Haig had blundered
Sir: 'None of [Haig's] subordinate comman- ders questioned either his objective or his methods, which is perhaps to be expected', writes Michael Howard in his review of Passchendaele: The Untold Story (Books, 1 June).
Not so, in at least one instance. Lieu- tenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, com- mander of the Canadian Corps, questioned Haig's objective in the strongest possible terms, both privately and publicly. 'Pass- chendaele, what's the good of it?', Currie raged to his staff, when he first learned, early in October 1917, that Canadian troops might be sent there. 'Let the Ger- mans have it, keep it, rot in it . . . it's not worth a drop of blood.' A few days later, when Haig took the unprecedented step of visiting Canadian headquarters to deliver his orders in person, Currie did his best to dissuade him. 'I carried my protest to the extreme limit . . . which I believe would have resulted in my being sent home had I been other than Canadian Corps Comman- der,' he wrote in his memoirs.
Ultimately, on 6 November 1917, the First and Second Canadian Divisions took Passchendaele Ridge. Their casualties 15,634 — were uncannily close to Currie's pre-battle forecast of 16,000. If in fact none of Haig's other commanders questioned either his objective, which was militarily pointless, or his methods, which were self- destructive and banal, they ought to have done.
Sandra Gwyn
300 Carlton Street, Toronto, Canada
Previous page
