle us in Britain would at last be ended. There would be free movement both of capital and of labour. We would have to com- pete, and when we have to be we can be formidable competitors. We would have the chance of being strong again, and we would take it. From our new economic strength would stern an added capacity to support the Common- wealth, and developing countries outside, both in trade and investment. Within Europe itself there would be a decisive reinforcement of the forces working in favour of liberal policies, and a powerful injection of political stability from the oldest democracy in the world. Britain would become a leading member of a new economic and political unity, co-operative with the United States, but rivalling her and the other great con- tinental powers in size, skills and resources.

Thus we should fulfil, better late than never, the dream that has haunted world statesmen from Julius Caesar to Dean Acheson. For no

doubt Mr. Acheson's famous remark at West Point—'Britain has lost an empire and not yet found a role'—was only his blunt way of urging us to swim the moat. He was mistaken in nothing save his choice of language. For it is not a 'role' that Britain has lacked in the post-war world, but rather a constructive enthusiasm, a cause to kindle her inner fires. And, of course, we did not 'lose' an empire. We followed to its logical end what has always been British colonial policy.

When I was appointed Colonial Secretary to- wards the end of 1959 the Commonwealth con- sisted of ten sovereign independent nations. Today there are twenty-one. This Commonwealth possesses few formal ties or obligations. Yet the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Minis- ters in London last summer reflected the con- tinuing vigour of this loose-knit institution. Understanding, although not unity, flows from the differing backgrounds, philosophies and policies of its component members. The essential strength of the Commonwealth, in other words, lies in its world-wide diversity, in the fact that it is a cross-section of humanity itself. It is this which gives its citizens an unparalleled oppor- tunity to show, by example, that different races and cultures can live in peace and work together with confidence. In particular, it is this which gives the Commonwealth a crucial relevance to the greatest idealistic issue of our time: the building up of societies offering genuine equality of-treatment to all, irrespective of race, of creed or of colour.

The sad decision of South Africa to leave us in 1961 underlined this essential characteristic of the modern Commonwealth. With the passage of, time, the pressure of the world on South Africa will surely mount. Can the Commonwealth contribute to peace in this part of the continent? I believe that it can—by helping us to solve the intractable problem of Southern Rhodesia. Here, among an African population fifteen times as large, a European community of nearly a quarter of a million has made its home and contributed its capital and skill. It desires independence within the Commonwealth. But clearly no British Parliament could honourably grant independence to Rhodesia in the absence of institutions sufficiently representative of the African majority. There need not actually be an African majority (although it is dangerous to transfer power to minorities), but there must be a clearer promise of one than the 1961 Constitution affords.

A unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) would be an open act of rebellion. It would not be recognised by Britain, nor by any member of the Commonwealth, nor by the over- whelming majority of the United Nations. But what would happen if UDI were turned from a threat into a reality? For Britain to restore the position by force of arms may be possible in theory, but is unthinkable in practice. Economic

sanctions could certainly be applied, but it would be a mistake to underestimate Rhodesia's power of retaliation. Zambia, for example—the newly independent country. which was formerly Northern Rhodesia—has to look to,Rhodesia for the transport of her copper and for the supply of much of her power.

But perhaps the key lies in Zambia. I remem- ber a conversation I had three years ago with Adlai Stevenson, at a time when the first African-dominated government in Northern Rho- desia was being formed. 'On what do you base your hopes?' Mr. Stevenson asked me. 'I am not optimistic,' I replied, 'but if there is anything to rely on, it is the infection of peace spreading southwards.' Because of the settlement in Kenya, the settlement in Northern Rhodesia became pos- sible. If Zambia succeeds, and I believe she will, so in time will Rhodesia.

In almost all respects Rhodesia is independent now, and has been so for forty years. There is no immediate answer beyond the hope that for a time both sides should agree to go on as they are. The way would then be open to a construc- tive Commonwealth solution. My suggestion is that we should jointly invite the services of statesmen front the old and the new Common- wealth in a goodwill mission. Then, with the help of this Commonwealth mission, we should begin to work towards a constitutional conference. In the end men must come to the conference table. The new Commonwealth which has evolved out of the empire has not ended our responsi- bilities. On the contrary, in the fields of aid and trade they are at a new beginning. The problem of problems for all of us in the free world in the years ahead is the disparity of wealth between the rich nations and the poor, between north and south as much as between east and west, between black and white, between the educated and the illiterate. And in helping to meet this challenge Britain's preponderant effort is naturally devoted to the developing nations of the Commonwealth. In recent years no comparable sector of our public expenditure has increased so fast. Taking both public and private expenditures into account, Britain's contribution to the developing world is now greater than that of the entire Communist bloc. Just as vital as money is the sharing of knowledge and experience. Here again, Britain's place at the centre of a developing Commonwealth has meant our maintaining a higher proportion of experts overseas and wel- coming a higher proportion of overseas students than any other country. Something like 20,000 British men and women are today serving in the developing countries as teachers, doctors, nurses, engineers, agriculturists and technicians of every kind. At home one student in every ten at our various colleges comes from overseas.

Of course, we shall receive and deserve little credit for building up the economies of the de- veloping world unless at the same time we are willing to buy what they produce at fair and stable prices. For this purpose lower tariffs, com- modity marketing agreements and adequate international liquidity are needed. None of these policies can be achieved in isolation. All demand the practice of interdependence. But in each, Britain's Commonwealth connection has enabled her to point the way. We provide developing countries with the most liberal access to our markets. We played a crucial role last year in preventing the breakdown of the United Nations Trade and Developinent Conference. We have put forward a plethora of proposals for strengthening the credit base of international trade. These problems demand sustained and urgent attention from western statesmen. They are of paramount importance. For the present struggle in the world is not primarily a military one.

The greatest test will not be on the battlefield, but in the market place. It is here that our

western institutions cry out to be remodelled. It is here that our unity needs fortifying most. It is here that our interdependence must become a living reality. Without such interdependence

neither peace nor prosperity can ever be secure. And because Britain, by the facts of history, i4 simultaneonsly an Atlantic, a European and a Commonwealth power, she has a unique respon- sibility and opportunity to urge forward thii cause.

This article is based on an address delivered this week at Amherst College, Massachusetts.