THE IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE versus LORD LYNDHURST.

LORD COTTENHAM has postponed the introduction of his bill for reforming the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords. Can it be that the notice which the press has recently bestowed on the doings of Lord LYNDHURST as ex-Chief Baron of the Exchequer, has pointed out a deficiency in the Chancellor's first draft of a bill? We all knew before, that one object of the intended reform was to relieve Chancellors from the penalty of having to sit as judges in appeals, from their own judgments : has it been found neces- sary to extend similar relief to other Law Lords ? The Courier, as will be seen by an extract below,* assures us that no other • "lord LYNDHURST is not the first Law Lord accused of volunteering to sit in judgment on appeals from his own decisions. In the Law Magazine for January 1830, we II tat it stated.'that " in the course of twenty years during which Lord II AXDWICKF. presided in the Court of Chancery, three only of his judgments were appealed from." And the fact is thus accounted for by the same authority—• It is too well known, that, with little regard to justice or fair dealing, he used all the arts of intrigue to prejudice those who might divide, and consequently lessen his authority. Thus it was his fa- vourite design, fur obvious reasons, to remain the only Law Lord, so that an appeal from the Court of Chancery to the Peers might be simply an appeal from Lord I IA R DIVICKE in Lincoln's Inn Hall to Lord II RDWICKS in the House of Lords. To effect that ob- ject, no exertion was spared to exclude fmrn the Peerage, either altogether or as long as might he possible, such own as PARKER, LAE, HYDFIlt, and WI t.t.Es.' The wonder, then, is, not that there were so few appeals from Lord IIARDWICHE to Lord Ils o wicxe, but that there were any at all. If the appellant in the cause to which we alluded last week, could have foreseen that Lord LYNDHURST W0111(1 Sit in judgment on his Lordship's own decision, there would probably have been no appeal. " in Lord Flaanwtcwe's time, a judge could commit tar worse misdeeds, almost with impunity. The able writer already quoted. speaking of Lord II•RDW MEE'S patron and friimd, Lord Chancellor MACCLESFIELD, says, it was " fortunate for him that he lived in an age when very many Men,b Ts of either House had excellent rea- sons for regarding cortyptitm as by no means an unpardonable sin ; to that the clamour against him was uot so loud as his frauds and his extortions were well worthy to raise. The tine of 30,000i., which was the rutishment awarded him Law Lord than the Chancellor stands in need of such relief; that when any other Law Lord than the Chancellor attends to hear an

appeal against his own decision, he does so by choice; that the

right exists for all, but is never asserted in practice by any except Lord LYNDHURST : and then our contemporary asks, whether

Parliament is to legislate "against the unique indecency of Lord

LYNDHURST ? " The question must be asked in Parliament. If, Lord DURHAM being absent, there be not in the House of Lords

a man of sufficient spirit to face the cock of that walk upon his own dunghill, the People's House contains many who will do their duty to the People in this case. And a curious case it is, as will be seen by what follows.

It is not through having been raised to the Peerage that Lord LYNDHURST has gained the opportunity to bear an appeal from himself in the Court of Exchequer. He had been Chancellor before he became Chief Baron. Succeeded as Chancellor by Lord BROUGHAM, and having, as the Chronicle says, " nothing to lose,"—wanting, in short, the difference between an ex-Chancel- lor's pension and the pay of a Chief Baron, viz. 4000/. a year,—he was charitably regarded by Lord GREY, who allowed him to descend from the woolsack on to an inferior judgment-seat. No other Chancellor ever so stooped. By thus stooping, Lord LYND- HURST picked up the cause of SMALL V. ATTWOOD. Already a Judicial Peer—a judge in the great court of Appeal—lie went down to a lower tribunal, and thus provided for himself the op- portunity of sitting to confirm such of his own judgments in that inferior court, as should be appealed against to the House of Lords. In the case before us, he avails himself of that oppor- tunity. The case is unique throughout. Let us clearly distinguish, however, between this session and the last. Last year there was no Chancellor : the Lords BROUGHAM and LYNDHURST sat in the House of Lords quasi Chancellor ; and thus appeals from the inferior court to which Lord LYNDHURST had descended came naturally, as one may say, before him. No doubt, he might have persuaded some other Law Lord, such as Lord PLUNKET, to take his place by the side of Lord BROUGHAM, and so to relieve him from the distressing task of either reversing or confirming his own " crack judgment." Such a step, more especially if we recollect by what unparalleled means the Exchequer cause of SMALL V. ATTWOOD had laid hold of an ex-Chancellor, would have been delicate and decorous; but there is the excuse for not taking it, that some " passive resist- ance" must have been made for the purpose. Situated as Lord LYNDHURST then was — quasi Chancellor along with Lord BROUGHAM—he had either to hear the appeal, or to decline bearing it. All we can say of the past then is, that lie did not

decline hearing an appeal against himself. .

But how stands the case now ? In consequence of Lord BROUGHAM'S absence (and thereby hangs another judicial tale, which will keep) —because it would be too bad that Lord LYND- FIURST, by himself, should finish the hearing of last year's appeal and give judgment therein, there is to be a fresh hearing of the entire case. What is Lord Lstisttuasr's excuse this year, for intending to bear and vote upon an appeal against his own "crack judgment ?" He is no longer quasi Chancellor ; this year, we have, besides a Chancellor, two new Peers who are Equity Judges; this year, Lord LYNDHURST could not decline a distressing or shameful task, because, this year, no law, or form, or custom, or accident, calls on him to perform it; this year, lie seeks, he volun- teers to bear—he insists upon suffering—the "penalty of the Judicial Peerage."

This case is peculiar in another respect. As to most causes, publicity is supposed to be a sufficient check upon the Court. All jurists speak of the press as a chief instrument to- wards the impartial administration of justice. But in this case, there has been scarce any publicity. According to a custom in

the Spectator, we had no sooner determined to make this subject

a "Topic of the Day," than we endeavoured to learn the main facts of' the whole case, including the question at issue in the cause. Upon the latter point we can gain no information. In answer to our questions, men not lawyers, but generally well-informed, declare that they know next to nothing; whilst lawyers only shrug their shoulders, and wink slyly at each other. The "great

cause" of SMALL V. Arrwoon, is a secret cause ; and why ?- because it is no great. If the newspapers had reported a tenth

part of the proceedings, the public would not have read a tenth part of what was reported. It is " the great cause—something

by his fellow Peers, was but a small portion of the sum he had amassed by his peculation; and to the disgrace of the time, his con* iction neither debarred him from the countenance of the great, nor even, if report speak true, from the favour of the court.' But at this time. happily for us, the • great and the court • themselves, as well as all judges, are in no small degree responsible to public opinion. A Lord Chancellor who should uuw take pains to secure for himself the sole hearing of appeals from his own judgments, would be removed by the press, which is at length become at pretty efficient instrument for the punishment, and therefore fur the preven- tion of villauy in high places. Nay, so improved is the spirit of our day, that the right of the Lord Chancellor on the Woolsack to hear appeals from the same Lord Chancel- lot in Westminster Hall. is considered, not a privilege, but as the Spectator has well described it, a cruel ' penalty ; and what our contemporary terms this • penalty of the Judicial Peerage,' is on the point of being abolished by act of Parliament. "The Spectator asks whether if Lord CorrEstrast relieve himself, as Chancellor, from this penalty, be will leave it to weigh on the Lords LYNDHURST, ABINGER, and LANGDALE ? We answer, that the Chancellor on the Woolsack is the only Peer subject to the penalty—that if any other Peer attend to hear an appeal from his own judgment, he does so by choice. Every Peer has a right to hear and vote upon all appeals : for the Chancellor alone, it is an obligation. For all but the Chancellor, it is a question of decency. Lay Lords abstain from exercising their right to determine questions of law : Law Lords (excepting the Chancellor, who cauuot help himself, and Lord LYND- HURST, who can) stay away when the appeal is from a judgment of their owu. Are we to legislate against the unique indecency of Lord ',wman? Is the act for relieving Chancellors from a penalty. to contain a clause for depriving Lord LYNDHURST, ec• softies, of a right which no other man would like to melds.? If so, the preamble will kw eurious."—Cowrisr, 90th April. about pig-iron—hetween a very rich company and one of the Arrwoons—in which Lord LvxDITURST gave a fsmous judgment, but whether for plaintiff or defendant, nobody can tell :" and this is all that most people know of a case as to which it is supposed that justice has been secured by publieity. The short-hand writers notes in this cause have been a closed hook—too heavy to be opened; and the future proceedings cannot be less bulky. It follows that the judge or judges who may have to give a final decision in this cause, will decide without publicity—in secret as it were, unobserved by the public, and therefore free, it' any interest of theirs should lead that way, to dee'de nnjustly. Lord LviviHootor, watched by the public—any Man, however closely observed—is the Ye: y last person who ought to hear an ap;:ea! against his own judgment : shall Lord Ivxmime,'T—shell any man—be allowed to do so behind su&i a screen as that with which lawyers have surrounded this extraordinary cause ? Why does not the appellant petition Parliement for a fair tribunal? Though Lord I) T IMAM iS ;May, LOA WEsTmIxsun, Lord FrTz- 'WILLIAM, and Lord RanNon are in their places. In one House or the other, this matter must be fully discussed. It is not a private (ie:Aim) ; it has no sort of relation to " the merits" the cause, about which the public neither know our care: it is e grievance, which, for the sake r.f" the impartial Alpinist in of justice," calls for instant redress. This appeal, we repeat, is about to be heard in secret. A cor- respondent, on whom we can rely, struck by our observations lest week, has furnished us with something like a measure of those volUminous proceedings which operate as a screen between the judge and the public. We give belew a few of their dimensions. The proper title for them would la" " STATISTICS OF PROCEDURE IN THE GREAT CAUSE OF SMALL v. ATWOOD." They do nut touch, be it observed, on the merits of the cause, with which we have no concern. If the figures are not perfectly accurate, they will not be found, in any case, to be far wide of the truth. Still, however near the truth, tley will not obtain much credence at first: to induce a belief in such enormities, frequent reiteration will be necessary.

Thetis considered " a heavy cause," to use a lawyer's term, of which the original brief delivered to counsel occupies 100 sheets. In this cause, the original Exchequer brief for counsel, voila ined- how many sheets ?-200 ? 400? 800? no, but 4,000 ! The first brief was in proportion to the original bill or complaint of the plaintiff's; which, without interrogatories, occupied about 1,000 sheets, or ten times as many as the brief sheets of " a heavy cause." The interrogatories may have occupied about 1000 sheets more. The plaintiffs exhibited upwards of 500 interrogatories, and examined more than 70 witnesses: jhe defendant exhibited upwards of 400 interrogatories, and also examined more than 70 witnesses: making together upwards of 900 interrogatories, and 141 witnesses:

The examination of witnesses in the country, not to mention those who were examined in London, occupied above 100 days, or more than a quarter of a year.

There are upwards of 250 letters proved in the cause, and more than 1,100 account-books, accounts, and other exhibits or docu- ments.

Two accountants, employed by the plaintiff's, earned together 3,6001.; and one accountant, employed by the defendant, about 3,0001.

The original hearing of the cause in the Exchequer occupied 21 days.

The short-hand-writers' notes filled 1,700 brief-sheets, and cost about 2,0001.

The plaintiffs' bill of costs in the original cause, as delivered to the defendant, exceeded 19,000/., but was reduced on taxation to something less than 10,000/.

The printed cases and appendices for the appeal in the House of Lords, occupy 6 folio volumes; the case and appendix of the appellant occupying 990 folio pages, and containing as many words as about 13 common-sized octavo volumes; while the case and appendix of the respondents would fill about 25 common- sized octavo volumes; making together about 38 such volumes as we find in an old octavo edition of HUME'S History of England.

The part hearing of the appeal last session occupied, 17 day's. The fees to counsel on both sides, on the partly-heard appeal of last session, amounted to about 11,000/.

The total amount of costs on both sides, up to the present time, is nearly 50,0001.; of which the appellant has actually paid about 40,0001.